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The activity of the court, as indicated by the number of cases disposed
of by opinion, remains relatively constant. In 1935 the -number was 331;
in 1936 it was 369; in 1937 it was 277; in 1938 it was 303; and in 1939 it
was 290.
Table I indicates the disposition of this litigation by the court.
TABLE I
114
Judgment affirmed .....................................
4
Affirmed on condition (enter remittitur) ..................
1
Decree affirmed .......................................
5
Awarding of new trial by trial court affirmed ............
1
Awarding of new trial by trial court affirmed and remanded
56
Reversed and remanded ................................
28
Judgment reversed ....................................
1
Affirmed in part and reversed in part ....................
2
Affirmed in part and reversed and remanded in part ........
7
Awarding of new trial by trial court reversed ............
A-warding of new trial by trial court reversed as to one
1
defendant, affirmed as to other ......................
1
Reversed with directions to resentence petitioner ..........
1
Judgment of submission set aside and case remanded ........
10
Writ quashed .........................................
2
Writ denied ...........................................
1
Writ dismissed .......................................
2
Peremptory writ issued ...............................
1
Provisional rule discharged and permanent writ denied ....
*Chairman, Board of Student Editors.
(377)
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1940

1

Missouri Law Review, Vol. 5, Iss. 4 [1940], Art. 1
378

MISSOURI LAW REVIEW
Provisional rule absolute ..............................
Provisional rule discharged ............................
Preliminary rule absolute ..............................
Preliminary rule discharged in part, made absolute in part ..
Case transferred to court of appeals ....................
Record quashed ........................................
Appeal dismissed ......................................
Petitioner discharged ..................................
Petitioner remanded to custody ..........................
Opinion quashed ......................................
Record and opinion quashed ............................
Record and opinion quashed in part .....................
Judgment of court of appeals quashed ..................
Opinion and order quashed in part ......................
Motion to dismiss overruled ............................
Ouster denied and proceeding dismissed ..................
Respondent ousted from office ..........................
Respondent discharged ................................

[Vol. 5
4
2
4
1
18
1
3
1
1
2
3
3
1
3
1
1
1
1

Table II shows the relative appellate activity in the several fields of
the law. A word of warning must be given, however. Each case was, in
some instances almost arbitrarily, allocated to the single subject with which
it seemed primarily to be concerned. It is seldom, of course, that a case
is disposed of on a single point, and if all the cases which touched upon each
field were listed under these headings, it is possible a somewhat different
relationship might be shown. Certainly few cases are presented to the
court in which questions of practice and jurisdiction are not involved. It
should be noticed, too, that the table is concerned only with the activity
of the supreme court. No attempt is made to show the relative activity
in the several fields of law in the trial courts.

TABLE II
TOPICAL ANALYSIS OF DECISIONS
Agency ................................................
Appeal and Error ......................................
Attorney and Client ....................................
Banks and Banking .....................................
Bills and Notes ........................................
Certiorari Proceedings ..................................
Conflicts ...............................................
Constitutional Law .....................................
Contempt ..............................................
Contracts ..............................................
Corporations ...........................................
Creditors Rights ........................................
Criminal Law ..........................................
D am ages ...............................................
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol5/iss4/1
Domestic Relations ......................................

1
22
5
6
1
6
1
8
1
7
2
1
49
2
4
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Election Contest ........................................
Eminent Domain .......................................
Equity ................................................
Evidence ..............................................

379
1
6
8
2

Habeas Corpus ........................
................
2
Insurance ...............................................
12
Mandamus .............................................
2
Master and Servant ....................................
10
Negligence (automobiles) ................................
13
Other Negligence .......................................
14
Ouster ................................................. 1
Partnership ............................................
1
Pleading ...............................................
8
Practice and Procedure ................................
15
Prohibition ............................................
2
Quo W arranto .........................................
2
Real Property ........................................
13
Receivership ...........................................
2
Statutory Construction ..................................
11
Taxation ...............................................
8
Torts (other than negligence) ............................
5
Trusts .................................................
6
Wills and Administration ................................
11
Workmen's Compensation ................................
10
It is interesting to observe that no case was reversed upon rehearing.
In only four cases were dissents recorded, although in six additional cases
a concurrence only in the result was indicated by some judges.
There were seven per curiam opinions; 121 opinions were written by
judges; 162 opinions were written by the commissioners. There were two
changes in court personnel. Judge Albert Clark succeeded Judge Ray
Lucas at the beginning of the year, and Commissioner S. P. Dalton was
appointed to the place left vacant by the death of Commissioner Charles
Ferguson in April.

APPELLATE PRACTICE
CnAass V. GARNETT*

The decisions of the court in the past year, insofar as they deal with
questions of appellate practice, have shown no tendency on the part of
the court to a technical application of its rules which would result in the

City. of
LL.B.,
Kansas Repository,
City School
Published by*Attorney,
University of Kansas
Missouri School
Law Scholarship
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impairment of substantial rights of litigants. In general, the principles
which have governed prior decisions of the court have not been disturbed.
The tendency has been, as in former years, toward liberalization and common sense application of the fundamental rules governing the jurisdiction
of the court and its procedure.
I.

JURISDICTION OF THE SUPREME COURT

In Robinson v. Nick,' the court again emphasized the constitutional
source of its jurisdiction, refusing to look upon Section 1018, Missouri
Revised Statutes 1929, which provides that the supreme court shall summarily hear and determine all appeals from interlocutory orders appointing
receivers, as in any sense broadening its jurisdiction. In that case the
court transferred an appeal from an order refusing to revoke the appointment of a temporary receiver to the proper court of appeals, pointing out
that:
"Our appellate jurisdiction is fixed by the Constitution.
Therefore, the Legislature is powerless to add to or subtract from
that jurisdiction unless authorized by the Constitution itself.
The only field of change allowed-to the Legislature by the Constitution is the pecuniary amount in dispute . . . Therefore, if
Section 1018 attempts to confine exclusive jurisdiction in this
court of an appeal from an order refusing to revoke the appointment of a receiver, it is . . . contrary to and in conflict with
Section 12, Article VI of the Constitution."
In McCoy v. Simpson,2 the court held that an appeal from an order of
the circuit court affirming the award of the Workmen's Compensation
Commission which merely read "Award of Commissioners Affirmed,"
conferred no appellate jurisdiction because the appeal was not from any
final judgment. In other words, the failure of the circuit court to enter
up a judgment for the parties on the affirmance of the award, deprived the
appellate court of jurisdiction. The case was remanded to the circuit court
with directions to set aside the order appealed from and to enter a judgment
in accordance with the decision of the court. The effect of the decision, however, was not to deny finally the right of appeal because, when the circuit
court does enter a final judgment, then an appeal may be taken from that
judgment.
As in former years, the court has consistently refused to entertain ju-

1.

134 S. W. (2d) 112, 115 (Mo. 1939).

https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol5/iss4/1
2. 344 Mo. 215, 125 S. W. (2d) 833 (1939).
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risdiction of causes where it is claimed that a constitutional question is
involved, except in those cases where a real and substantial constitutional
question has in fact been raised and actually requires decision. In other
words, the court does not regard the provision of the constitution that the
jurisdiction of appeals involving constitutional questions shall be in the
supreme court, as intending to confer jurisdiction upon the supreme court
by the mere suggestion that a constitutional question is involved.
In Silberstein v. if-A Circus OperatingCorp.,3 the claim of defendants
that the petition did not state facts sufficient to invoke equitable relief and
that the appointment of a receiver violated their constitutional right of
trial by jury, was held to be merely one of claim of error in the trial court
in passing upon the sufficiency of the petition and, if error, merely a
misconstruction of the pleadings, and that the consequent denial of right
of trial by jury did not lodge appellate jurisdiction in the supreme court.
Again, in State v. Sanderson,' the real question in the case was the construction of the bus and truck law, appellants contending that the trial
court erred in so construing the law as to give it a retrospective effect, and
claiming that the enactment of retrospective laws are prohibited by the
constitution. The court held that a constitutional question was not directly involved and retransferred the case to the proper court of appeals. So
also, in Laret Investment Co. v. Dickmann,5 the court held that where the
question of constitutionality of a statute could have been but was not
raised in the petition, such question could not be raised for the first time on
appeal and that amicus curiae, even though they had had no previous
opportunity to urge that question, must take the case as they found it on
the record and that the appeal should have been taken to the proper court
of appeals.
Notwithstanding the general rule that if any part of the case below
involves questions on appeal conferring jurisdiction in the supreme court,
the court in Hyer v. Baker,6 refused to entertain jurisdiction of an appeal
from an order granting an interpleader even though the questions involved
in the main suit involved the title to real estate. The court held that the
interpleader proceeding was a proceeding "distinct and separable from
the original action" and that the issues on such an appeal, not being issues
over which the supreme court has jurisdiction, should be decided by the
3. 124 S. W. (2d) 1207 (Mo. 1939).
4. 124 S. W. (2d) 1071 (Mo. 1939).
5. 134 S. W. (2d) 65 (Mo. 1939).
130 S.of Missouri
W. (2d)School
516 of(Mo.
1939). Repository, 1940
Published by 6.
University
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proper court of appeals and that it did not constitute a splitting up of issues
for the court of appeals to consider the questions of interpleader.
The year's decisions again reflect the failure of some litigants to understand the difference between cases actually involving the title to real
estate and cases only involving possession or control of real estate. For
example, in Rust v. Geneva Investment Co., 7 the court refused to entertain
jurisdiction because the issues only related to the appointment of a temporary receiver for property which was the subject of a foreclosure and
did not directly involve title (as distinguished from possession) to real
estate; and in In re Ellis,8 an action involving an application for directions
for the construction of a will, the court, in transferring the appeal to the
proper court of appeals, pointed out that the validity of the will was not
in dispute and that the effect of the controversy was not to involve title
but that the matter about which there was a contest only collaterally or
incidentally related to the title to real estate. So, also, in Peters v. Kirkwood Federal Savings & Loan Ass'n,9 where the action was one to set aside
a foreclosure sale under a deed of trust on the ground that the note secured thereby had been fully paid, the court pointed out that there was no
claim that the deed of trust was void ab initio, but only that it should not
be enforced because of the fact that it had been paid. After analyzing prior
decisions quite fully, the court reached the conclusion that title is only indirectly involved and transferred the case to the proper court of appeals.
So, also, in Peoples Finance Corp. v. Lincoln,0 the court held that it
had no jurisdiction of an unlawful detainer action since title to real estate
could not be directly involved. It was there stated: "By the very terms
of the statutes defining unlawful detainer, a proceeding of such nature can
only be a possessory action. In addition, there is an express statutory prohibition against inquiring into the merits of title to the real property involved in such an action."
Again, in Gentemann v. Dyer,1 the court again pointed out that an
action in ejectment was one where the judgment does not determine title
"in the modern sense," but is an action for possession and damages only
and does not involve title to real estate within the meaning of the constitutional provisions with reference to the jurisdiction of the supreme court.

7. 124 S. W. (2d) 1135 (Mo. 1939).
8. 127 S. W. (2d) 441 (Mo. 1939).
9. 344 Mo. 1067, 130 S. W. (2d) 507 (1939).
10. 131 S. W. (2d) 520, 521 (Mo. 1939).
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol5/iss4/1
11. 132 S. W. (2d) 1022 (Mo. 1939).
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And in State. ex rel. Pemberton v. Shain' 2 where the action was one based
upon a contract to make joint wills affecting the title to real estate, the
court again points out that where the judgment sought or rendered would
take title from one litigant and give it to another, title would be involved
within the meaning of the constitution and that jurisdiction of such cases
rests in the supreme court. Accordingly, the court, on certiorari (again
affirming the rule that in a certiorariof that nature the entire record is before the court for examination), the court quashed an opinion of the court
of appeals and retained jurisdiction of the case on its merits and ordered it
set down for argument and decision. So, also, in Diebold v. Diebold,1" the
court refused to entertain jurisdiction of an appeal in a suit involving con-struction of a will where there was no dispute as to the title to the real estate,
but the dispute was only as to the manner of its disposition. The court again
points out that in order to invest the supreme court with jurisdiction on
the ground that title to real estate is involved "the title must be in dispute,
that is, there must be a title controversy to be settled."
While the court refused to entertain jurisdiction of the appeal in
.ardwell v. Howard,,4 where the judgment appealed from was against a
consolidated school district, holding that the school district was not a political subdivision of the state within the meaning of Section 12, Article VI
of the constitution and that the appealing directors of the school district
were not state officers in the constitutional sense, pointing out that the
term "state officer" as used in the constitution "has reference to officers
whose official duties and functions are co-extensive with the state," the
principle there applied must not be confused with the principle involved
in the case of State ex rel. Goodman v. Heath."5 The latter case was a proceeding in quo warrantoto oust a school director on the ground that he was
not qualified to hold the office. The court entertained jurisdiction because
the office of school director is an office "under this state." These two
cases involve two separate clauses of the constitution. The Cardwell case
is controlled by the clause conferring jurisdiction on the supreme court "in
cases where a county or other political subdivision of the state or any state.
officer is a party." As already stated, the term "state officer" means only
those officers whose official duties and functions are co-extensive with the
state. On the other hand, the Goodman case is controlled by the clause

12.
13.

344 Mo. 15, 124 S. W. (2d) 1087 (1939).
133 S. W. (2d) 401 (Mo. 1939).

14.
15.

132 S. W. (2d) 960 (Mo. 1939).
132 S. W. (2d) 1001 (Mo. 1939).
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conferring jurisdiction in cases involving "the title to any office minder this
state". The court, citing former authorities, views the phrase "office under
this state" as relating to offices created by the statutes of this state. The
distinction between these two clauses of the constitution, while a narrow one,
is nevertheless a well marked distinction which should be kept in mind
in order to determine the proper appellate forum.
As in former years, appeals in compensation cases still seem to find
their way to the wrong court. In two cases, Hanley v. Carlo Motor Service
Co.,1 6 and State ex rel. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp. v. Workmen's
Compensation Commission, 7 the appeals were transferred to the proper
appellate courts because the jurisdictional amount did not affirmatively appear from the record. Both were compensation cases where there was an
award of $20.00 per week for 300 weeks and thereafter a further amount
for the life of the claimant. In both cases the Compensation Commission
commuted the award, finding an amount due in excess of $7500.00. Appellants did not complain of the award, but denied the validity of the
commutation order, and the court held that the necessary jurisdictional
amount was not actually involved.
In Sayles v. Kansas City Structural Steel Co.,' the court again considered the difference between a compensation award to an injured employee, payable in weekly installments and an award payble to the surviving
dependent of a deceased employee, also payable in installments, as it affects
the jurisdiction of the supreme court. After again reviewing the authorities, the court declined to overrule the case of Shroyer v. Missouri Livestock
Commission Co., 9 pointing out that "the Shroyer case points out the distinction, as affecting our appellate jurisdiction, between an award to dependents on account of death and an award for disability to the injured employee."
Thus the rule is now well settled that an award for disability, payable
in weekly installments, the total amount of which would exceed $7500.00,
will not be sufficient to place appellate jurisdiction in the supreme court
because of the fact that it does not certainly appear either that the disability will continue or the employee shall live, so that the amount certainly to
be paid would exceed $7500.00; while in death cases the statute contemplates
a single death benefit, and the fact that it is to be paid in weekly install16. 344 Mo. 267, 126 S. W. (2d) 229 (1939).
17. 126 S. W. (2d) 230 (Mo. 1939).
18. 344 Mo. 756, 128 S. W. (2d) 1046 (1939).
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol5/iss4/1
19. 231 Mo. 1219, 61 S. W. (2d) 713 (1933).

8

et al.: Work of the Missouri Supreme Court

1940]

WORK OF MISSOURI SUPREME COURT-1939

ments which would cease upon the death or remarriage of the widow does
not operate to deprive the supreme court of jurisdiction. As was said in
the Shroyer case, "the possibility that this amount might thereafter be
reduced by the death or remarriage of the dependent would obviously not
change the amount that was actually in dispute at the time the judgment
was rendered and the appeal allowed in this court."
In other respects, the constitutional provision that the jurisdiction shall
be in the supreme court in those cases where the amount involved is more
than $7500.00, has not been made the subject for judicial review.
II. FoRms OF BRIFS

AND ABSTRACTS

In only a few opinions during the past year has the court found it
necessary to complain of the forms of abstracts and briefs in cases presented to it. And in those few cases where such complaints have been made,
the tendency of the court has been to waive the requirements of its rules
whenever the interests of justice require it.
Thus, in Rishel v. Kansas City Public Service Co., 20 the appellant's
abstract was defective in that it brought up only the instructions complained
of, did not include other instructions in the case which were given, and
omitted much of the evidence. Respondents filed a motion to dismiss
the appeal. Thereupon, the appellants, within six days of the time the
cause was set for argument, and without the consent of court or opposing
,counsel, filed a supplemental abstract. The court points that the record
<liscloses no valid reason for the exercise of the discretion of the court to
permit the filing of an additional abstract and that the supplemental abstract clearly presents new issues for consideration, holding that:
"To permit it to be filed and considered would tend to defeat
the very purpose of the rules adopted by the court to secure the
orderly consideration of the record in cases presented on appeal."
But, although the court ruled that the first abstract of the record was insufficient to enable the court to pass upon the action of the trial court in
refusing appellants' instructions, the instructions were, nevertheless, reviewed in the light of the showing made by the supplemental abstract, the
court reaching the conclusion that if the supplemental abstract is considered,
the instruction still could not be regarded as erroneous. While the motion
to dismiss might well have been sustained, the court overruled the motion

20.

129 S. W. (2d) 851, 854 (Mo. 1939).

Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1940
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and affirmed the judgment below because there bad been no affirmative
showing of error in the record.
Again, in Brown v. Citizens State Bank,2 although the court was of the
opinion that the statement of facts contained in appellant's brief was
inadequate and failed to set forth essential facts necessary for a consideration of the issues on appeal, the penalty of the rule was not applied, but the
court carefully reviewed the record and decided the appeal upon the
merits. In that case, one of the principal issues on the appeal was whether
or not a demurrer to the petition should have been sustained. Logically, a
consideration of that issue required a detailed examination of the actual
allegations of the petition rather than a statement about them.
In one case, Produce Exchange Bank v. Winn,22 an appeal was dismissed for failure of the appellant to comply with the rule requiring a proper statement of facts. The appeal was from a decree in equity which the
court was, of course, required to review de novo, but the appellant's statement presented only the appellant's evidence and version of the questioned
transaction and totally ignored the respondent's evidence and version of
the same transaction. The court, in dismissing the appeal, quoted from
prior authorities to the effect that the"statement is primarily "in aid of an
immediate, accurate, complete and unbiased understanding of the facts of
the case, without which there can be no proper administration of justice.
A statement that does not fairly present the facts, not only fails to accomplish this purpose; it is in fact pernicious to the extent that it conveys
in the first instance a false, distorted, or imperfect impression as to the
facts of the case."
But even in dismissing that appeal, it is obvious that the court did review the record, because the opinion points out much evidence not referred
to in appellant's statement to which the chancellor below might have
given consideration, calls attention to the well-known rule that the findings
of fact of the chancellor will ordinarily not be disturbed on appeal, and
concludes that there is nothing upon which the court could determine that
the conclusions of the chancellor were against the weight of the evidence.

21.

134 S. W. (2d) 116 (Mo. 1939).

22. 133 S. W. (2d) 419, 423 (Mo. 1939).
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol5/iss4/1
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III. EFFECT OF DECISIONS.
In Creason v. Harding," the court reviewed and again declared the
difference between a prior opinion in the same case which, on the second
trial or appeal must be regarded as the law of the case, and a prior opinion
which must be regarded as res adjudicata. It is only in those cases where
the first remand confines the re-trial to certain issues only that all other
issues are determined on the first appeal. In all other cases, that is, where
the remand is general, if the facts on the second trial present a different
case, the trial court will be bound by the prior decision only insofar as the
principles of law declared in the prior decision are applicable to the new
state of facts.
In Sheehan v. Terminal R. R. Ass'n, 24 the court had held on a former appeal that the action was governed by the Federal Employers' Liability Act.
The case was re-tried without amendment of the pleadings and the proof
on the second trial was substantially the same. The court points out that
its prior opinion constitutes the law of the case and was binding on the
court at the second trial, citing the Creason case. But in State v. White,25
the court refused to follow an earlier opinion of the court as binding law,
pointing out that the former opinion, while receiving the concurring votes
of a majority of the judges as to result, did not receive a carrying vote insofar as the point involved was concerned and could not be considered as
authoritative.
In Martin v. Southwestern Bell Telephone. Co.,26 the court held that
where a rehearing had been granted, the appellant was not limited, on the
rehearing, to the points briefed at the first hearing, but that appellant has
a right to present points not briefed on the first petition. The court
points out that when a rehearing has been granted, the case stands on the
docket as though it had not been heard at all, and that the parties may brief
any point preserved for review even though not mentioned on the first
p ition.

23. 344 Mo.452, 126 S. W. (2d) 1179 (1939).
24. 344 Mo. 586, 127 S. W. (2d) 657 (1939).
25. 126 S. W. (2d) 234 (Mo. 1939).
26. 344 Mo. 83, 125 S. W. (2d) 19 (1939).
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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
WILLIAm R. COLLiNsoN
Our supreme court mentions some principle of constitutional law in
twenty-four of the cases which it decided in 1939. In many of these cases
the constitutional point was not discussed, but some well-established constitutional principle was simply stated by the court in the course of the
opinion. In this article the cases of this nature will simply be classified
and only those cases will be discussed in which the constitutional point was
the determining factor in the decision of the case.
I.

CONSTRUCTION, OPERATION, AND ENFORCEMENT

In the case of National Cemetery Assn. v. Benson,1 the court held that
Article X, Section 6, of the state constitution is self-enforcing. This provision of our constitution exempts the property of cemeteries from taxation,
and, as pointed out by the court, the constitutional provisions declaring
that certain property should be exempt from taxation are generally selfenforcing and need no legislation to be effective. The court further held
in this case that such provision should be strictly construed and that the
burden is on the property owner to establish that his property comes within
the constitutional exemption. In this case the court ruled that land held
by a cemetery association but which had not been "set apart" for the burial
of the dead did not come within the exemption.
In Nodaway County v. Tilson,2 the court held that no constitutional
question was presented when the defendant's pleading did not challenge the
constitutionality of statutes pleaded in the petition, and when the assignments of error did not raise a constitutional question, and no section of the
constitution was cited in points and authorities in the appellant's brief.
In the case of State ex rel. School DistrictNo. 24 v. Neaf,3 the supreme
court en bane denied an application for mandamus to repeal the assessment
and taxation of certain mains, pipes, and hydrants of the St. Louis Water
Company which were not located within the relator school district. Prior to
the 1937 amendment of Section 9977, Missouri Revised Statutes, 1929, these

*Attorney, Springfield. A.B., Drury College, 1933; LL.B., University of
Missouri, 1935.
1. 344 Mo. 784, 129 S. W. (2d) 842 (1939).
2. 129 S. W. (2d) 915 (Mo. 1939).
3. 344 Mo. 905, 130 S. W. (2d) 509 (1939).
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol5/iss4/1
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mains, pipes, and hydrants had been assessed as appurtenances to the land
upon which the power plant was located. The amendment provided that
such mains and pipes should be treated as personal property for tax purposes and taxable where situated. After the amendment, the assessor assessed the mains and pipes in the school districts where located and this
action was brought to compel their assessment as appurtenances, it being
claimed that the amendment was unconstitutional as an arbitrary and unreasonable classification. The court denied the writ on the principle that
it would not pass on the constitutional question in mandamus unless there
was an extraordinary emergency or the legislative enactment attacked was
clearly unconstitutional. The court pointed out that the presumption was
that the statute was constitutional and that the many other municipalities
and school districts in St. Louis were directly interested and that no
emergency existed. For this reason the court concluded that the constitutional question could be fully determined upon a full trial of the cause.
The case of Laret Investment Co. v. Diokmann,4 appears to have been
a test case to determine whether or not the property of the Housing Authority of the city of St. Louis would be tax exempt under the constitutional
provision exempting the property of municipal corporations from taxation.5
The Housing Authority is a corporation duly organized, pursuant to the
Housing Act of 1939,6 which act declares that the Housing Authority is a
municipal corporation but which does not specifically exempt its property
from taxation. The court pointed out that this declaration that the Housing
Authority was a municipal corporation was not binding upon the supreme
court, but was entitled to great weight by the court. The court discassed
previous definitions of municipal corporations in this state, and held that
under principles previously laid down by the court, and under the overwhelming weight of authority in the country as a whole, the Housing Authority was a municipal corporation and its property exempt from taxation.

I.

DISTIBUTION OF GOVERNMENTAL POWERS AND FUNCTIONS

It is a primary principle of constitutional law that the courts must
take the statutes as they find them and cannot write laws, under the guise
of construction, which the legislature did not see fit to enact. Some constitutional writers have intimated that mbst courts recognize this rule more

4. 134 S. W. (2d) 65 (Mo. 1939).
5. Mo. CONST. art. X, § 6.
6. Mo. Laws 1939, pp. 488-502.
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1940
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by its breach than by its observance, but such a criticism cannot be directed
at our supreme court for the year 1939. The court repeated over and over
again that if laws needed changing, it was for the legislature to change
them, and that the wisdom of, and reasons for, the enactment of legislation
was not for the court to inquire into, if the legislation did not violate provisions of our constitution. These well-established principles can be found
in several cases,2 sometimes only mentioned in passing and in some cases
discussed at some length.
Excellent discussion of this question will be found in the case of Poole
& Creber Market Co. v. Breshears,8 in which the constitutionality of the
statutes prohibiting the sale of filled milk was involved.
In the case of Lime v. Blagg,9 the court held that the governor's constitutional power to issue and revoke sick paroles to state prisoners was beyond the range of judicial or legislation encroachment.

III. POLICE PowER
In the case of Poole & Creber Market Co. v. Breshears, the supreme
court upheld the constitutionality of Sections 12408, et seq., Missouri Revised Statutes, 1929, prohibiting the sale in this state of filled milk. The
court ruled that this prohibition was a valid exercise of the police power of
the state. These statutes were attacked as violating the due process clauses
of the Federal and State Constitutions and as being special laws in violation of Article IV, Section 53, Sub-Section 32 of the state constitution,
The court held that no laws touch public welfare more closely than those
relating to food, and pointed out the importance of milk as a food. The court
had a great deal of precedent for this decision, including the late case of
United States v. Carolene Products Co.,2° and numerous cases from other
states cited in the opinion.

7. Poole & Creber Market Co. v. Breshears, 343 Mo. 1133, 125 S. W. (2d)
23 (1939) ; State ex rel. Wilkerson v. Skinker, 344 Mo. 359, 126 S. W. (2d) 1156
(1939); State ez rel. Mills v. Allen, 344 Mo. 743, 128 S. W. (2d) 1040 (1939);
Sayles v. Kansas City Structural Steel Co., 344 Mo. 756, 128 S. W. (2d) 1046

(1939); Lime v. Blagg, 131 S. W. (2d) 583 (Mo. 1939); Hull v. Baumann, 131

S. W. (2d) 721 (Mo. 1939); Emery v. Holt County, 132 S. W. (2d) 970 (Mo.
1939); Artophone Corporation v. Coale, 133 S. W. (2d) 343 (Mo. 1939); State

v. Wipke, 133 S. W. (2d) 354 (Mo. 1939); Conn v. Chestnut Street Realty Co.,
133 S. W. (2d) 1056 (Mo. App. 1939); Laret Investment Co. v. Dickmann, 134
S.W. (2d) 65 (Mo. 1939).

8. 343 Mo. 1133, 125 S. W. (2d) 23 (1939).
9. 131 S.W. (2d) 583 (Mo. 1939).
10. 304 U. S.144 (1938).
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol5/iss4/1
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IV.

OBLIGATION OF CONTRACTS

In Robinson v. Nick," a contention was made that an interlocutory
order appointing a receiver violated Article II, Section 15, of the state
constitution. That is the Section prohibiting legislation impairing the
obligation of contracts, and the court pointed out the well-established rule
that such a constitutional prohibition had no application to an order of a
court.
V.

EqUAL. PROTECTION

As pointed out before, our supreme court held, in Poole & Creber
Market Co. v. Breshears, that our statutes prohibiting the sale of filled milk
did not violate the equal protection clause, because said statutes were a valid
exercise of the police power of the state.
In State v. Logan,'2 the appellant, a negro defendant in a criminal case,
claimed that he had not been afforded the equal protection of the laws because he "did not have a chance to have any negroes on the jury of twelve
men." The record showed that six of the forty-one talesmen from whom
the jury panel of thirty was selected were negroes, four of whom were disqualified for cause, and the other two peremptorily challenged by the state.
The court held that this conclusively showed that negroes were not discriminated against in drawing the jury panel, and that the constitutional
guaranty was not a guaranty to a negro defendant of a right to'have
negroes on the jury.
The case of Beverly Hills v. Schulter,23 upheld the validity of a city
ordinance imposing a license tax on gasoline dealers, when no license tax
was imposed upon any other retail business. The ordinance was attacked
as violating Section 3, Article X, of our constitution, which provides that
taxes shall be uniform, as violating the due process clauses of the State
and Federal Constitution, and as in violation of the equal protection clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution of the United States.
All of these contentions were overruled by the court upon the principle that
the tax was uniform, because gasoline dealers constituted a taxable class,
and such was a reasonable classification for tax purposes.
The case of State ex rel. Gaines v. Canada,'4 was again before our supreme court in 1939, after the reversal by the United States Supreme Court

11.
12.
13.
14.

134
344
344
344

S. W. (2d) 112 (Mo. 1939).

Mo. 351, 126 S. W. (2d) 256 (1939).

Mo. 1098, 130 S. W. (2d) 532 (1939).
Mo. 1238, 131 S. W. (2d) 217 (1939).
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of the former opinion. 15 After the decision by the United States Supreme
Court, the legislature amended Section 9618 of our statutes, by eliminating
any discretion in the Board of Curators at Lincoln University, and requiring
them to create new departments and courses of instruction to afford training for negroes equal and the same as that furnished at the State University;
and the legislature further appropriated $200,000 for that purpose. In view
of this change in the law, our State Supreme Court remanded the case with
directions that if the facilities available at the beginning of the next school
year at Lincoln University were substantially equal to those at Missouri
University, the writ would be denied, and otherwise it should issue.
In the case of Hull v. Baumann," the constitutionality of House Bill 677
of the 60th General Assembly,17 was attacked as unconstitutional under
both the Federal and State Constitutions. This particular bill amended the
Jones-Munger Act by enacting new sections applying only to counties, or
cities in a county, which have a population in excess of 700,000, and to counties which have a population of not less than 200,000 and not more than
400,000. The amendment constituted provisions providing for suits to
collect back taxes. The plaintiff contended that the act was unconstitutional
as a local and special law, for the reason that it applies only to the city of
St. Louis and St. Louis County. A lengthy statement of facts was agreed
upon in this case which conclusively (and conveniently) showed a need for
this specific legislation in the city of St. Louis and in St. Louis County,
a need which does not exist in rural counties. However, the court took
judicial notice of the fact that Jackson County has a population greater
than that of St. Louis County, and the court indicated that for that reason
this legislation might have been held unconstitutional as an unreasonable
classification and as a special law if it stood alone. However, the court
pointed out that at the same session of the General Assembly another bill
-was passed, practically the same as this one, applying to Jackson County,
and the constitutional questions were ruled in favor of the constitutionality
of the statute.
In the case of State v. Wipke, 18 the provisions of the Liquor Control Act
requiring a bond in the penal sum of $2,000 by all licensees who sell liquor
by the drink, was attacked as unconstitutional under Section 25, Article II,
of our constitution, which is the provision prohibiting excessive bails and

15. 305 U. S. 337 (1938).
16.
17.

131 S. W. (2d) 721 (Mo. 1939).
Mo. Laws 1939, p. 878.

18. 133 S. W. (2d) 354 (Mo. 1939).
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol5/iss4/1
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excessive fines, and also as violating the equal protection clause of the
Federal and State Constitution. The court overruled both these contentions
and held that the act was constitutional.
In the case of Kay v. Moniteau County,1" the plaintiff attempted to collect his back salary, as prosecuting attorney, on a population basis determined by multiplying the number of votes cast by five, rather than upon
the official census, even after the official census had been compiled. The
plaintiff contended that the County of Monitean had not ascertained the
population according to the census, because the county officials had never
received a certified copy. On appeal the plaintiff argued that he had been
denied equal protection of the law by the trial court because the judgment
of the trial court (against him) had placed the burden and duty of ascertaining the census from the census bureau upon the plaintiff and relieved the
county court of that duty. The supreme court overruled this contention
without comment.

VI. DuF

PROcESS

The case of Ussery v. Haynes, 20 raised an interesting question of due
process. The action was for false imprisonment, the plaintiff therein having
been adjudicated insane by a county court and confined in a state institution. At the time of her adjudication, the statutes covering such a procedure contained no provision for notice to the alleged insane person.2 1 In
this case a formal notice was issued by the clerk of the county court and
given to the physician who was directed to examine her. The evidence
showed that the physician read the notice to her twice and explained the
notice in detail, but no copy was left with her. Since there were no provisions for service of notice or the manner of service, the court discussed
the question as to whether or not such service as this, without leaving a
copy and by a private individual, not an officer, constituted the necessary
notice to the defendant in the insanity proceedings, and came to the conclusion *that it did not. The court further pointed out that the fact that
the alleged insane person appeared by attorney before the court could not
supply the want of notice, because her attorney was appointed by the county
court and not employed by her. This case appears to follow well-established
principles of the necessity of notice and an opportunity to be heard in order
to have due process of law.

19. 134 S. W. (2d) 81 (Mo. 1939).
20.

344 Mo. 530, 127 S. W. (2d) 410 (1939).

This defect
has been
amendment,
see Mo.
Published 21.
by University
of Missouri
Schoolcured
of Law by
Scholarship
Repository,
1940 Laws 1937, p. 512.
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The several other cases in which due process questions have been raised
have already been discussed.
VII.

RiGnTs op JUSTICE AND REmEDIES FOR INJURIES

In the case of State v. Davit,22 the court, in the conclusion of its opinion,
criticized the conduct of the State's Attorney and said, "A defendant-any
defendant-in a criminal case is entitled to the rights which a statute gives
him. No court can refuse to enforce them where the record calls for it."
While not deciding any new point of law or establishing any new principle,
we pass this language on in the belief that it is an excellent, quotable
judicial utterance.
In the case of State ex rel. National Refining Co. v. Seehorn,23 the protection of Article II, Section 10, of our state constitution was invoked by one
of the parties. This Section, which says, "The courts of justice shall be
open to every person, and certain remedy afforded for every injury to
person, property, or character," has caused the courts of this state no little
trouble in the past. In this case a husband had sought damages for the loss
of society and services of his wife. The husband died before trial and the
suit was revived by the husband's administrator. This suit was a proceeding
in prohibition challenging the revival of the suit in the administrator's
name, the contention being that such a cause of action did not survive.
The court held that this cause of action did not survive at common law,
and did not survive by reason of Sections 97-99, Missouri Revised Statutes,
1929, and that the quoted constitutional provision was not intended to
create any new rights of action which were not recognized and were not in
existence at the time of the adoption of the constitution, but was only designed to protect those causes of action recognized at common law.
VIII. MJSCELLANEOUS
The case of McDonald v. Pacific States Life Insurance Co.,24 presented
an interesting question to the court. The defendant life insurance company was a corporation of Colorado, and had been found insolvent by a
Colorado court and placed in liquidation under the statutory provisions of
Colorado. Under the Colorado Act, the Colorado insurance commissioner
was the liquidator. The Missouri plaintiff had secured a judgment against

22. 343 Mo. 1151, 125 S. W. (2d) 47 (1939).
23. 344 Mo. 547, 127 S. W. (2d) 418 (1939).
24. 344 Mo. 1, 124 S. W. (2d) 1157 (1939).
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol5/iss4/1
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this company in Missouri, and, by discovering assets in this state, had
secured a preference by an execution, which was attacked in this case.
The precise question presented to the court was whether the proceedings
in Colorado under the Colorado Act should be given such effect in Mlissouri
as to prevent a Missouri creditor from securing a preference. There is no
question but that the powers of a receiver appointed by a court of equity
extend no further than the territorial limitation of the jurisdiction of the
court making the appointment, and if the liquidator had occupied no
greater status than that of an equity receiver, the courts of Missouri would
not have to recognize his power or title to the property of the corporation
located in this state. However, it has been held by no less an authority than
the United States Supreme Court, in the case of Clark v. Williard,25 that
a statutory liquidator holds title to the property of a corporation, not
by a court decree, but succeeds to all its right and the title to the corporation's property under the laws of the state of incorporation, which laws
are part of the corporation charter. From some of the cases cited in this
opinion, it appears that the courts of some states have felt that they are
bound under the full faith and credit clause of the Federal Constitution to
fully recognize the title of the statutory liquidator of another state, and
that the courts of other states hold that they will recognize the title under
the principles of comity. The Clark case, seems to incline to the latter view,
in which case, of course, the public policy of the jurisdiction of the forum
would have to be taken into account. In this case the Missouri Supreme
Court held that the public policy of a state is defined by its legislative enactments, or by its courts of last resort, or by both, and that the question
presented was one of first impression in this state. The court then held that
the public policy of this state should be to prevent creditors of insolvent
insurance companies from securing preferences, and to protect the assets
for the benefit of all creditors.

25. 292ofU.Missouri
S. 112School
(1934).
Published by University
of Law Scholarship Repository, 1940
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CORPORATIONS
TALBOT SMITH*
The decisions of the court relating to the law of corporations covered,
during the year under consideration, as in years past, a wide range, reflecting the universality of employment of the corporate form as a business
device. Certain of what are regarded as the more significant of the decisions
are commented upon herewith. No attempt has been made to exhaust the
subject in any instance, and only so much of the general law as forms a
background for the decision under consideration has been treated.'
I.

PLEDGE OF CoRpoRATE ASSETS

In the case of People's Bank of Butler v. Allen, 2 the court was faced
with one of the most controversial of modern banking questions-namely,
the right of a banking corporation or other savings institution to pledge
a portion of its assets for the ultimate security of a depositor. 3 A typical
fact situation involves, as did the instant case, statutory requirement that
the depository of public moneys furnish bond or other security for the
proper return of such funds. Deposit is then made by the public custodian
and security furnished. It may consist of a direct pledge of assets by the
bank to the depositor, or, in the alternative, it may involve the execution
of bond conditioned upon proper return of the funds involved, in which
case the pledge of assets involved may be made to the surety on the bond.
This latter was the method adopted in the People's Bank case, the sureties
in such case being directors of the bank rather than a commercial surety
company. 4 Should the bank thereafter become insolvent, the legal question
*Associate Professor of Law, University of Missouri. B.S., United States
Naval Academy, 1920; M.S., University of Michigan, 1927, J.D., 1934.
1.

In addition to the decisions commented upon, the following are regarded

as worthy of additional note: People's Finance Corp. v. Buckner, 344 Mo. 347,
126 S. W. (2d) 301 (1939) (corporation managerial contract calling for devo-

tion of entire time to corporate business); In re Franz Estate, 344 Mo. 510,
127 S. W. (2d) 401 (1939) (rights to purchase additional stock as part of
corpus of estate); State ex rel. Lee v. Sartorius, 344 Mo. 912 130 S. W. (2d)
547 (1939)

(construction of agreement with Participation Holders Supervisory

Committee); Johansen v. St. Louis Union Trust Co., 131 S. W. (2d) 599 (Mo.
1939)

(law governing stockholder's liability to corporation's creditors as law

-of domicile); Rossi v. Davis, 133 S. W. (2d) 363 (Mo. 1939) (corporation as
necessary party defendant).
2. 344 Mo. 207, 125 S. W. (2d) 829 (1939).
3. Only that portion of the problem relating to the deposit of public
funds is treated in this article.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol5/iss4/1
4. Appellant's abstract of the record (p. 45) indicates that the bank was
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is usually presented, as it was in the instant case, by the receiver's demand
upon the pledgee for a return of the collateral without a return of the full
amount deposited. The problem may, on the other hand, be raised by the
pledgee's attempt to foreclose the security.5
In view of the opposing considerations, involving, as they do, questions
of the relative rights of secured and unsecured creditors, and of large and
small depositors both public and private, the problem will be seen to be one
of considerable economic complexity. The legislature's naked direction to
the banking corporation to furnish bond with surety 6 contains no guiding
declaration of policy for the courts when the facts under consideration involve a variation from the precise situation apparently contemplated in the
statute. In such a case, of which People's Bank is an example, the problem
resolves itself into one of implied corporate power, the act in question being
intravires or ultra vires depending upon the court's answer to the question
of power.
The precise question presented, then, is that of the policy or impolicy
of the secured deposit as a means of attracting or holding bank deposits,
and the decisions in the field reflect the confusion existing in the courts
with regard to beliefs as to the wisdom of the practice. To a court holding
the view that, apart from statute, a banking corporation has the implied
7
or inherent right to pledge a portion of its assets to secure public funds, it
is a short step, though not an inevitable one, to the next position, that it
may also pledge its assets to secure the surety on bond given for the same
purpose,8 especially in view of the consideration that had security in fact
been given the depositor itself, the surety might be subrogated to such
depositor's rightsY
On the other hand, should the court take the view that the secured bank
deposit is to be condemned by reason of its being a means for preferring

unable to obtain a Surety Company bond, due (p. 2 appellant's brief) "to the
exigencies of the times" (1931).
5. See Texas & Pac. Ry. v. Pottorff, 291 U. S. 245 (1934).
6. Mo. REv. STAT. (1929) §§ 6794, 12187.
7. Williams v. Hall, 30 Ariz. 581, 249 Pac. 755 (1926); Richards v. Osceola
Bank, 79 Iowa 707, 45 N. W. 294 (1890). The cases are collected in (1930) 65
A. L. R. 1412; (1933) 87 A. L. R. 1456; (1936) 101 A. L. R. 515; (1938) 112

A. L. R. 483.
8. Fulton v. Lloyds Casualty Co., 75 F. (2d) 295 (C. C. A. 6th, 1935);
McFerson v. National Surety Co., 72 Colo. 482, 212 Pac. 489 (1923); Page Trust
Co. v. Rose, 192 N. C. 673, 135 S. E. 795 (1926); Grigsby v. People's Bank, 158
Tenn. 182, 11 S. .W. (2d) 673 (1928). Contra: Commercial Banking & Trust
Co. v. Citizens Trust & Guar. Co., 153 Ky. 566, 156 S. W. 160 (1913).
9. See Mothersead v. United States Fidelity & Guar. Co., 22 F. (2d) 644

(C. C. A. 8th, 1927), cert. denied sub. nom., Schull v. Fidelity & Guar. Co., 276
U. S.637 (1928).
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one creditor over another, and thus arguably detrimental to the best interests of the depositing public, it will not only declare ultra vires the pledge
to the depositor, 10 or to the surety on the depository's bond," but will also
construe relevant statutory enactments in such a way as to discourage the
practice. 2 Thus the decisions in the field show great diversity of result,
depending upon the court's view as to the wisdom or desirability of the
secured bank deposit as an instrument of banking practice.
In Missouri the decisions on the point are not numerous. It should
be noted that our statutes sanction the direct pledge to the public depositor
in certain instances of specified securities in lieu of bond, 3 and the validity
of pledges made in reliance thereon have been upheld by our courts. 4 In the
People's Bank case, however, the court refused to extend the doctrine to a
pledge made to the sureties on the bond and thus we may be justified in
examining the problem anew. The divergence in the opinions remits us,
then, to a consideration of the policy of the pledge device. It has been
argued in favor thereof that "arrangements" for the safeguard of public
moneys cannot be deemed contrary to public policy but the statement
proves too much. "Arrangements" is a term of broad meaning and it seems
difficult to justify on principle an arrangement for the safeguard of public
funds which amounts in effect to a tax upon a few, the depositors of the
bank, for the benefit of the many. The small depositors so levied upon are
entirely without the bargaining power of the large depositors and it would
seem that the tendency of the courts should be toward their protection rather
than their exploitation. Such protection was, in fact, the theory of the
federal deposit insurance plan. 6 Not only, then, does an interpretation of a
grant of incidental power to a banking corporation to pledge its assets for
the purpose of securing a public depositor enable the bank to favor, in
effect, one creditor over another, but it also makes possible the procuration
of depositors by a species of misrepresentation, if the pledging is in fact
secret and the pledged assets appear as unincumbered assets in the financial

10. Divide County v. Baird, 55 N. D. 45, 212 N. W. 236 (1926).
11. Commercial Banking & Trust Co. v. Citizens Trust & Guar. Co., 153

Ky. 566, 156 S. W. 160 (1913).

12. Arkansas County Road Imp. Dist. v. Taylor, 185 Ark. 293, 47 S. W.
(2d) 27 (1932).
13. Mo. Rzv. STAT. (1929) § 12187.
14. Huntsville Trust Co. v. Noel, 321 Mo. 749, 12 S. W. (2d) 751 (1928).
Note also Consolidated School Dist. v. Citizens Say. Bank, 223 Mo. App. 940,

21 S. W. (2d) 781 (1929).

15. Frazer, J., in Cameron v. Christy, 286 Pa. 405, 410, 133 AtI. 551, 552
(1926).
16. 48 STAT. 168 (1933), 12 U. S. C. A. § 264 (1934).
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol5/iss4/1
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statement of the bank. There seems much that can be said against the
practice of permitting a banking corporation to secure any depositor, public
or private, by a pledge of the bank's assets, and it has been asserted that
the trend of the recent decisions is against the practice.'7 Although our
court, then, in refusing to uphold the validity of the pledge made to the
sureties on the bond, takes what may at the present time be a minority position, 8 it is in line with the alleged modern trend to restrict the employment
of the pledge device by banking corporations, and, broadly speaking, the
policy has much to commend it.
There is one aspect of the court's opinion, however, that seems doubtful
in principle. The agreement (of pledge) between the bank and its individual director-sureties is described as not arising "to the dignity of a
contract" because one man cannot contract with himself, 9 the court citing
in support thereof a passage in Corpus Juris20 relating to the elementary
doctrine in the law of contracts that it requires two parties to make a binding contract. If this statement is made to describe the result of the ultra
vires contract it may be sound, but it cannot be one of the reasons why the
agreement is bad in the first place unless we assume the answer to the very
question we are investigating. In other words, if the contract, otherwise
valid, is in fact intra vires it is between the bank, the corporate entity, on
the one hand, and the individual directors on the other, and there are thus
two separate and distinct parties. The same reasoning, believed to be
erroneous, was observed in the case upon which the principal case rests,
FrankfordExchange Bank v. MoCune.2" Even though the orthodox entity
theory be discarded and the corporation thought of as a business group,
treated for certain purposes as if it were a separate individual, it is questionable, from a procedural point of view, if this should be one of the places
22
for looldng at the individuals rather than the group.

17.

Note (1934) 47 HARv. L. Rnv.

1017.

18. This has been termed the minority view in this respect. See (1931)
'79 U. oF PA. L. REv. 608, 612.
19. That the agreement was between the banking corporation itself and
the directors as individuals seems clear. The transfer of assets to the individual

-directors for purposes of security obviously must come from the corporation.
Also note the language of the court, 344 Mo. 207, 212, 125 S. W. (2d) 829, 831
(1939): "The agreement of the bank for the hypothecation of the assets
-

."

(italics ours)

20. 13 C. J. (1917) § 43.
21. 72 S. W. (2d) 155 (Mo. App. 1934).
22. As indicative of the present attitude towards this problem, note the
liberal view taken by RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS (1932) § 17.
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II. ULTRA VIRES
It is often stated as a rule of law that an implied contract exists for
the restoration of any benefits received by reason of an ultra vires contract
as a condition precedent to either party's renunciation thereof. 28 Or, as it
is occasionally put, if the corporation sets up the defense of ultra vires it
must restore what it has received. 24 That this is a correct general principle
cannot be doubted" and this jurisdiction seems in full accord therewith. 2
The rationale of the doctrine as thus stated is the unfairness of a contrary
holding, or, as stated by a lower federal court, "it would be inequitable and
unconscionable to hold otherwise.' 27 When, however, insolvency intervenes
and the rights of innocent creditors are involved, a number of recent wellconsidered cases have refused,2 8 as did the Missouri court in the People's
Bank case, to apply the doctrine. Superior equities are involved and the
rights and equities of the original contracting parties are no longer controlling. As this case well illustrates, it is becoming increasingly difficult
to make any broad statement of even reasonable validity in the field of ultra
vires.
III.

PUNrrIVE DAmAGES

In the case of State ez rel. United Factories v. Hostetter,2 involving,
among other matters, the question of the award of punitive damages against
a principal for the acts of an agent, the court took occasion to review the
problem in general and to contrast the difference between the liabilities of
corporate and individual principals in-this respect.

23,

See 7 FLETCHER, CYCLOPEDIA OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS (Penn. ed. 1931)

§ 3571.
-24. Atkins v. Shreveport & Red River Valley Ry., 106 La. 568, 577, 31 So. 166,
170 (1901).
25. BALLANTINE, LAW OF CORPORATIONS (1930) § 76.
26. "Certain it is that such a contract (ultra vires) is not voidable at the
instance of the party receiving the consideration of the contract, without a
restoration of what -was received. (citing cases)" Sutton, C., in Wellston Trust

Co. v. American Surety Co., 14 S. W. (2d) 23, 27 (Mo. App. 1929). Note also
the following dictum-of Graves, J., in Hanlon Millinery Co. v. Mississippi Valley
Trust Co., 251 Mo. 553, 579, 158 S. W. 359, 364 (1913): "If the contract were
only executed upon one side, then the plea of ultra vires would be unavailing,
because a corporation cannot receive money to do a thing and fail to do that
thing, and after keeping the money, excuse itself from liability by a plea of
ultra vires."

27. McVicar, J., in Smith v. Baltimore & 0. R. R., 48 F. (2d) 861, 871
(W. D. Pa. 1931), aff'd, 56 F. (2d) 799 (C. C. A. 3rd, 1932).
28. Smith v. Baltimore & 0. R. R., 48 F. (2d) 861 (W. D. Pa. 1931), aff'd,

56 F. (2d) 799 (C. C. A. 3rd, 1932); Sneeden v. Marion, 64 F. (2d) 721 (C. C.
A. 7th, 1933), aff'd, 291 U. S.262 (1934); Texas & Pac. Ry. v. Pottorff, 291
U. S. 245 (1934). Contra: State Bank of Commerce v. Stone, 261 N. Y. 175,
184 N. E. 750 (1933).

https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol5/iss4/1
29. 344 Mo. 386, 126 S.W. (2d) 1173 (1939).
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While it has been said that the award of punitive damages is "a sort
of hybrid between a display of ethical indignation and the imposition of a
criminal fine, "30 and in spite of much criticism of the doctrine,31 it is
firmly imbedded in the jurisprudence of the great majority of American
jurisdictions. 32 The courts of this state have sanctioned the award of punitive or exemplary damages since early times when the circumstances of the
injury involved acts of oppression or malice.3 3 Since, however, the award
of punitive damages is in the nature of punishment inflicted upon the defendant because of the quality of his acts, it is commonly held that an individual principal will not be forced to respond in exemplary damages for
the malicious acts of his agent unless such principal personally acquiesced
in, authorized, or ratified the act in question, 34 and the instant decision
leaves no doubt that such is the attitude of the courts of this state upon this
branch of the question.3 5 It might be suggested, however, that since a
principal's liability under the doctrine of respondeat superior is not based
upon his personal fault but rather upon the burdens his activity should
properly be called upon to bear, 38 it seems somewhat anachronistic to make
fault the criterion in this particular type of case. Nor is it particularly
satisfactory to distinguish punitive damages on the ground that they are
"punishment" rather than compensation. Any award of damages involves
some degree of punishment to the payor thereof. For these and similar
reasons the distinction made in the instant case has occasionally been rejected.' 7
The attack upon payment of punitive damages by the corporate principal originally took an ingenious form, the classical metaphysical argument
that has been conducive of much of the confusion in the law of corporations.' 8 Since the malice of the defendant was an essential element in the
award of punitive damages, and since the corporation, being both a soulless

30.
31.

Garrison, J., in Haines v. Schultz, 50 N. J. L. 481, 484 (1888).
See 2 GREENLEAF, EVIDENCE (16th ed. 1899) § 253; HALE, DAMAGES (2d

ed. 1912) §§ 87, 88; Willis, Measure of Damages When Property is Wrongfully Taken by a Private Individual (1909) 22 HAnv. L. REV. 419, 420.

32. The cases are collected in (1914) 48 L. R. A. (N. S.) 35. MCCORMICK,
in THE LAw OF DAMAGES (1935) § 78, states that only four jurisdictions, Louisiana, Massachusetts, Nebraska, and Washington, "definitely reject the doctrine
altogether." See also 1 SEDGWICK, DAMAGES (9th ed. 1912) §§ 347-388.
33. Thus note remarks of Wagner, J., in Buckley v. Knapp, 48 Mo. 152,
162 (1871).

34.
35.

36.

op. cit. supra. note 32, § 80.
See 344 Mo. 386, 392, 126 S.W. (2d) 1173, 1176 (1939).

McCoRMICK,

This matter may be found more tully elaborated by the writer hereof

in an article entitled Scope of the Business (1940) 38 MICH. L. REV. 1222,
37. Schmidt v. Minor, 150 Minn. 236, 184 N. W. 964 (1921).
38. STEVENS, PRIVATE CoRPORATIoNs (1936) §§ 1, 2, and 3.
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and a brainless body, had no mind with which to conceive the required
malice, it was argued that it could under no circumstances be called upon
to respond in punitive damages. 89 This argument has long since been overthrown and it is now settled in the great majority of our jurisdictions 0
that the corporate principal, just as the individual principal, may be required to pay punitive damages in a proper case. Just what a proper case
is, however, has occasioned considerable diversity of thought,4 1 this jurisdiction in the instant case, reiterating its earlier position taken in the case
of Haehl v. Wabash R. R., 42 that since corporations can act only through
agents, whenever the agent in the discharge of his duties acts in a wanton
and malicious manner the corporation will be liable as though it had itself
done the act.43 The doctrine as thus stated should be feasible of efficient
administration since the court will not be faced with questions of either
command or ratification. Against the arguable hardship to the corporation
arising from liability for increased damages for the purely malicious and
wanton acts of an agent must be weighed the possible preventitive tendency
as regards the corporation's choice, training, and retention of servants.
There is doubtless much public approval of the words of Walton, J., in the
Goddard case: "When it is thoroughly understood that it is not profitable
to employ careless and indifferent agents, or reckless and insolent servants,
better men will take their places, and not before.""+ One may ask, however,
why this doctrine, if salutory, should be limited to corporations.
IV.

CORPORATE CREDITORS

In the early case of Attorney-General v. Utica Insurance Co.,4" Chancellor Kent expressed some doubt as to whether any visitatorial jurisdiction
existed over corporations, save as to charitable corporations, in the court
of chancery. 0 This view, or doubt, expressed by the learned chancellor,

39. Jeffersonville R. R. v. Rogers, 28 Ind. 1 (1867). The classical argument
relating to the impossibility of imputing malice to a mere legal entity may also
be found in Whitefield V. S. E. Ry., 96 E. C. L. 115 (1858), and Green v. London
General Omnibus Co. 29 L. J. C. P. 13 (1859).
40. See cases collected in (1914) 48 L. R. A. (N. S.) 35.
41.

Thus compare Western Union Tel. Co. v. Aldridge, 66 F. (2d)

26

(C. C. A. 9th, 1933) (no liability because no participation by corporate principal), commented upon in (1933) 12 N. C. L. REv. 55, with Goddard v. Grand
Trunk Ry., 57 Me. 202 (1869), making the corporation liable for exemplary as
well as compensatory damages, the conduct of the corporate servant having
been such as would render him liable for such damages.
42. 119 Mo. 325, 24 S. W. 737 (1893).
43. 344 Mo. 386, 390, 126 S. W. (2d) 1173, 1175 (1939).
44.

Goddard v. Grand Trunk Ry., 57 Me. 202, 224 (1869).

45. 2 Johns Ch. 371 (N. Y. 1817).
46. Ibid. at 389. See Pound's discussion of the visitatorial power in (1936)
49 HARv. L. REv. 369.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol5/iss4/1
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was the cause47 of the passage by the state of New York, in 1829, of
statutes' s which, because of their adoption by other states, including Missouri,49 have exerted considerable influence on modern corporation law.
Among other clauses it is therein provided that "any creditor" 50 may invoke
the jurisdiction of the circuit court for the purpose of taking various
remedial steps against the directors of manufacturing and business corporations. This statute was the subject of judicial construction in the recent
case of Yellow Manufacturing Acceptance Corp. v. American Taxicabs,51
wherein simple nonjudgment creditors of a corporation sought to obtain
a judgment against the directors for money and property allegedly transferred or wasted by them.
The relation between a director of a corporation and one of the simple
creditors thereof is not difficult to define. There is no privity whatever. 2 Of
course, if the director has committed an individual tort against some creditor, the latter has his remedy, just as any injured person under such
circumstances."3 Such cases have occasionally arisen involving a misrepresentation to the creditor by means of published statements of the corporation.5 4 Except for cases of this type, however, it is commonly held that the
individual creditor cannot, without the aid of statute, recover from the
directors of the corporation even in event of such waste or diversion of
the corporation's assets by the directors that the claim of the creditor cannot

47.

The "Report of the Commissioners Appointed to Revise the Statute

Laws of this State", in Ch. 8, Title IV, Art. 2, footnote to #33 states:

"The

preceding section (similar to Mo. REv. STAT. (1929) § 4959) is drawn to supply

what are conceived to be important defects in some cases, and to remove doubts
entertained respecting the power of the court in others. The first subdivision is.
intended, in connection with #35, to give the court of chancery in this state,
the same power that is exercised by that court in England in cases of charitable
corporations, and in other cases; the possession of which power is doubted by
Ch. Kent, in 2 J. C. R. 384, although alleged to be a part of the general jurisdiction

of the court in 2 Term Rep. 199. .
48. 2 R. S. 462, #33, 34, and 35 (N. Y. 1829).

49. Mo. REv. STAT. (1929) §§ 4959-4961, adopted in 1877, are substantially
in the form of the original New York statute, although not identical therewith.
See also MicH. CoMP. LAws (1929) §§ 15328, 15329, and 15330.
50. Mo. REV. STAT. (1929) § 4961.
51. 344 Mo. 1200, 130 S. W. (2d) 601 (1939).
52. The common view was well expressed by Engerud, J., in the leading

case of Hart v. Hanson, 14 N. D. 570, 575, 105 N. W. 942, 943 (1905), in the

"Creditors of the corporations are utter strangers to the
See also Union National Bank
v. Hill, 148 Mo. 380, 49 S. W. 1012 (1899). A minority view, severely criticized by many courts, is that under the "trust fund doctrine" the directors are
fiduciaries for individual creditors. See Comment (1936) 34 MicH. L. Ray.
521.
following words:

obligations of the directors to the corporation."

53. Ashby v. Peters, 128 Neb. 338, 258 N. W. 639 (1935).
54.

Id.
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be liquidated.5 5 The duty of the director, it is said, is owed to the corporation
itself, not to the creditors thereof.5 0 If, however, the creditor reduces his
claim to judgment57 and thereafter seeks the aid of a court of equity by
means of a creditor's bill to reach the alleged claim of the corporation
against the directors, it has been held that the action will lie.5 8
The statute involved in the instant case, however, speaks broadly of
"any" creditor.5 9 Does this mean that all bars are down? That any simple
contract creditor may now, by virtue of the statute, institute at will actions
in the circuit court directly against the managing officers of the corporation
to bring them to account? It would doubtless be within the competence of
the legislature to enact such a statute, but whether or not they have done
so is a vital question and one upon which the court was called to rule in the
principal case.
As opposed to such broad and literal construction, the traditional view
as to the status of a creditor of a corporation may be stressed, namely, that
his only right is to have his debt paid. 60 We may also argue against such
construction that it could not have been the intent of the legislature in enacting this statute to subject corporate directors to the harassment that
a literal construction might seem to warrant. It is not surprising, then,
that two courts, Michigan,6 1 and a lower court of New York, 2 have both
squarely held, in construing substantially similar statutes, that the words
"any creditor" should be interpreted to read "any judgment creditor."
Such a construction, however, results in a radical change in the class
of individuals protected by the statute. And, to utilize an argument frequently employed in statutory interpretation, we might say that if the
legislature had meant judgment creditor it would have been easy to have
said so. Possibly a consideration of the origin of the statute may throw
some light upon its meaning. Chancellor Kent, it will be recalled,13 had

55. Ready v. Smith, 170 Mo. 163, 70 S. W. 484 (1902). The same is held
as to a mere general creditor seeking to set aside a fraudulent conveyance:
Daggs v. McDermott 327 Mo. 73, 34 S. W. (2d) 46 (1931) ; Davidson v. Dockery,
179 Mo. 687, 78 S. W. 624 (1904). As to the distinction noted in certain of
the cases between acts of misfeasance and those of nonfeasance, see Darling
& Co. v. Fry, 24 S. W. (2d) 622, 724 (Mo. App. 1930).
56. See Union National Bank v. Hill, 148 Mo. 380, 49 S. W. 1012 (1899).
57. Relating to the necessity for judgment, see (1939) 4 Mo. L. REv. 327.
58. The matter is thoroughly discussed in Buckley v. Maupin, 344 Mo.
193, 125 S.W. (2d) 820 (1939).
59.

Mo. REv. STAT. (1929)

§ 4961.

60. Brandeis, J., in Pusey & Jones Co. v. Hanssen, 261 U. S. 491, 497
(1923).
61. McKee v. City Garbage Co., 140 Mich. 497, 103 N. W. 906 (1905).
62. Steele v. Isman, 164 App. Div. 146, 149 N. Y. Supp. 488 (1914).
63. Note 46, supra.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol5/iss4/1
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suggested some doubt as to the jurisdiction of a court of chancery to supervise the conduct of corporations, and it was to avoid possible difficulties
arising from his opinion that the statute was enacted. 4 In other words, it
was not primarily remedial as to creditors: it was not enacted principally
nor even secondarily for the purpose of supplying in equity a creditor's
remedy desirable and necessary because of the law's inadequacy. The
purpose was to enlarge the power of the court with respect to its supervision of corporations.6 Considered in that light, the interpolation of the
word "any judgment creditor" becomes an interpolation of questionable
validity.('
It does not follow, however, from the conclusion that the statute may
be invoked by any creditor, that it may be so invoked by such creditor at
his whim and caprice, as was apparently feared by the New York court in
the Steele case. 67 As was pointed out by Judge Otis in the case of Hutson
v. Long Bell Lumber Co.,6 before a creditor can complain and seek the
intervention of the court, he must have been injured, i. e., his rights must
have been affected,6 9 as, for instance, by the wrongful transfer of the assets
of an insolvent corporation. Thus construed, we neither subject the corporation's officers to the abuse feared by the New York court, nor are we
forced to read into the statute the requirement of judgment which arguably
was not contemplated by the framers thereof. It is, of course, perfectly
consistent with the interpretation here suggested on the basis of the history
of the statute, that the court's jurisdiction under the statute be invoked
only by those with a proper interest.
In the Yellow Manufacturing case, 70 the court clearly distinguishes

64. Report of Commissioners, note 47, supra.
65. Vann, J., in People v. Ballard, 134 N. Y. 269, 286 (1892). In this
regard the following extract from the opinion (not officially reported) of Peckham, J., upon the same point is of considerable interest (published as a footnote in the opinion of Vann, J., supra, p. 278): "It seems to me the plain
language of the note by the revisers means to authorize the Court of Chancery
to exercise, in regard to corporations created within this state, the same power
which is exercised by that court in England in cases of charitable as well as
other corporations, and that the language of the statute does, as matter of fact,
clothe the court with the powers therein enumerated, and provides that they
may be exercised in all such cases at the instance of the attorney-general as well
as of a creditor or director."
66. Assuming, of course, that the purposes of the New York and Missouri
legislatures were similar in enacting the statutes in question. Their marked
similarity, together with the weight accorded the opinions of Chancellor Kent,
suggest such conclusion.
67. Steele v. Isman, 164 App. Div. 146, 149 N. Y. Supp. 488 (1914).
68. 1 F. Supp. 468 (W. D. Mo. 1932), aff'd sub nom, Carson v. LongBell Lumber Corp., 73 F. (2d) 397 (C. C. A. 8th, 1934), cert. denied, 294 U. S.
707 (1934), rehearing denied, 294 U. S. 731 (1935).
69. 1 F. Supp. 468, 474 (W. D. Mo. 1932).
70.University
344 Mo.
1200, 130
(2d) 601 Repository,
(1939). 1940
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between the ordinary judgment creditor's bill in which the creditor's claim
must have been reduced to judgment (if possible), and an action based upon
the statute here under consideration. In spite of the long-standing authority
to the contrary,7 1 the decision that simple contract creditors may invoke
the jurisdiction of the court, is, it is felt, entirely sound and in accordance
with the underlying theory of the statute involved.
V. VENUE
In the case of State ex rel. Henning v. Williams,7 2 the court was faced
with one of the most baffling questions of modern jurisprudence, namely,
"where is a corporation? '11 3 Where does it. "reside?" The problem is not
unlike that of asking where a thought "resides." We do, for certain purposes, treat a corporation as if it were a person, just as admiralty law at
times treats a ship as if it were a person,74 but this constant, although not
invariable,75 process of thought is dangerous. As soon as the legal mind
accepts as a fact that the corporation is a person, traveling as a person from
one state to another, though having its "residence," just as a person, in the
state of X-just at that point of complete personification, some strong decisions are likely to appear. Thus in Peoples PleasurePark Co. v. Rohleder,70
we find it decided that a corporation composed wholly of negro stockholders
did not violate a covenant providing that "title to this land (is) never
to vest in a person or persons of African descent" because, in effect, the
corporate person has no color. One may be permitted to ask, with all deference to the court, how it is possible to establish the race or descent of a
corporation, or, for that matter, of any other thought or idea? The hard
truth of the matter is that we are using the word "corporation ' as a shorthand symbol for a much longer phrase describing 77 a group of beings who
are associated together for the purpose of conducting a certain business (or
plan, or venture; not necessarily profit-making), with a pool of capital contributed by the members of the group, with the power to acquire and convey

71. See notes 45 and 46, supra.
72. 131 S. W. (2d) 561 (Mo. 1939).
73. The phrase is that used by Cohen in his penetrating article, Transcendental Nonsense and the FunctionalApproach (1935) 35 COL. L. REv. 809.
74. The John G. Stevens, 170 U. S. 113 (1898).
75. The great number of exceptions to the entity rule (no insulation when
the corporate form is used to evade a statute, perpetrate a fraud, defeat "public
convenience", and so forth) may east some doubt as to the actual acceptance,
as a matter of practice, of the orthodox theory.
76. 109 Va. 439, 61 S. E. 794 (1908).
77. Not intended, of course, to be all-inclusive. See remarks of Finch, J.,
in People-ee rel. Winchester v. Coleman, 133 N. Y. 279, 284, 31 N. E. 96 (1892).
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol5/iss4/1
30

et al.: Work of the Missouri Supreme Court
1940]

WORK OF MISSOURI SUPREME COURT-1939

407

property in their selected group name, and with the financial responsibility
of each individual of the group limited by statute to his contribution to the
pool. In shorter compass, a "corporation." Now let us suppose that this
group borrows money as a unit upon the understanding not only fairly
implied from the statute but specifically expressed that only the group,
and not the members thereof, is to respond for repayment. The lender,
however, upon maturity, prefers to seek his recovery from the wealthiest
individual of the group. It is submitted that the plaintiff should fail in
his action regardless of what this particular group is called. By hypothesis
he knowingly lent his money to the group and not to the wealthy individual,
and he must make his first attempt to seek repayment from that same group,
regardless of what later remedies he may have by way of creditor's bill or
otherwise. No fair-minded person objects to this result. Clothe the decision,
now, in corporate language-the wealthy individual is a "stockholder"
and it is well known that a stockholder is not liable for the debts of the
corporation. The court will state further that it will not pierce the corporate
veil to reach the stockholder behind, and, it will continue, since the corporation is the person who borrowed the money, the corporation is the person
who must repay.
We have achieved the same result with either explanation. In neither
does the individual have to respond. The difference is that in the latter
decision we have, to explain the individual's non-liability, stressed the fact
that the corporation is a "person."
And, of course, if it is a person, questions as to its color and race and residence are sure to arise. It would seem
a much more reasonable solution in the Peoples Pleasure Park case to have
said that for this purpose (i. e., for the purpose of interpreting the restrictive covenant) we will not forget that human beings compose the group
and in them we are here primarily interested,78 admitting, of course, that
if the same group had borrowed money, we would not look for repayment
primarily to the individuals composing the group. "Corporation," it is
submitted, does not mean a "thing" but is a shorthand description of a way
of doing business.79 Briefly, a corporation is merely a method of doing
business-the corporate method.

78. Compare with the People's Pleasure Park v. Rohleder, the case of
Frick v. Webb, 281 Fed. 407 (N. D. Calif. 1922), in which the ownership by a
"subject of the emperor of Japan" of stock in a domestic corporation which in
turn owned land in California was held to be an interest in real property and
hence violative of the California Alien Land Law of 1920.
79. "The abstract idea of a corporation, the legal entity, the impalpable
and intangible creation of human thought, is itself a fiction, and has been
appropriately
as aoffigure
of speech.
It serves
Published
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WVhere, now, does this corporation "reside?" The general rule is well
established. A corporation's residence is in the state of its incorporation.
But we no sooner make such a statement than we have to change it to meet
the next succeeding fact situation, which is always the case when we employ fictions in order to personify mental processes. Thus: a foreign
corporation argues that it need not register its automobiles in a given jurisdiction because the statute merely says that all residents shall register
their cars, and, continues the corporation, it is well established that we are
a resident only of the state of our incorporation. The court replies, of
course, that for this particular purpose it is also a resident of the jurisdiction in question."' Have we really been concerned with a question of
"residence" at all? The real question before the court was whether or not
the cars of that business unit, operated over the highways of the state,
should be amenable to its laws regarding registration of automobiles. As
to this there is only one answer. Or, this question may arise-shall a
domesticated foreign corporation be suable in the same general manner as a
corporation of our own state? Why not? It is an integral part of the business structure of the state and no reason suggests itself why it should
normally have or claim preferential treatment. Yet, if it is a "non-resident"
of the state the plaintiff may have more difficulty in establishing his venue
than if such were not the case.8 2 This was the problem before the court
in the Henning case83 in which the court decided that for purposes of venue,
in the case at bar, a domesticated foreign corporation resided in the city
and county of St. Louis where it maintained an office and place of business.
The court, faced with a practical problem, gave a realistic answer. The
phrasing of the decision in terms of "residence" followed from the statutory
employment of the same terms, but the problem, it is submitted, is not
basically one of "residence." To talk of the "residence" of a "corporation" is to pile one fiction on another.8 4 Here, as in the automobile registration case,8 5 the red question was one of control over foreign corporations.

in our minds the collective action and agency of many individuals as permitted
by the law; and the substantial inquiry always is what, in a given case, has
been that collective action and agency." Finch, J., in People v. North River
Sugar Refining Co., 121 N. Y. 582, 621, 24 N. E. 834, 839 (1890).
80. 8 FLETCHER, CYCLOPEDIA OF CORPORATIONS (Perm. ed. 1931) § 4025.
81. Gondek v. Cudahy Packing Co., 233 lass. 105, 123 N. E. 398 (1919).
82. Note provisions of Mo. REv. STAT. (1929) § 720.
83. 131 S. W. (2d) 561 (Mo. 1939).
84. See Goodwin v. New York, N. H. & H. R. Co., 124 Fed. 358, 370 (C.
C. D. Mass. 1903).
85. See text keyed to note 81, supra.
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Similarly, in the case involving the corporation's borrowing of money,8" the
real question was whether or not the group which borrowed as a unit should
have to repay as a unit. This is answered by saying it must, because the
corporation is the borrowing "person." It does no harm to use these fictions
of "person" and "residence" provided we constantly bear in mind that
they are in fact the baldest fictions. The next step, however, is to overlook
that vital point-and rules as to the color, or race, of this corporate person.
If it is in fact a person it is not absurd, certainly, to give it race or color.
But is it a person? Or is the fact of the matter merely that we treat the
group, for certain purposes, as if it were one?

CRIMINAL LAW
LATNEY BARNEs*

During the year 1939 the Missouri Supreme Court handed down fiftythree decisions involving violations of the state's criminal statutes. One
represented an unsuccessful appeal by the state from a judgment sustaining
a demurrer to an indictment,1 one was limited to a denial of its jurisdiction
to decide the appeal,2 one made absolute a preliminary rule of prohibition
and prevented a circuit court from taking jurisdiction by certiorariover a
proceeding against a justice and a constable who had seized "gambling devices" by illegal search and seizure and who were about to conduct a hearing to determine whether the devices were "gambling devices" vhich
should be destroyed, 3 one was a habeas corpus proceeding by a defendant
properly convicted of assault with intent to rob but in whose case the
judgment, sentence and committment were for robbery in the first degree,-

86.

See text keyed to note 77, supra.

*Attorney, Mexico. LLB., University of Missouri, 1935.
1. State v. Green, 344 Mo. 985, 130 S. W. (2d) 475 (1939), holding that
"laundry service is not an 'article of commerce' or 'article of convenience bought

and sold' within Section 8701 of Missouri Revised Statutes, 1929, penalizingcreation or participation in an agreement to regulate, control or fix the price of

any article of manufacture, mechanism, merchandise, commodity, convenience or
repair . . . or any 'article' or thing of any class or kind bought and sold."
2. State v. Sanderson, 124 S. W. (2d) 1071 (Mo. 1939).
3. State ex rel. McDonald v. Frankenhoff, 344 Mo. 188, 125 S. W. (2d) 816
(1939).
4. LaGore v. Ramsey, 126 S. W. (2d) 1153 (Mo. 1939). The court very
properly refused to release, but remanded him to the custody of the sheriff of the
county of his conviction (Jackson) that the court having jurisdiction over felony

cases might pass the proper sentence in accordance with the verdict, to be effective from the date of his original conviction, in accordance with Section 1468 of
Missouri Revised Statutes, 1939.
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and one was a judgment that the state might recover the full $2000 penalty
of a bond given under the provisions of the Liquor Control Act by one
holding a five per cent liquor license, and who had sold one drink of whiskey
in violation of the Act, without proving that the state was damaged by the
principal's breach of the bond in making the sale.' The remaining fortyeight cases represent appeals from convictions - an average of less than
one-half a case per county throughout the state.' In thirty of these cases
the convictions were affirmed. Eighteen were reversed and remanded or
reversed outright. Thus one would conclude that a defendant has about
one chance in three of successfully maintaining an appeal.
Taken as a whole, the criminal cases decided during the year make
interesting reading, for while many are "mine run" insofar as the principles of law involved are concerned, their application to novel and modern
situations and conditions and the exceptions made to the old rules present
and encouraging growth and development in this branch of the law.

I. JURISDICTION

A. Of the supreme court on appeal
In State v. Sanderson,7 an appeal from a conviction of a Bus and
Truck Law violation, raising an issue as to whether the legislature intended
to enact retrospective law, was held to present only a question of construction of the statutes involved and not of constitutionality, and jurisdiction of
the appeal was placed in the courts of appeal rather than in the supreme
court.
B. Of the circuit courts
In State v. Bailey,8 the defendant was charged in Shannon County, in
the 20th Judicial Circuit, for statutory rape committed there. The defendant filed an application to disqualify the circuit judge, Hon. Will H. D.
Green, on account of bias and prejudice, and also for a change of venue
from Shannon County on account of the prejudice of the inhabitants of
that county, but did not swear against the inhabitants of the other counties
State v. Wipke, 133 S. W. (2d) 354 (Mo. 1939).
In1927 the court decided 164 criminal cases; in 1928, 113; in 1929, 95.
The average for the ten year period, 1927-1936, was 89.2. See Hyde. The Work of
the Missouri Supreme Court for the Year 1938 (Court Organization) (1939) 4
Mo. L. Rnv. 348.
7. 124 S.W. (2d) 1071 (Mo. 1939).
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol5/iss4/1
8. 344 Mo. 322, 126 S.W. (2d) 224 (1939).
5.
6.
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in the 20th Judicial Circuit. The application for disqualification of the
judge was erroneously denied, but that for change of venue was granted
and the cause sent to Howell County in the same circuit. The defendant
there contended that upon the filing of the application the court had been
rendered incompetent and had no jurisdiction to enter the order changing
the venue to Howell County, in consequence of which the circuit court of
the latter county acquired no jurisdiction. This plea was overruled and
after various proceedings, including the trial of the cause (wherein the
jury failed to agree and a mistrial was declared), Judge Green reconsidered,
sustained the plea to the jurisdiction, and ordered the cause certified back
to Shannon County. There Judge Green entered an order reciting the
foregoing history, set aside his order granting the change of venue to Howell
County, sustained the application to disqualify himself, and called in
Judge Barton of the 19th Circuit as special judge. Judge Barton sustained
the application for a change of venue and sent the case to Dent County in
his own circuit, the 19th. Defendant then filed a plea challenging the
jurisdiction of the Dent County Circuit Court on two grounds: (1) that
Judge Green originally changed the venue of the cause from Shannon
to Howell County, and was without jurisdiction to change it back to the
former county; (2) that Judge Barton was not authorized to send the
cause out of the 20th circuit in which it was originally filed.
The supreme court held the first ground untenable; and that since the
defendant did not save his exceptions in the Shannon County Circuit Court,
whence the change of venue was ordered, but raised the question for the
first time after the transfer to Dent County by a plea to the jurisdiction,
the second objection was not properly saved.9
II.

DOUBLE JEOPARDY

The theft of several articles of property belonging to different owners
it the same time and from the same place constitutes, in law, but one
offense; and where a defendant was convicted in Carter County of stealing
four heifers in Oregon County and transporting them into Carter County,
and pending an appeal was placed upon trial in Oregon County for having
stolen another heifer at the same time and place, a motion by the defendant
for declaration of a mistrial and for a continuance of the cause pending final

9. The point must be raised and saved in the court from which the change
is being taken. State ex rel. Wolfner v. Harris, 312 Mo. 209, 278 S. W. 668
(1925).
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determination of the appeal from the first trial should have been sustained;
and the motion to dismiss, filed at the close of the second case on the theory
that the defendant was placed in double jeopardy for the same offense, was
timely.10
A defendant cannot, after the jury is sworn, ask for a continuance, and,
when it is granted at his request or with his consent, thereafter upon another trial object that he is placed in double jeopardy. The very word
continuance connotes a resumption at a later date. The right to object to
former jeopardy may be waived, and the defendant does so waive by
his request for a continuance."
III. THE TRI
A. The jury
In the trial of a murder case the jury may separate to the extent of
sleeping in pairs in various rooms of a hotel, where the rooms are kept
locked, the sheriff sleeps in the hall, and the evidence shows that there was
no room in the town large enough to enable all of the jurors to sleep in
one room, providing the state affirmatively shows that the jurors were not
subject to improper influences. 12 The jurors may make affidavits to show
that no one approached them, since such affidavits tend to uphold the
verdict and not to contradict or destroy it." 8 But the general rule that
jurors cannot impeach their own verdict was reaffirmed. 14
Similarly, the court in State v. Ferguson,5 held that in small cities a
sensible and substantial compliance with the statutory mandate 0 that
the jury be kept together is sufficient. The rulings seem to be reasonable
and, in view of the safeguards set up by the court, to do no violence to the
defendant's right to have the jury kept together.
A juror whose wife's cousin married a brother of the defendant is not
an incompetent juror and is not related to the defendant. 7

10. State v. Bockman, 344 Mo. 80, 124 S. W. (2d) 1205 (1939).
11. State v. Reynolds, 131 S. W. (2d) 552 (Mo. 1939).
12. State v. Westmoreland, 126 S. W. (2d) 202 (Mo. 1939).
13. Ibid.
14. State v. Bailey, 344 Mo. 322, 126 S. W. (2d) 224 (1939); Jordan v.
St. Joseph Ry., Light, Heat & Power Co., 335 Mo. 319, 73 S. W. (2d) 205, 210
(1934).

15. 133 S. W. (2d) 1023 (Mo. 1939).
16. Mo. REv. STAT. (1929) § 3683.
17. State v. Carter, 131 S. W. (2d) 546 (Mo. 1939).
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In State v. Londe,"" a prosecution for bombing, it was held that the
defendant was not shown to have been prejudiced by the trial court's
refusal to permit inquiry of several veniremen, who testified on voir dire.
examination that they had formed an opinion as to defendant's guilt or
innocence from newspaper articles, as to whether evidence would be
required to remove such opinion, because it did not appear that the state
did not peremptorily challenge such veniremen or that defendant was required to exhaust any of his peremptory challenges in removing such veniremen from the trial jury. This seems to be the usual rule, 9 but there is
serious question whether it is not the better rule that a failure to challenge
for cause should stand separate and independent from the exhaustion of
defendant's peremptory challenges. It would certainly seem preferable, if
the rule in the principal case is to obtain, to require the state to show affirmatively either that the objectionable veniremen were struck off by the
state or that the defendant did not exhaust his peremptory challenges,
rather than to place the burden on the defendant of showing that he
was injured by the erroneous ruling of the court.
B. Continuances
It was not error to refuse a continuance asked because defendant's
subpoena for a material witness, issued eleven days before the trial,
had not been served, where the defendant's attorney had made no attempt
to discover whether the sheriff had served the witness and where no diligence was shown in attempting to reach the witness.20 The court properly
distinguishes this situation from that in which the witness is subpoenaed
21
but fails to appear.
But the court, in State v. Jackson,22 reversed a conviction of murder in
the first degree on the ground that insufficient time was allowed counsel
to pi'epare for a murder trial. Counsel had been appointed on Thursday
prior to a trial set for the following Monday, and it further appeared that
one of the counsel was attending his first term of court and the other was
absent on other legal business for three days, preventing his conferring

18. 132 S. W. (2d) 501 (Mo. 1939).
19. See State v. Davis, 237 Mo. 237, 240, 140 S. W. 902, 904 (1911) ; State
v. Nevils, 330 Mo. 831, 839, 51 S. W. (2d) 47, 50 (1932); Parlon v. Wells, 322
Mo. 1001, 1012, 17 S. W. (2d) 528, 533 (1929).
20. See note 11, supra.
21. State v. Jasper, 324 Mo. 668, 24 S. W. (2d) 161 (1930).
22. 344 Mo. 1055, 130 S. W. (2d) 595 (1939).
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with co-counsel. The overruling of a motion to continue the case for one
week under such circumstances was an abuse of discretion by the trial court.
C. The verdict
A verdict finding the defendant "guilty as charged", and reading "we
assess his punishment by $50 [without using the word "fine"] and sixty
days in County Jail" (without using the word "imprisonment") was
sufficiently clear to authorize the trial court to assess defendant's punishment at a fine of $50 and imprisonment in the county jail for a term of
sixty days.2' The court held that under section 3704 of Missouri Revised
Statutes 1929, where the jury agree upon a verdict of guilty but fail to
agree upon the punishment, or do not declare such punishment by their
verdict, or where the jury finds a verdict of guilty and assesses an unauthorized punishment, the court shall assess the punishment and render
judgment accordingly.
IV.

EVIDENCE

In a prosecution for manslaughter for the death of a passenger of the
accused,24 the evidence for the state showed that the defendant had been to
two dancing resorts within a period of two hours, taking three drinks of
whiskey at one and two drinks of whiskey and part of a bottle of 3.2%
beer at the other. Defendant testified that the count was two and one and
no beer. Evidence from a couple who had accompanied the defendant,
elicited by the state, was that "you could tell by his eyes and actions that he
had been drinking", "he was under the influence of bitoxicating liquor
but not drunk" and "not real drunk . . . but a little under the influence of liquor, and that his eyes were red and that he talked a little
louder than usual"; and the sheriff who had seen the accused a few minutes
before the accident opined that the accused "was under the influence
of liquor".
Speed of the car was estimated by his companions as seventy miles an
hour or more; by the defendant as from fifty to fifty-five. On a very slight
curve the accused's car began to swerve (he had been driving properly

1 23. State v. Couch, 344 Mo. 78, 124 S. W. (2d) 1091 (1939); citing State
v. McDonough, 232 Mo. 219, 134 S. W. 545 (1911) with approval. See also note
2, supra. See also State v. Couch, 130 S. W. (2d) 529 (Mo. 1939).
24. State v. Ruffin, 344 Mo. 301, 126 S. W. (2d) 218 (1939). Only one other
similar case has been tried in Missouri. See State v. Scheufler, 285 S. W. 419 (Mo.
1926).
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for some seven or eight miles just prior to the accident), skidded, lost two
of its tires, rolled over three or four times in a space of 150 feet, and then
lodged against a railroad embankment. Defendant testified he thought the
swerving resulted "from the collapse of the right rear tire."
The court thought the car was going "at a fast but not at a dangerous
speed. Otherwise, why did not the girls protest?" The conviction had before the jury was reversed by the supreme court on "procedural grounds"
in this "close case" for failure of the judge to reprimand the prosecuting
attorney for showing by question and answer--struck out by the trial
court on objection by the defendant-that the accused had not attended the
funeral of the deceased. Error was also found in permitting the state, after
the accused had testified that he had "no intention of injury, hurting or
killing" the deceased, to ask the defendant on cross-examination if he had
not stated in a restaurant on the night of the homicide that "he guessed he
had had a bad wreck for he 'had killed a damned girl' ", and when the
defendant denied having made such statements, to produce evidence that he
had.
A reading of the court's opinion would indicate that the reasons assigned for the reversal were errors fortunately found by it to dispose of a
jury's verdict with which it did not agree. The opinion does not show that
confidence, deference and respect so customarily given the jury who "had
the witnesses before them." The opinion does violence by suggesting that
the guilt or innocence of the crime should turn upon whether or not the
accused's companions "protested."
The court seemed to forget that the
case was a criminal action "against the peace and dignity of the State",
and not a disfavored guest-passenger civil action for damages.
An accomplice is a competent state's witness if he has not agreed to
testify in a particular manner, notwithstanding he may have made an arrangement by which, if he turns state's evidence, he will not be prosecuted.
Sueh fact goes to his credibility and not to his competency, and the agreement to "testify against" a defendant does not mean that the witness will
testify in any particular manner other than to disclose his full knowledge
touching the offense. 25 The interpretation of the words "testify against"
seem most reasonable. The court wisely ruled that State v. Miller,8 holding
similar words to disqualify a witness, was "not authoritative" in this re-

25.
26.

State v. White, 126 S. W. (2d) 234 (Mo. 1939).
100 Mo. 606, 13 S. W. 832, 838, 1051 (1890).
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spect, that opinion not having received a carrying vote but a majority of
the court merely having concurred in the result.
Possession of recently stolen property is not proof of guilt as a matter
of law, but is sufficient to carry the question of guilt and defendant's explanation of his possession to the jury; but the identity of the property in
the defendant's possession as that stolen must be clearly established, and
such mere descriptions as "a red sow with black spots on her" and "that
would weigh around 300 pounds" are insufficient on which alone to base
a conviction.2 7 The possession of recently stolen property will support an
inference that the possessor was the thief, 8 and it was for the jury to determine the truthfulness of the defendant's explanation of his possession,
even though his explanation be uncontradicted.
While a mere promise to do something in the future, even if fraudulently made, will not sustain a conviction of obtaining money by false pretenses, yet where accused made such representations of existing facts as that
he was a doctor and his companion an eye specialist, the mere fact that he
also promised the glasses would be delivered in a few days would not prevent his conviction, where that was not relied on by the state as one of the
false pretenses made. And prosecutions for obtaining money by false
pretenses are exceptions to the general rule that evidence of crimes other
than the one for which the defendant is on trial is inadmissible. The intent of the accused to deceive is vital and evidence of similar false
representations to others shortly before or after the representations for
2
which the accused is on trial or admissible to show the accused's intent. D
In a robbery prosecution wherein two witnesses who testified at a
preliminary hearing had been subsequently executed pursuant to death
sentences, the transcript of the evidence of such witnesses at the preliminary
hearing was admissible, and its admission did not violate the right of the
defendant to face his accusers."
In State v. Robinson,31 the court held that where the accused tenders
the factual issue of the bad character of the victim of his assault to substantiate his plea of self defense, he thereby tenders an issue involving his
own character, having extended the scope of the inquiry beyond the rea

27. State v. Lease, 124 S. W. (2d) 1084 (Mo. 1939).
28. State v. Nicoletti, 344 Mo. 86, 125 S. W. (2d) 33 (1939), citing State v.
Dilley, 336 Mo. 75, 80, 76 S. W. (2d) 1085 (1934). To the same effect see
also State v. Nichols, 130 S. W. (2d) 485 (Mo. 1939).
29. State v. Craft, 344 Mo. 269, 126 S. W. (2d) 177 (1939).
30. State v. Gregory, 344 Mo. 525, 127 S. W. (2d) 408 (1939).
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol5/iss4/1
31. 344 Mo. 1094, 130 S.W. (2d) 530 (1939).
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gestae. And a defendant should have been allowed to show that his reputation for honesty and as a "law-abiding citizen" was good, in a charge of
larceny, for the evidence would go to the existence of the particular trait
involved.32
In a prosecution for manslaughter for performing an abortion, it is
incumbent on the state to show affimatively that the abortion was not necessary to preserve the life of the mother or of the unborn child. It is not
sufficient to show that the deceased appeared to be in good health and
performing her usual household duties just before the operation, where
it appeared that she had been afflicted for some time with pulmonary tuberculosis and there was no evidence whether a woman in her condition
33
could or could not have gone through pregnancy and childbirth safely.
V.

RIGHT OF OFFICER IN EFFECTING ARREST

In State v. Ford, 4 defendant, a city marshal, had been convicted of
second degree murder for shooting and killing the deceased as the marshal
undertook to arrest him for a misdemeanor, the deceased resisting the arrest and attempting to seize the officer's gun. The court reversed the conviction and remanded the case for new trial, citing much-overlooked section 3571 of Missouri Revised Statutes 1929, and held that homicide is
justifiable not only when committed in attempting by lawful means to apprehend any person for any felony committed but also in effecting the
arrest of a misdemeanant who flees or forcibly resists, for the officer may
then "use all necessary means to effect the arrest." By this decision the
court overturned the doctrines of State v. McGehee,3 5 and State v. Salts,36
3
and reinstated State v. Dierberger.
T The court did not determine what its
ruling would be in the case of an officer shooting a fleeing misdemeanant 8
but dealt only with the situation where there was forcible resistance.
VI. INSTRUCTIONS

Where a "reasonable doubt" instruction is given, it is not necessary
to have a repetition of the phrase "beyond a reasonable doubt" in the
32. State v. Quinn, 344 Mo. 1072, 130 S. W. (2d) 511 (1939).
33. State v. Smith, 344 Mo. 1129, 130 S. W. (2d) 550 (1939).
34. 344 Mo. 1219, 130 S. W. (2d) 635 (1939), noted (1940) 5 Mo. L. REV. 93.
35. 308 Mo. 560, 274 S. W. 70 (1925).
36. 331 Mo. 665, 56 S. W. (2d) 21 (1932).
37. 96 Mo. 666, 10 S. W. 168 (1888).
38. See State ex rel. Kaercher v. Roth, 330 Mo. 105, 49 S. W. (2d) 109
(1932), holding an officer civilly liable for shooting a misdemeanant while fleeing
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other instructions.3" But it was error to refuse a correct instruction submitting the converse of the state's main instruction, unless freely and fully
covered by other instructions, if defendant requests it, notwithstanding
the 'fact that the state's main instruction concludes with the words, "and
unless you so find, you will acquit" or words of similar import. The mere
giving of the instruction: "If, upon a consideration of all the evidence,
you have a reasonable doubt of defendant's guilt, you should acquit," is
insufficient to cure the error. The defendant is entitled to have his defense submitted to the jury in a direct way by instruction. 4 Further, the
instructions must be in such physical form that they are intelligible. See
the court's scathing denunciation of one which it called "wholly unintelligible," "in the nature of a jig-saw puzzle", the case being reversed on account of a given instruction's "awkwardness of form and jumble of sub-

stance. "41
In a prosecution for forcible rape, it was not error for the court to fail
to give an instruction on the failure of the prosecutrix to make complaint at
the first reasonable opportunity on the theory that the failure to do so
would be inconsistent with defendant's guilt. To instruct in such a manner
would be a comment on the evidence and would invade the province of the
jury.

42

EQUITY
ROBERT S. EASTIN"

The decisions of the supreme court in the field of equity during the
past year display no startling or unusual features. In general, the court
applied well-settled rules of equity jurisprudence to situations which legally
and factually conform to the traditional types.
The field of equity covers so many different subjects and is related
so intimately to so many phases of the law, that it is difficult to approximate
any general conclusions of value. Personally, the most salient feature

39. State v. Westmoreland, 126 S. W. (2d) 202 (Mo. 1939).
40. State v. Quinn, 344 Mo. 1072, 130 S. W. (2d) 511 (1939).
41. State v. Ervin, 344 Mo. 1029, 130 S. W. (2d) 580 (1939).
42. State v. Palmer, 344 Mo. 1063, 130 S. W. (2d) 599 (1939), disapproving
State v. Patrick, 107 Mo. 147, 17 S. W. 666 (1891), which in turn was overruled
by State v. Marcks, 140 Mo. 656, 41 S. W. 973, 43 S. W. 1095 (1897).
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol5/iss4/1
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observed in a review of the cases is the large number of actions brought to
set aside transfers of property, real and personal. Creditors' bills to set
aside fraudulent conveyances; suits by wives or widows to set aside transfers
as in fraud of their dower and marital rights; suits by defrauded grantors
themselves-all appear very frequently in the reports. Time has not permitted a survey to determine whether this situation is unusual. Perhaps
such a survey might be of value to ascertain whether or not any relation
exists between the number of such suits and the economic troubles of recent
years.
In a clear majority of the equity cases the decision is based almost entirely upon the facts. Of necessity such decisions cannot be reviewed here.
Many other cases simply apply well-settled principles of law. Some of these
cases may be referred to, but in general they must be passed with at best
a slighting comment. The following cases appear to deserve a more extended treatment.
The power of an equity court to mould its relief and to give adequate
protection to equitable interests in the light of changing circumstances is
well illustrated in Bates v. Dana," perhaps the most unusual case decided
during the year. There A Bank had a mortgage on part of a tract of land
while B had a mortgage on another part of the tract. In place of this lien,
B agreed to take a second mortgage on the whole tract subject to a prior
lien of $26,500 to A. Actually, A was given a first mortgage for $66,000.
B threatened litigation when she discovered this fact. To settle the dispute
and to induce B to extend the maturity of her mortgage, A agreed with B
that should it become necessary for A to foreclose its mortgage and should 1
commence foreclosure while B's mortgage was unpaid, A would, at B's
request, "take up by assignment to it" B's mortgage at the face amount
plus accrued interest. This agreement was entered into in 1929 and at that
time A was a going concern. Some time later A failed and was placed in
the hands of the proper statutory receiver. The mortgage given to A having
become in default, A's receiver brought this action to foreclose it, making
B a party defendant. B filed a cross-bill claiming priority as to the proceeds of the sale of the property to the extent of her mortgage. The supreme
court held that B should be given this relief. A's receiver argued that the
contract mentioned was a mere personal covenant by A; that when A failed,
B could have filed a claim against A's estate for the damages suffered by her
for non-performance, but that it did not give B any greater rights under her

1. 133 of
S. Missouri
W. (2d)School
326 of(Mo.
1939).
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mortgage than she had previously-a second mortgage. The court held that
the contract was more than a mere personal covenant; that it expressed a
condition precedent to foreclosure and that foreclosure could not be had
until and unless B's mortgage was paid. While A could not be compelled
to pay B's mortgage because of its insolvency, still the court could protect
B's rights by subordinating A's mortgage to B's and by awarding to B
priority in payment out of the purchase money on the foreclosure sale.
Here, therefore, -we find a case where the court, in order to protect B's
rights, treated and construed what was in form a personal covenant to buy
B's mortgage into a substantive right in the property covered by the mortgage.
Also presenting rather unusual features are the somewhat parallel cases
of Smith v. Holdoway Construction Co. 2 and Merz v. Tower Grove Bank &
Trust Co.3 Both involve the problem of how far a court will go in setting
aside a transaction where the plaintiff is the wife or widow of the grantor
and where it is found that the transaction is in fraud of her dower or
marital rights. In each of these cases the court did not content itself with
setting aside the transaction as it affected the interests of the plaintiff, but
went further and set aside the whole transaction even though this tended
to the benefit of the husband or the husband's heirs or distributees, the
husband being, of course, a party to the fraudulent transfer. The court
recognized that in general a fraudulent grantor or his heirs and distributees
may not attack a transfer because it was in fraud of the marital rights of the
grantor's wife-an elementary application of the clean hands doctrinebut stressed special circumstances in each of the cases which made the
equities of the fraudulent grantor superior to those of the grantee. In
the Smith case these superior equities arose out of the acts of the grantee
subsequent to the transfer in placing a large mortgage on the property and
appropriating the proceeds. This mortgage was given to a bona fide taker
and so could not be set aside. Here also the court stressed the fact that in
view of the presence of the large mortgage on the property, the wife's inchoate dower interest was of little value and could be cut off by default
in the mortgage and subsequent foreclosure unless the equity should be in
friendly hands. The husband and wife had become reconciled, and with
the title in the name of the husband, the wife's equity could be protected.
In the Merz case the special equities arose out of the fact that the grantee,

2. 344 Mo. 862, 129 S. W. (2d) 894 (1939).
3. 344 Mo. 1150, 130 S. W. (2d) 611 (1939).
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a trust company acting as trustee under an inter vivos trust indenture, had
induced the establishment of the trust by representations to the settlor, -who
apparently had no independent legal advice, that the trust could not be
successfully attacked by his widow although the court found that the trust
company should have known better.
In spite of what appears to have been a very determined attack by
counsel, the court in Buckley v. 111aupin,4 adhered to the familiar doctrine
that a creditor's bill to set aside a fraudulent conveyance can be brought
only after the plaintiff has reduced his claim to judgment and execution
has been returned nulla bona. The court noted that certain special circumstances might excuse compliance with the letter of this rule, but held
that insolvency of the debtor was not such a special circumstance. The reasons for this position adduced by the court were entirely for the protection
of the debtor-basically that he should not be deprived of his right to a trial
by jury on a legal claim. In Yellow Manufacturing Acceptance Corp. v.
American Taxicabs, Inc.,5 however, an action brought under Section 4959,
et seq., Revised Statutes, 1929, the court held that a judgment at law was not
a condition precedent to relief at the suit of a creditor. This statutory action
is essentially an action against the directors of a debtor corporation who
have aided or consented to a fraudulent conveyance. This action is not a
creditor's bill but is based solely upon statute and the two cases may, therefore, be easily distinguished. However, the thought occurs that there is
no real difference. In each instance a creditor is seeking secondary reliefin the first instance against a fraudulent grantee, in the second instance
against the directors of a corporate debtor-because of fraudulent conveyances by the debtor. If the requirement of a jury trial as between debtor
and creditor prevents the filing of a creditor's bill until a judgment has
been obtained, it would seem that the same requirement would necessitate
obtaining a judgment before pursuing the directors of the debtor. There
is ample basis in history for the decision in Buckley v. Maupin, but it may
be that the historical doctrine should be re-scrutinized. If the interests
of the debtor do not require a jury trial as a condition precedent to a
statutory action against the directors, should they do so in the case of a
creditor's bill ? It may be that they do not.
In the field of specific performance the chief interest lies in cases
brought to enforce alleged oral contracts of adoption and to devise or be-

4.
5.

344 Mo. 193, 125 S. W. (2d) 820 (1939).
344 Mo. 1200, 130 S. W. (2d) 601 (1939).
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queath property. In Thompson v. Moseley,' the court held that an oral contract to adopt would not be enforced where the adopted child was of age
at the time of the contract. In this opinion the court recognized that such
contracts have been enforced at the suit of persons who were minors at the
time of the contract. However, the court definitely felt that these cases
should be regarded with very close scrutiny as they offer a fertile field
for fraud. Consequently, the right of recovery should be restricted to persons who were infants at the time that the contract was entered into, largely
because the adopted child under such circumstances has little or nothing
to say about the matter and frequently renders valuable services to the
adoptive parent extending over a long period of time in the thought or under
the impression that he or she in fact has been adopted. Such considerations
do not apply where the adopted child is of age. While it may be difficult to
justify the distinction on logical grounds, as a practical matter the distinction seems eminently sound.
In at least two cases of the same sort where the plaintiffs were minors
when the contract was made, the court refused to enforce the alleged contracts because the proof of their existence did not come up to that clear
7
and convincing standard required.
Such oral contracts are not, however, universally rejected as appears
from Ver Standig v. St. Louis Union Trust Co.8 In this case an oral contract to devise realty was enforced and this notwithstanding a decision of
the trial court in favor of the defendant. The court, however, was careful
to point out that these contracts are enforced only when the proof of the
contract is clear and convincing and when the failure to so enforce the
contract will work an equitable fraud on the plaintiff. Another interesting
problem presented in this case should be noted. At the time the contract
was entered into the testator was unmarried. Later she married. Her
husband survived her and elected to reject her will and take his statutory
one-half subject to debts. There was no evidence that at the time of the
marriage or at the time of his election the husband knew of the existence
of the contract. The court, therefore, treated him as a bona fide taker and
the plaintiff's claim was enforced only as to one-half of the property which
was the subject matter of the contract. This serves to draw attention to

6. 344 Mo. 240, 125 S. W. (2d) 860 (1939).
7. Keller v. Lewis County, 134 S. W. (2d) 48 (Mo. 1939); Taylor v.
Hamrick, 134 S. W. (2d) 52 (Rio. 1939).
8. 344 Mo. 880, 129 S. W. (2d) 905 (1939).
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the fact that a person may take as a bona fide purchaser although he does
not come within the ordinary concept of the term.
The following cases perhaps deserve a line or two.
In Boatmen's National Bank v. Wurdeman, it was held that a deed of
trust was properly set aside at the suit of the executor of the grantor on
the ground that it was against public policy, having been given in part
consideration of the dismissal by the informant of a proceeding to determine
the grantor's sanity. Such proceedings are not adversary and the informant may not discontinue the same for a consideration.
In Cordia v. Matthes, 0 it was held that a sale under a deed of trust
would not be set aside at the behest of the owner of the equity of redemption
solely on the ground of inadequacy of price where the plaintiff had announced at the sale that any purchaser was buying a law suit and thus
chilled the bidding.
A taxpayer in a drainage district was held to be barred by laches from
complaining of the expenditure of money on certain works on the ground
that they were not within the district's plan of drainage where such plan
of drainage had been departed from more than twenty years past to the
knowledge of the plaintiff.1
Naslund v. Moon Motor Car Co.,12 will be of interest to all receivers
and their counsel. It well demonstrates what a receiver should not do.
An entirely honest man became involved and suffered substantial losses
because of his undue optimism and his failure to take necessary precautions.
While his errors were too numerous to mention, the most grievous one
(financially) was the payment of claims as preferred upon ex parte orders
of the receivership court. The supreme court held that these orders did
not protect the receiver because entered ex parte and without notice to interested parties.
The decision a few years ago in Haugh v. Bokern,'3 that equity has no
jurisdiction to construe a will solely to determine the legal title to lands
passing thereunder (because of the adequacy of the legal remedy) was
restricted to that particular situation in Masterson v. Masterson,' where
equitable jurisdiction was upheld where personal property was involved

9. 344 Mo. 573, 127 S. W. (2d) 438 (1939).
10. 344 Mo. 1059, 130 S. W. (2d) 597 (1939).

11. Graves v. Little Tarkio Drainage Dist. No. 1, 134 S. W. (2d) 70 (Mo.
1939).
12. 134 S. W. (2d) 102 (Mo. 1939).
13. 325 Mo. 1143, 30 S. W. (2d) 47 (1930).
14. 344 Mo. 1188, 130 S. W (2d) 629 (1939).

Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1940

47

Missouri Law Review, Vol. 5, Iss. 4 [1940], Art. 1
MISSOURI LAW REVIEWV

[Vol. 5

and where the plaintiffs (who claimed a remainder interest under the will)
asked protection against waste and the like.
There have been many assertions that a divorce action is not an action
in equity, and some holdings that it is specifically an action at law. A
great deal of the confusion has been cleared up by the decision of the su5
preme court in State ex rel. Coupli, v. Hostetter."
There the court held that
while a divorce action is sui generis, nevertheless the divorce court has
all of the powers of a court of equity in framing and enforcing its decree,
especially when dealing with alimony, child support, and the like. As a
result, a modification of an alimony decree granted upon terms was upheld.
In Liberty Mutual Insurance Co. v. Jones,16 plaintiffs sought a declaratory judgment and defendants filed an equitable cross-bill thereto praying
injunctive relief. The trial court took the view that the cross-bill had the
effect of eliminating the declaratory judgment feature of the case, but the
supreme court held that notwithstanding the cross-bill, the trial court
should have entered a judgment declaring the parties' rights. Presumably,
if the rights as declared warranted equitable relief in favor of defendants,
the court could also give such relief.
In Ross ConstructionCo. v. Chiles,1 7 it was held that an appeal by the
plaintiff in an action in the nature of a bill of interpleader from an order
refusing to require the defendants to interplead, was premature. Due to
the continued interest of the plaintiff in the action, it was held that only
the final judgment was appealable. Incidentally, in reaching this result
the court wrote a rather lengthy and elaborate discussion of bills of interpleader, bills in the nature of bills of interpleader, their attributes and
characteristics.
Many other cases of interest could be mentioned but considerations of
space forbid. None present any particularly new feature of importance.
On the whole, therefoize, it can be said that 1939 was a typical year in
the field of equity, with an interesting but familiar group of cases. The
law did not remain static but showed signs of sturdy growth. Perhaps a less
hesitant attitude toward the more flexible remedies offered by equity may
be desired, but on the whole, no serious criticism can be leveled at the court
for failing to utilize all equitable remedies sought by the litigants.

15. 344 Mo. 770, 129 S. W. (2d) 1 (1939).
16. 344 Mo. 932, 130 S. W. (2d) 945 (1939).
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol5/iss4/1
17. 344 Mo. 1084, 130 S. W. (2d) 524 (1939).
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EVIDENCE
J. A. WALDEN"

The cases on evidence decided by the supreme court in 1939 do not
break much new ground, but are concerned mainly with the application
of established rules to the facts involved. If in some cases the reader considers that this review has been unduly burdened by a recitation of cases
applying recognized principles, our justification will lie in the importance
to the trial lawyer of having the rules of evidence constantly at his fingers'
tips.
I.

JUDICIAL NOTICE

In two cases the supreme court reiterates the well-established rule that
it takes judicial notice of its own records ;1 in State ex rel. Gaines v.
Canada,2 the supreme court took judicial notice of an amendment of certain
statutes; and in Brown v. Citizens' State Bank,3 judicial notice was taken
that under the laws of this state the property and business of a corporation
4
is controlled and managed by its board of directors. In Stark v. Berger,
judicial notice was taken of the fact that some perceptible space of time
must elapse between the realization of danger by an engineer and the setting
of the brakes; and in State v. Wymore, 5 the court judicially noticed that
private persons rarely ifie complaints in criminal cases with the circuit
clerk or with the prosecuting attorney.
II.

PRESUMPTION, INFERENCE, AND BURDEN OF PROOF

In Snowwhite v. Metropolitan Life Insurance Co.,6 the court stated
that the fact that an insurance agent collected a premium on his debit two
hours after the accident in issue, raised no presumption that he was on
company business at the time of the accident. This is an application of the
established rule that while proof of a condition or situation at a prior time,
not too remote, raises a presumption of its continued existence thereafter

^Attorney, Moberly. A. B., University of Missouri, 1917, LL.B., 1920.
1. State ex rel. Horton v. Bourke, 344 Mo. 826, 129 S. W. (2d) 866 (1939);

Ross Construction Co. v. Chiles, 344 Mo. 1084, 130 S. W. (2d) 524 (1939).
2.
3.
4.
5.

344
134
344
132

Mo. 1238, 131 S. W. (2d) 217 (1939).
S. W. (2d) 116 (Mo. 1939).
Mo. 170, 125 S. W. (2d) 870 (1939).
S. W. (2d) 979 (Mo. 1939).

6. 344 Mo. 705, 127 S. W. (2d) 718 (1939).
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until the contrary is shown, nevertheless, such presumptions are not retroactive and do not run backward.
In a disbarment proceeding, the failure of respondent to call as a witness a person charged to have been employed by him as his solicitor, raised
no unfavorable inference against respondent, where respondent had not
admitted and the evidence did not establish that such person was actually
a solicitor for respondent, and where such person attended the hearing
under subpoena from informants; 7 but, in Tichenor v. Bowman,8 it was held
that failure to produce relevant documentary evidence under control of a
party raised an inference that such evidence, if produced, would have
been unfavorable to the party.
In Conrad v. Diehl," it was re-affirmed that where real estate is carried
in the name of straw parties with the intent and purpose to conceal the true
ownership, an inference of fraud arises.
In Wills v. Berberich's Delivery Co.,10 the court, in an illuminating
opinion, re-examines the ever-troublesome rule against piling inference upon
inference. The claimant, in a compensation proceeding, contended that the
deceased died of septecemia which spread from a boil, and that the spreading was induced by an injury to deceased's shoulder received in the course
and scope of his employment. The defendant vigorously contended that the
causal connection between the shoulder injury and the spread of the
septecemia from the boil could only be established by piling inference on
inference. The opinion establishes new limitations upon the rule, and says
that the true doctrine is that the rule against piling inference on inference
is not a general rule applicable to all situations, but is a rule of reason
governing only when the proven facts and their reasonable implications
furnish no basis for agreement or disagreement by persons of average intelligence as to whether the factum probandum has been established. The
case of Cardinalev. Kemp 1 is not overruled by the opinion, but is limited
to conform to the true doctrine as above stated. The strength of the relation
between the factual premise and the conclusion is the all-important test, even
though one or more inferences may intervene, and the rule prohibiting the
piling of inferences is said to be intended to guard against attenuated reasoning, as where an initial inference is drawn from fact and other infer-

7.
8.
9.
10.

In re Parkinson, 344 Mo. 715, 128 S. W. (2d) 1023 (1939).
133 S. W. (2d) 324 (Mo. 1939).
344 Mo. 811, 129 S. W. (2d) 870 (1939).
134 S. W. (2d) 125 (Mo. 1939).
11. 309 Mo. 241, 276, 274 S. W. 437, 448 (1925).
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ences are built solely and cumulatively on the first so that the conclusion
reached is too remote and has no sound logical foundation in fact. But it
is noted that there is no inflexible rule to cover the logical processes involved.
Logic, and not law, furnishes the test of relevancy, so that the real question
is whether the conclusion hypothesized can fairly be drawn from proven
facts by reasonably intelligent minds. Under the opinion, a result reached
by piling inference upon inference is not per se unsound, and the rule
against the piling of inferences is relegated to the status of a test of
relevancy and of the logical processes involved in reaching a conclusion
sought to be established.

III. ADmisSIONS AwD DEcLAATioNs
An offer of compromise is not admissible as an admission against interest,1 2 but statements and admissions made before any dispute took place
or after an attempted compromise had been abandoned, and admissions
which by their very nature negative compromise, are not within the rule
which prohibits the introduction of an offer of compromise."3
The statement or former testimony of one not a party to the action
cannot be introduced on the theory that it is an admission against interest ;14
and in Schroeder v. Rawlings,15 it was ruled that to make a statement of the
defendant in an automobile accident suit that he had liability insurance
admissible as against his interest, the statement must be relevant and material to some issue involved.
Admissions against interest may be contained in proofs of loss and in
receipts furnished insurance companies, and where such admissions are
uncontradicted, they are sufficient to place the burden upon the insured
to disprove the facts so admitted.'
In Rei7ing v. Russell,'" the rule is re-stated that admissions may be by
acts as well as by words, and the fraudulent conduct of a party to litigation
in a prior suit, from which can logically be inferred the belief in the
existence or non-existence of some fact in issue in a subsequent suit, is admissible as against his interest. Where a plaintiff has been paid compensation by his employer's insurer, his failure to file a compensation claim for

12.
(1939).

Schneider v. Dubinsky Realty Co., 344 Mo. 654, 127 S. W. (2d) 691

13.

Jacobs v. Danciger, 344 Mo. 1042, 130 S. W. (2d)

588 (1939).

16.

Langan v. United States Life Ins. Co., 344 Mo. 989, 130 S. W. (2d)

14. Collins v. Leahy, 344 Mo. 250, 125 S. W. (2d) 874 (1939).
15. 344 Mo. 630, 127 S. W. (2d) 678 (1939).
479 (1939).
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by 17.
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Repository, 1940
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two months after compensation payments were stopped could not be an
admission on plaintiff's part, in an action against a third party, that his dis,
ability terminated at the time payments were stopped.
IV.

PAROL AND EXTRINSIC EVIDENCE APPECTING WRITINGS

In White v. Kentling,18 a clause in a deed provided, "in case this land is
not used for the purpose of a bank and this corporation passes out of
existence said property is to revert to grantors." This clause was held not
ambiguous, and was subject to construction by the trial court in a quiet title
suit, and oral testimony as to circumstances surrounding the writing of the
deed and insertion of the clause were inadmissible.
V.

OPINION EVIDENCE

In State v. Ruffin,"9 the testimony of the occupants of an automobile
as to its speed was admitted ex necessitate for what it was worth, although
they said they were not qualified judges as to speed; and in State v. Evans, 20
defendant's witnesses, although allowed, upon the circumstances detailed,
to testify that in their opinion defendant was of unsound mind, were not
permitted to state that defendant did not know right from wrong, since
such an opinion would have invaded the province of the jury.
Where an issue arises as to whether claimant's disability arose from
causes for which the defendant would be liable, and where the evidence
does not exclude all other causes, and a layman could not know or have any
reasonable basis for an inference as to the cause of the disability, the opinion
of a doctor that a certain occurrence or condition might, could or would
produce a certain result, is not alone substantial evidence that such an oc2
currence or condition did produce the result. '
But in Wills v. Berberich's Delivery Co., the court held that experts
might give their opinion as to which of two or more possible causes more
probably produced the injury, and further, that physicians may express an
opinion upon the causal connection between the injury and result, where
such opinion is based on facts testified to by physicians treating the injured
person.

18.
19.
20.
21.

134 S. W. (2d) 39 (Mo. 1939).
344 Mo. 301, 126 S. W. (2d) 218 (1939).
133 S. W. (2d) 389 (Mo. 1939).
Hunt v. Armour & Co., 136 S. W. (2d) 312 (Mo. 1939).
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VI.

WEIGHT AND SUFFICIENCY OF EVIDENCE

In two cases the court reaffirms its rule that a very clear case is required
for a holding that positive corroborated testimony is untrue, because of
2
physical impossibility.1
In Tichenor v. Bowman, casual remarks made thirty years before the
trial with respect to certain deeds, were of slight probative value in a suit
to establish an implied trust.
In Lappin v. Prebe,2 3 it is stated that while the facts necessary to sustain a recovery in a civil case may be proven by circumstantial evidence,
nevertheless, the facts and circumstances proven must be such that the facts
necessary to support the verdict may be inferred, and must reasonably
follow, and such circumstantial evidence must exclude guess-work, conjecture and speculation as to the existence of necessary facts, and a case
based upon an inference or inferences must fail, upon proof of undisputed
facts incompetent with such inferences.
VII. WITNESSES
A.

Competency

In Taylor v. Hamrik,24 plaintiff sought to enforce an alleged oral contract to adopt her, made between plaintiff's father and her deceased stepmother. To such a contract the father was a competent witness.
In a suit to adjudge title and partition real estate, one claiming under
a deceased party who would have been a competent witness if living, is
25
not disqualified by the death of the one under whom he claims.
Where a witness is disqualified by the death of a party, the disqualification is waived if his adversary first introduces testimony on the subject,
26
given by the disqualified witness in another trial.
B.

Examination

In First National Bank v. Vogt,27 it was error to restrict too much the
cross-examination as to the circumstances, where it was contended, in a suit

22. Melenson v. Howell, 344 Mo. 1137, 130 S. W. (2d) 555 (1939) ; Branson
v. Abernathy Furniture Co., 344 Mo. 1171, 130 S. W. (2d) 562 (1-939).
23. 131 S. W. (2d) 511 (Mo. 1939).
24.

134 S. W. (2d) 52 (Mo. 1939).

25. Fullerton v. Fullerton, 132 S. W. (2d) 966 (Mo. 1939).
26. In 'e Franz Estate, 344 Mo. 510, 127 S. W. (2d) 401 (1939).
27. 344 Mo. 284, 126 S. W. (2d) 199 (1939).
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by creditors to set aside a conveyance by a father to a daughter as fraudulent, that the deed was executed in payment of antecedent indebtedness.
In Schroeder v. Rawlings, under the guise of cross-examination, it was
sought to develop testimony which would reveal to the jury that the defendant was protected by liability insurance, and the rule was declared that
cross-examination cannot be used to develop improper matter, nor excused
upon the ground that it is to lay a basis for impeachment, since incompetent
and irrelevant matter cannot come in under the guise of impeachment.
In State v. Privett,8 witnesses offered by defendant to prove his general reputation as a quiet, peaceable and law-abiding citizen may be crossexamined as to their knowledge of defendant's activities, inconsistent with
such reputation.
In Schipper v. Brashear Truck Co., 29 it was held that the extent to
which an unfriendly witness, or a person whose interest is adverse, may be
examined, is a matter within the sound discretion of a trial court, and the
appellate court will not interfere with the exercise of such discretion in the
absence of abuse thereof.
C.

Credibility, impeachment and corroboration

Where the character of the prosecutrix in a rape case had been attacked
by testimony as to specific instances of unchastity and lewdness, rebuttal
testimony showing prosecutrix' good reputation for morality and chastity
was admissible, and it was permissible to ask a witness on cross-examination
whether he was not a deserter from a C. C. Camp, since such fact tended
to discredit the witness.30
A defendant testifying as a witness in his own behalf cannot be impeached by proof of the mere charge of an offense. 31
In Flint v. Loew's St. Louis Realty & Amusement Corp.,32 a statement
in writing, made by the plaintiff at the time she fell on defendant's steps, in
which she said she did not know the cause of her fall, was admissible to
impeach her, after she had testified on trial to facts which she said caused
her fall.
In the case of State v. Robinson, 3 the court indicates a new situation,
wherein defendant's reputation for the specific traits of character involved

28. 344 Mo. 1020, 130 S. W. (2d) 575 (1939).
29. 132 S. W. (2d) 993 (Mo. 1939).
30. State v. Daugherty, 126 S. W. (2d) 237 (Mo. 1939).
31. State v. Spinks, 344 Mo. 105, 125 S. W. (2d) 60 (1939).
32. 344 Mo. 310, 126 S. W. (2d) 193 (1939).
33. 344 Mo. 1094, 130 S. W. (2d) 530 (1939).
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in a homicide case may be considered in issue. The trial was one for murder,
with a plea of self-defense. Error was assigned because the state introduced
evidence of the accused's reputation as a quarrelsome, turbulent and violent
man, contending that the accused had tendered no such issue, and that only
his reputation for truth and veracity was in issue. The opinion points out
that the defendant, by cross-examination of the state's witnesses and by
direct evidence offered by him, had sought to prove the bad reputation of
deceased as a quarrelsome, turbulent and violent man. This, the court says,
was a tender by the defendant of the factual issue as to the bad character
of his victim, to sustain his plea of self-defense, and it is ruled that thereby
defendant extended the scope of the inquiry beyond the res gestae, and
opened up for inquiry all evidence of like quality and probative value on
the merits of the ultimate factual issue, and held that the state was not
limited, under such circumstances, solely to such evidence as would impeach
the defendant as a witness. The decision obviously will change the course
to be followed by defense attorneys in many future criminal trials.
VIII. RELEVANCY AND REs GESTAE
In Schroeder v. Rawlings, it was sought to justify the admission of
defendant, made shortly after the accident, that he had liability insurance,
upon the ground of res gestae, and that same constituted an admission of
liability. In holding such evidence inadmissible as res gestae, the court states
the rule to be that res gestae relates to and authorizes the reception in evidence of matter incidental to the main fact and explanatory of it, but that
it is confined to acts and words which are so clearly connected therewith
as to constitute a part of the transaction, and without knowledge of which
the main fact might not be properly understood.
Concerning the admission of what is sometimes designated real evidence, the court held that in a second degree murder case where there was
an issue of self-defense, deceased's shirt was properly admissible for the
purpose of showing the location of the wound he received, so that the jury
might determine who was the aggressor ;3- that a revolver taken by defendant
at the time of a robbery is admissible in evidence ;' and that in a burglary
and larceny case, cartridges found on the ground outside of the burglarized
store were admissible when similar cartridges were found on the defend36
ant.

34. State v. Westmoreland, 126 S. W. (2d) 202 (Mo. 1939).
35. State v. Gregory, 344 Mo. 525, 127 S. W. (2d) 408 (1939).
Stateofv.Missouri
Pease,School
133 S.
W. Scholarship
(2d) 409 Repository,
(Mo. 1939).
Published by36.
University
of Law
1940

55

Missouri Law Review, Vol. 5, Iss. 4 [1940], Art. 1
MISSOURI LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 5

In State v. Wymore, it was held that evidence of the notoriety of an
existing fact is admissible to prove knowledge on the part of another of such
fact.
IX.

A.

CRimniAL LAw

Acts and declarations of co-conspirators and co-defendants

The testimony of an accomplice may be used by the state, even though
the accomplice has been promised immunity, provided he has not promised
37
to testify in a particular way in consideration of immunity.
Admissions and confessions

B.

In State v. Graft,38 a constable was allowed to testify as to when he
received the warrant for defendant's arrest, and as to his inability to find
defendant, on the theory that the whereabouts of a defendant after the
9
commiEsion of a crime are always admissible; and in State v. Murphy, the
entire conversation at the time defendant was arrested was admissible, and
it was not error to ask the witness if the defendant at the time stated where
he was on the day of the robbery, to which the witness replied in the negative.
A written statement given by the defendant while under arrest and
before he was represented by counsel, and when he had not been advised
that the statement might be used against him, was, nevertheless, admissible
40
against him, where it did appear that the statement was voluntary.
C. Proof of other offenses
4

In State v. Spinks, 1 the rule is re-affirmed that the state cannot prove
against a defendant any crime not alleged either as a foundation for a
separate punishment or as aiding the proof that he is guilty of the offense
charged, even though he has put his character in issue, except that evidence
of other crimes is competent to prove the specific crime when such evidence
tends to establish (1) motive, (2) intent, (3) absence of mistake or accident, (4) a common scheme embracing the commission of two or more
crimes so related to each other -that proof of one tends to establish the

37. State v. White, 126 S. W. (2d) 234 (Mo. 1939).
38. 344 Mo.269, 126 S. W. (2d) 177 (1939).
39. 133 S. W. (2d) 398 (Mo. 1939).
40. State v. Evans, 133 S. W. (2d) 389. (Mo. 1939).
41. 344 Mo. 105, 125 S. W. (2d) 60 (1939).
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proof of the others or the identity of the person charged with the commission
of the crime on trial. Proof merely that the defendant is charged with or
has committed another crime is not admissible to impeach him, even after
he has testified as a witness in his own behalf. 42 And in State v. Craft,43 it is
held that in a criminal charge of obtaining money or property under false
pretenses, evidence of similar transactions in which the accused participated
is generally admissible, under the exceptions hereinabove set out, so that
the conduct of the accused and his statements to others, admittedly defrauded, are relevant to establish his guilt under the charge being tried.
D. Evidence at preliminary or former trial
In State v. Gregory," it was held that where two witnesses who had
testified at the preliminary were dead, the transcript of their testimony
taken at the preliminary could be used at the trial, and it was not necessary
to produce the testimony of the stenographer at the preliminary, who at
the time of trial was in South America, to identify the transcript, where
the justice of the peace before whom the preliminary was held, and the
prosecuting attorney who acted at the preliminary, identified the exhibit
purporting to be the transcript of the evidence taken at the preliminary.

EXTRAORDINARY LEGAL REMEDIES
RusH

H. LImBAUGH*

I. CFaTIORARi

A. Statistics
During 1939 the Missouri Supreme Court decided or finally disposed
of twenty-six cases in which writs of certiorarihad been issued. In each
of these cases the court reviewed a decision by one of the courts of appeals.
Eleven of these cases were decided by Division One of the court, six by
Division Two of the court, and nine by the court en bano. Of the cases
reviewed, fourteen were decisions of the Kansas City Court of Appeals,
42. Ibid.
43.
44.

344 Mo. 269, 126 S. W. (2d) 177 (1939).
344 Mo. 525, 127 S. W. (2d) 408 (1939).
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nine were decisions of the St. Louis Court of Appeals, and three were
decisions of the Springfield Court of Appeals. In fourteen of the cases
reviewed, the opinion of the court of appeals was quashed, either in whole
or in part. In twelve of the eases reviewed, the writ or certiorari was
quashed. During the year the court did not exercise its function of reviewing decisions of other inferior courts.'
B. Purpose of writ as applied to courts of appeals
In State ex rel. Missouri-Kansas-Texas R. R. v. Shain,2 State ex rel.
Mills v. Allen,3 State ex rel. Pemberton v. Shain,4 and State ex rel. Banks
v. Hostetter,, the court restated the general rule that the purpose of
certiorarito review opinions of the courts of appeals was to secure uniformity in judicial decisions and preserve harmony in the law.
C. The question of conflict
In State ex rel. Kansas City Public Service Co. v. Shain, the court
adhered to the general rule that on certiorarito review an opinion of a court
of appeals, its function is to determine whether the opinion of the court
of appeals conflicted with the last previous ruling of the supreme court,
either as to a general principle of law announced or as to a ruling under
a like, analogous or similar state of facts. The rule was re-announced
in the same language in State ex rel. Melbourne Hotel Co. v. Hostetter.7
In State ex rel. Gentry v. Hostetter,8 the court declined to consider a
question of error raised in the opinion of the court of appeals, because
on certiorari the supreme court is concerned only with the question of
conflict. Likewise, in State ex rel. Waters v. Hostetter,9 the court repeated
that on certiorariit was concerned only with questions of conflict on the
particular issues decided by the court of appeals. And in State ex rel.
United Factories v. Hostetter," the court said that it would not quash
an opinion of a court of appeals "unless it clearly appears that the ruling

1. Limbaugh, The Work of the Missouri Supreme Court for the Year 1938
(ExtraordinaryLegal Remedies) (1939) 4 Mo. L. REv. 389-391.

2. 343 Mo. 961, 124 S. W. (2d) 1141 (1939).
3. 344 Mo. 743, 128 S. W. (2d) 1040 (1939).
4. 344 Mo. 15, 124 S. W. (2d) 1087 (1939).
5. 344 Mo. 155, 125 S. W. (2d) 835 (1939).
6. 134 S. W. (2d) 58 (Mo. 1939).
7. 344 Mo. 472, 126 S.W. (2d) 1189 (1939).
8. 343 Mo. 1090, 125 S. W. (2d) 72 (1939).
9. 344 Mo. 443, 126 S. W. (2d) 1164 (1939).
10. 344 Mo. 386, 126 S. W. (2d) 1173 (1939).
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of the court of appeals conflicts with, or contravenes, a controlling decision
of this court ruling the point in question." In State ex rel. St. LouisSan Francisco Ry. v. Shain," and State ex rel. Massman Construction
Co. v. Shain," the court pointed out that on certiorarithe supreme court
was concerned only with whether or not the opinion under review is in conflict with the last controlling decision of the supreme court on the points
ruled.
D. What constitutes conflict
In an automobile collision case where plaintiff sought recovery under
the humanitarian rule and primary negligence, and defendant sought
recovery on a counterclaim on the same grounds, a ruling by the court of
appeals approving an instruction that if defendant were driving on the
right side of the road while exercising the highest degree of care, and was
negligently struck by an automobile driven by plaintiff's employee, the
defendant was entitled to recover, was held to be in conflict with prior decisions of the supreme court holding that an instruction directing a verdict on factual issues should submit pleaded and proved affirmative facts
upon which predicated verdict is to be determined. This was held in
State ex rel. Grisham v. Allen. 13
In State ex rel. Jefferson City v. Shain, 4 plaintiff recovered judgment against the city for injuries resulting from a fall alleged to have
been caused by a defective sidewalk. The court of appeals approved an
instruction which authorized a verdict for plaintiff based on a mere defect in the sidewalk, whether dangerous or not. The supreme court held
that such approved instruction amounted to a positive misdirection, because
it did not require a finding that the defective condition rendered the
sidewalk unsafe and dangerous to travelers, and the error in such instruction
was not cured by the fact that other instructions submitted that question.
B3ecause the decision of the court of appeals approving such instruction
conflicted with prior decisions announcing such principles, its opinion was
quashed.
In State ex rel. Baldwin v. Shain,"s it was held that a decision of
of the court of appeals that the trial court could not say as a matter of

11. 134 S. W. (2d) 89 (Mo. 1939).
12. 344 Mo. 1003, 130 S.W. (2d) 491 (1939).
13. 344 Mo. 66, 124 S. W. (2d) 1080 (1939).
14.
15.

344 Mo. 57, 124 S. W. (2d) 1194 (1939).
125 S. W. (2d) 41 (Mo. 1938).
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law, in a suit under the humanitarian doctrine for the death of a person
struck by a train, that the defendant's failure to slacken the speed of the
train was not a proximate cause of the death of the deceased, in view of
the fact that the deceased, who was walking on ends of ties, would have
had more time to step aside to a place of safety if speed had been slackened,
conflicted with controlling decisions of the supreme court.
In State. ex rel. Banks v. Hostetter, the court held that a decision
by the court of appeals that an instruction submitting the question of
slackening the speed of a truck, though there was no evidence to show
that a collision would have been prevented by the slackening of speed,
did not require reversal, was in conflict with prior decisions of the supreme
court, where it was held prejudicial error to instruct the jury on the failure to slacken speed when there was no evidence that slackening would
have prevented the collision.
In State ex rel. PrudentialInsurance Co. v. Shain,16 where the court
of appeals had decided, in effect, that contracting typhoid fever through
the normal consumption of contaminated water amounts to the suffering
of bodily injuries from accidental means, so as to come within a provision
of an insurance policy providing for double indemnity in case of accidental
death, the supreme court held that in such decision the court of appeals construed language that had a plain and unambiguous meaning, contrary to
prior decisions of the supreme court.
In State ex rel. Mutual Life Insurance, Co. v. Shain,17 it was held that
where a court of appeals construes language of an insurance policy that
is unambiguous, in order to reach its conclusion authorizing recovery under
the policy, its decision construing the policy contrary to its plain meaning
is in conflict with decisions of the supreme court and must be quashed.
In State ex rel. Melbourne Hotel Co. v. Hostetter, the supreme court
quashed an opinion of a court of appeals remanding a cause based on a
claim filed with the workmen's compensation commission, to the commission
with an instruction as to the character of award to make, on the ground
that the action of the court of appeals conflicted with decisions by the
supreme court that a court, on reviewing an award made by the workmen's
compensation commission, is not authorized under the law to make its
own findings and direct the commission to confirm it.

16.
17.

344 Mo. 623, 127 S. W. (2d) 675 (1939).
344 Mo. 276, 126 S. W. (2d) 181 (1939).
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In State ex rel. Sterling v. Shain,18 where a court of appeals held
that the setting aside of a default judgment at a subsequent term was discretionary, the supreme court held that such decision was in conflict with
its prior decision and that such action must be based on evidence that is
sufficient and substantial.
In State ex rel. Henderson v. Shain, 9 the supreme court held that
a decision by a court of appeals permitting recovery on an implied contract although a specific contract had been alleged, was in conflict with
prior decisions of the supreme court.
E. What may be considered in determining question of conflict
In State ex rel. Pemberton v. Shain, and in State ex rel. St. LouisSan Francisco Ry. v. Shain, the supreme court followed its established
rule that on certiorarito review a decision of a court of appeals it is limited
to a consideration only of the opinion of the court of appeals and such
pleadings and documents as are referred to therein and made in part a
basis of the decision.
In State ex rel. Alassman Construction Co. v. Shain and State ex
rel. Henderson v. Shain, it was held that the supreme court on certiorari
will examine a motion referred to in a court of appeals opinion under
review, as though the motion was set out in full in the opinion.
As previously indicated, a number of cases re-asserted the principle
that the supreme court might not, on certiorari, consider the question of
the correctness of the decision of the court of appeals on the merits of
the case.
F. What is binding on supreme court on certiorari
In State ex rel. Baldwin v. Shain, and in State ex rel. Kansas City
Gas Co. v. Shain,20 the court said that on certiorarithe court of appeals
determines the facts and the supreme court is bound by the court of appeals'
conclusion as to what the facts are.
In State ex rel. Sterling v. Shain, the court held that, generally, the
question of whether evidence is sufficient and substantial is for the trial
court and court of appeals in the determination of the case on its merits,
and is not one for the supreme court to decide on certiorari.

18. 344 Mo. 891, 129 S.W. (2d) 1048 (1939).
19. 344 Mo. 1003, 130 S. W. (2d) 491 (1939).
20. 132 S. W. (2d) 1015 (Mo. 1939).
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State ex rel. Sterling v. Shain also held that in determining the question
of conflict the supreme court is limited to facts stated in the opinion by the
court of appeals.
On the other hand, in State ex rel. Baldwin v. Shain, the court repeated its rule formerly.announced that, while it is bound by the conclusion
of the court of appeals in the case under review as to what the facts are,
it is not bound by the result the court of appeals reaches by applying
the law to the facts. And in State ex rel. Banks v. Hostetter, the court said
that it was not bound "by an expression of the court of appeals in its opinion as to what the result should be after the law is applied to the facts
stated in the opinion where such result conflicts with a controlling decision
of this court." Likewise, in State ex rel. Sterling v. Shain, the court held
that, while a court of appeals as a matter of law passes on questions of substance, the supreme court on certiorariis not bound by a conclusion reached
by a court of appeals in applying the law to the facts, where the supreme
court has reached a different conclusion in applying the law to a similar
state of facts.
Nor can a court of appeals prevent certiorari by declaring that the
facts it sets out in its opinion are not similar to those in decision by the
supreme court, for, as said in State ex rel. Banks v. Hostetter, if the
supreme court should be bound by such a declaration by a court of appeals,
it "would be completely disarmed and unable to preserve harmony in our
judicial decisions."
G. What supreme court cannot do on certiorari
In Stato ex rel. Melbourne Hotel Co. v. Hostetter, the supreme court
said that it could not on certioraridescribe the bounds of the court of
appeals' analysis, nor control the form or content of their expression of
the facts.
The supreme court cannot on certiorari examine de nomo the evidence
as shown by the record of the case submitted to the court of appeals, as
the supreme court is limited in its consideration to what the evidence of
the case is as such evidence is stated in the opinion of the court of appeals.
This was held in State ex rel. Sterling v. Shain.
In State ex rel. Massman Construction Co. v. Shain and State ez
rel. Henderson v. Shain, it was held that contentions not decided by the
court of appeals are not considered by the supreme court on certiorari.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol5/iss4/1
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These same two eases also held that on certiorari the supreme court
will not decide conflicts between opinions of courts of appeals.
When a court of appeals says in its opinion that it concludes that the
evidence of the case does not justify a ruling that plaintiff was guilty of
contributory negligence as a matter of law but does not state the evidence
on which it bases that conclusion, the supreme court cannot determine
whether or not the decision is in conflict with its prior decisions. This was
held in State ex rel. Kansas City Gas Co. v. Shain. This is one way by which
a court of appeals can shut the door against a review of its decision by
certiorari.
H. What supreme court can do on certiorari
Under the constitution, the supreme court has exclusive jurisdiction
to determine appeals in cases where the title to real estate is involved.
On an appeal in a will contest where the will devised real estate, the supreme
court has held that it had exclusive jurisdiction.2 1 In State ex rel. Pemberton v. Shain, where the Kansas City Court of Appeals, decided an
appeal of a case to set aside a will which devised real estate, the supreme
court on certiorariquashed the opinion of the court of appeals and retained the decision on its merits.
Where a court of appeals' decision correctly stated the law on a given
proposition, although it was in conflict with a prior decision of the supreme
court, it was held in State ex rel. Mills v. Allen that in considering the
proposition anew on certiorari,where the supreme court finds its former
decision on the point was wrong, it would overrule its former decision
and quash the writ of certiorari.

II. HABEAS CORPUS
In LaGore v. Ramsey, 22 petitioner was tried and convicted on an
indictment charging him with assault with intent to rob. He was sentenced to the penitentiary for robbery in the first degree. The court
held, on the prisoner's petition for habeas corpus, that the judgment,
sentence and commitment were void but that he not be discharged but
released from the penitentiary to the marshal of the supreme court and
by him delivered to the sheriff of the county where he was convicted,

21.

22.

Proffer v. Proffer, 342 Mo. 184, 114 S. W. (2d) 1035 (1938).
126 S. W. (2d) 1153 (Mo. 1939).

Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1940

63

Missouri Law Review, Vol. 5, Iss. 4 [1940], Art. 1
MISSOURI LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 5

to be taken before the judge of the circuit court where he was convicted,
and that the judge sentence him on the charge on which he was convicted.
In Reardon v. ffrace,23 petitioner was held under a judgment of a court
of appeals that he had unlawfully engaged in the practice of the law and
for that reason was guilty of contempt of court. The petitioner claimed
he was unlawfully restrained under a warrant of commitment void because no facts were stated authorizing the restraint. The applicable statute24 provides that when a person is committed for any contempt specified
by the statute "the particular circumstances of his offense shall be set
forth in the order or warrant of commitment." The statute does not mention unlawful practice of the law as an offense for which there shall be a
commitment. But the statute is declaratory of the common law, and under
both the warrant was void, and the petitioner was ordered discharged.
III. MANDAMUS

In State ex rel. Garhart v. Smith, 5 mandamus was sought against
the state auditor to compel him to register a township bond. The point
raised was that the first date of publication of the notice of the bond
election was not twenty-one days prior to the date of the election, as the
statute26 required. The court issued the peremptory writ, holding the
newspaper containing the notice of the bond election as first published,
which was placed in the hands of readers twenty-one days before the
election, furnished statutory notice, even though it contained a date twenty
days prior to the election.
In State ex rel. Springfield v. Smith,27 mandamus was used to compel the state auditor to register a series of City of Springfield bonds. The
question involved was, whether statutes pertaining to cities of the second
class prescribing notice applied, or whether a statute applicable to all cities
governed the notice. The court laid down the proper rule of statutory
construction, found the sections of the statutes applicable to cities of the
second class applied, and held that proper notice had been given and that
the bonds should be registered.
In State ex rel. Horton v. Bourke, 28 the mandamus writ was first

23. 344 Mo. 448, 126 S. W. (2d) 1167 (1939).
24. Mo. Rsv. STAT. (1929) § 1867.
25. 344 Mo. 213, 125 S. W. (2d) 832 (1939).
26. Mo. REV. STAT. (1929) § 7961.

27. 344 Mo. 150, 125 S. W. (2d) 883 (1939).
28. 344 Mo. 826, 129 S. W. (2d) 866 (1939).
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issued by a circuit court against the members of the state board of health
to compel the board to annul an order revoking a license to practice
medicine and surgery in the state and to issue relator a license or reinstate the license previously revoked. The alternative writ was made permanent by order of the circuit court and on appeal to the supreme court
the judgment was reversed. Asserting that the writ of mandamus was
a hard and fast and unreasoning writ, representing the right arm of the
court and essentially the exponent of judicial power reserved only for
extraordinary emergencies, and that it does not issue except in cases where
the ministerial duty sought to be coerced is simple and definite, and that
it does not lie where there is another adequate remedy, the supreme court
held that the writ cannot be used to redress any wrong the board may have
done in revoking the license of relator, and that relator's remedy was by
suit in equity to set aside the order revoking his license.
In State ex rel. School District No. 24 v. Nea, 29 the action originated
in the supreme court to compel the assessment and taxation of mains, pipes,
hydrants and appurtenances of a power plant as personal property in the
district where they are located, under an amendment to a statute authorizing
such assessment. The constitutionality of the amendment was urged.
Pointing out that the function of the mandamus writ is to exclude and
not adjudicate, to compel the performance of ministerial official duties
when the right of such compulsion is not doubtful, and to meet the exigencies of extraordinary emergencies in matters -of more than local concern, the court said it would even declare statutes unconstitutional in
determining whether the writ should issue, where the statute was "clearly
and obviously" unconstitutional, but it denied the peremptory writ on the
ground that the question presented was only of local concern, and that the
existence of an extraordinary emergency was not shown.
30
In State. ex rel. Gaines v. Canada,
the supreme court reversed and
remanded the cause in which relator used the writ of mandamus against
the registrar and curators of the University of Missouri to compel them
to admit him to the school of law of the University, in accordance with the
mandate of the Supreme Court of the United States.3 1

29. 344 Mo. 905, 130 S. W. (2d) 509 (1939).
30. 344 Mo. 1238, 131 S. W. (2d) 217 (1939).
31. For comment on the first decision of the case by the Supreme Court of
Missouri and the decision of the case by the Supreme Court of the United States,
see (1939) 4 Mo. L. Rgv. 400-401.
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In State ex rel. Eggers v. Brown,32 mandamus was sought against
the secretary of state and the commissioner of motor vehicles and his
deputy in charge of the St. Louis branch office, to compel them to furnish
relator, who is in the business of publishing and selling lists of the registration of motor vehicles, certain records kept in the St. Louis office. The
alternative writ was quashed, on the ground that the right to inspect and
copy the records in the office of respondent is not an unlimited right but
it is one that is subject to such reasonable regulations as may be imposed
to prevent undue interference with the work of the employes of the office
and to prevent undue interference with the public being served at the
office.
IV.

PROHIBITION

In each of the thirteen cases the supreme court decided in 1939 involving the extraordinary writ of prohibition, the writ was directed against
a circuit judge. All of the cases but one originated in the supreme court.
One of the cases was decided by Division One of the court, three by
Division Two of the court, and the remainder by the court en bane.
In State ex rel. Graves v. Southern,3 3 the prosecuting attorney of
Jackson county applied unsuccessfully to have the writ used against a
circuit judge who excluded the prosecuting attorney and the attorney
general from the grand jury room.
In State ex rel. McDonald v. Frankenhoff,34 the writ was used at the
instance of a justice of the peace and constable to compel a circuit judge
to desist from hearing a proceeding on a writ of certiorarito determine
the legality of proceedings by the justice as to whether certain property
were gambling devices. The case involves the question of illegal search
and seizure. The preliminary rule was made absolute on the ground that
the circuit court did not acquire jurisdiction to issue the writ of certiorari
because of the lack of candor and fairness in failing to make full disclosure
of the facts in his petition and because the petition disclosed that its purpose
was to protect outlawed devices.
In State ex rel. Riggs v. Seehorn,'5 prohibition was used to prevent
a circuit judge from exercising jurisdiction he announced that he intended

134 S. W. (2d) 28 (Mo. 1939).
33. 344 Mo. 14, 124 S. W. (2d) 1176 (1939).
34. 344 Mo. 188, 125 S. W. (2d) 816 (1939).
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol5/iss4/1
35. 344 Mo. 186, 125 S. W. (2d) 851 (1939).
32.
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to assume over a trust estate, the jurisdiction over which had been already
lodged in another division of the same circuit court.
In State ex rel. Wilkerson v. Skinker,3 6 a probate judge sought by the
use of the writ of prohibition to prevent a circuit judge from using the
mandamzits writ against the probate court to compel it to grant an appeal
from a judgment of the restoration of relator to his right mind after he
had been adjudicated insane. The question was whether an appeal lies
from judgment under the statute."
The supreme court held that, even
though the statute granting the right of appeal in such case caused hardship, it was the function of the court in prohibition not to determine the
wisdom of the statute but to construe it, and since the statute gave the
right of appeal the circuit court had the right to compel the probate
court to abide by it.
In State ex rel. Natinal Refining Co. v. Seehorn,38 a suit was originally
brought by a husband in circuit court for damages for the loss of the
comfort, society and services of his wife and medical expenses incurred
in her behalf, all caused by the alleged negligence of defendant. Before
the case was tried, plaintiff died and the action was revived in the name of
the administrator of his estate. The defendant demurred on the ground
that the cause of action died with plaintiff and could not be maintained
by the administrator. The court overruled the demurrer and required
the defendant to answer and announced that the trial must proceed.
The writ of prohibition was used to prevent further proceedings. The
supreme court held that the cause of action of the husband did not survive
him and could not be maintained by the administrator of his estate, and,
since the trial court was about to act in excess of its jurisdiction, prohibition is the proper remedy.
In State ex rel. Missouri Broadcasting Co. v. O'Malley, 9 the writ of
prohibition was used against a circuit judge who ordered the production
for inspection of certain books and records for use in a case on trial. The
question was whether the order violated constitutional provisions forbidding unreasonable searches and seizures. The supreme court held
that the circuit court did not exceed its jurisdiction in making the order,
and the provisional rule in prohibition was discharged.

36.
37.
38.

344 Mo. 359, 126 S. W. (2d) 1156 (1939).
Mo. REv. STAT. (1929) § 493.
344 Mo. 547, 127 S. W. (2d) 418 (1939).

39. 344 Mo. 639, 127 S.W. (2d) 684 (1939).
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In State ex rel. Smith v. Joynt,40 the writ of prohibition was used to
prevent a circuit judge from appointing a receiver for an alleged partnership in a case where the petition against the alleged partnership did not state
a cause of action and facts showed the partnership did not exist. The court
held that where a cause of action is not stated, there is no case pending
and the court is without power to appoint a receiver.
In State ex rel. Caulfield v. Sartorius,4' prohibition was used to
prevent a circuit judge from enforcing an order removing relator as cotrustee, on the ground that the court was without jurisdiction. The supreme
court held that the order of removal was not a final judgment from which
an appeal lies, but was merely an incident in the administration of a trust,
that for a court to have authority to remove a trustee there must be a clear
necessity for it in order to save the trust property, and, since no such
necessity was shown to exist, the court exceeded its jurisdiction in ordering
the removal of the trustee, and prohibition lies to prevent the enforcement
of the order.
State ex rel. Lee v. Sartorius42 involved the administration of certain
trust property as part of the trust under consideration in the last preceding
case. Here the circuit court undertook to remove a committee representing certificate holders operating under an agreement. The supreme court
held that the members of the committee were not subject to removal by the
court, and prohibition would lie to prevent the court from acting beyond
the scope of his powers.
In State ex rel. FirstNationalBank v. Sartorius,43 prohibition was used
to prevent a circuit judge from appointing a successor-trustee to fill a
vacancy caused by the removal of a trustee.
In State ex rel. Robertson v. Sevier,4 the writ of prohibition was
used on the relation of the superintendent of insurance of Missouri against
a circuit judge to prohibit him from passing on a motion relative to the
payment of funds derived from insurance rate reduction litigation.
V. QUO WARRANTO
There is little left unstated in the law of quo werranto in Missouri
in the case of State ex inf. McKittrick v. Wymore4 5 where the writ was
40. 344 Mo. 686, 127 S. W. (2d) 708 (1939).
41. 344 Mo. 919, 130 S. W. (2d) 541 (1939).
42. 344 Mo. 912, 130 S. W. (2d) 547 (1939).
43. 344 Mo. 931, 130 S. W. (2d) 550 (1939).
44. 132 S. W. (2d) 961 (Mo. 1939).
45. 132 S. W. (2d) 979 (Mo. 1939).
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used to oust a prosecuting attorney because of official misconduct. The
court not only exercised its power under the writ to remove respondent
from his office, but it also assessed a fine and taxed the costs of the action
against him. The opinion of the court is classic and historic.
The writ was also used to oust from office the treasurer of St. Louis,
in State ex inf. McKittrick v. Dwyer.4" Respondent was appointed by
the mayor of St. Louis upon the death of the regularly-elected treasurer.
The court held that the mayor was without authority to make such appointment.
In State ex rel. Springfield v. Springfield City Water 6o., 4 7 a proceeding in the nature of quo warrantowas instituted for the purpose of ousting
the respondent from the streets and public thoroughfares of Springfield, on
the alleged ground that respondent was occupying the streets illegally and
without franchise. After discussing at length the legal effect of proceedings
by Springfield in which the existence and rights of the respondent were
recognized, the court held that the city was estopped to deny that respondent has a perpetual franchise. The right of ouster was denied.
In State ex rel. Goodman v. Heath,48 a quo warranto proceeding
originated in the circuit court on the information of a prosecuting attorney
at the relation of an individual, to oust respondent from the office of
school director, on the ground that he was not qualified to hold the office
because he was not a resident taxpayer who had paid a state and county
tax within one year next preceding his election and because he did not
make a legal oath and qualify for the office, within four days after his
election. The circuit court denied ouster and quashed the writ. From
this judgment relator appealed to the supreme court. The court discussed
the statutes fixing the qualifications of the respondent and held that a
person who owns taxable property and owes taxes on it which are due and
payable during the calendar year preceding his election, is eligible to
take the office of common school director if he pays such taxes at least
prior to the time prescribed for taking his oath of office. The judgment
of the circuit court was affirmed.

46.
47.

343 Mo. 973, 124 S. W. (2d) 1173 (1939).
131 S. W. (2d) 525 (Mo. 1939).

48. 132ofS.Missouri
W. (2d)
1001
(Mo.
1939). Repository, 1940
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THE HUMANITARIAN DOCTRINE
WILLIAMAt

H.

BECKER, JR.*

During the year 1939, the Missouri Supreme Court continued to use
the phrase "humanitarian doctrine" to cover the well established last
clear chance rule as well as the peculiar Missouri doctrine. And the cases
determined in 1939 failed to shed any light upon the true nature of the
Missouri humanitarian rule as distinguished from the last clear chance
rule. It became increasingly evident, however, that the court would some
day be confronted with the necessity of determining whether two equally
oblivious automobile operators colliding at a street intersection may recover
simultaneously against each other. Increasing use of the humanitarian
rule as a defense or counter offense in automobile cases made it more likely
that this question would be presented in a form which cannot be avoided.
In the meantime, the court is having more and more difficulty with instructions to juries in automobile cases which are not so simple as the
classic grade-crossing train accident. This difficulty in trial practice
is but a symptom of an underlying obscurity of principle. Until the court
decides what the Missouri humanitarian doctrine is, there is going to be
more than the usual difficulty in its administration. Until some satisfactory answer is found, the court will probably continue to avoid a showdown.

I. TnE

COURT EN BANC

Stark v. Berger' involved a truck-train grade crossing collision. The
court reversed outright a judgment for the plaintiff, holding:
(1) That the engineer of a train had a right to assume that the truck
driver would stop before entering the pathway of the train;
(2) That no duty arose under the humanitarian rule to stop the train
or slacken its speed until the truck reached a point where it could not be
stopped before entering the pathway of the train, (i. e., the truck was not in
the "zone of imminent peril" until it reached this point) ;
That where, as in the case at bar, only two seconds elapsed from
(3)
the time the duty to act arose and the time the collision occurred, there could

*Attorney, Columbia. LL.B., University of Missouri, 1932.

1. 344 Mo. 170, 125 S. W. (2d) 870 (1939).
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be no recovery for failure to stop or slacken (the truck driver was not
oblivious, therefore failure to warn was not involved) ;
(4) That judicial notice will be taken of the fact that some time must
elapse from the moment the engineer realizes the danger until the time
the brakes can be set;
(5)
That expert testimony of the instantaneous action of air brakes
at the moment the lever is pushed into position will be disregarded in
view of the judicial knowledge of the court and evidence of the various
operations required to make the brakes effective.
The principles announced by the court seem to be well established.
The result depended upon the court's construction of the effect of the evidence.
Judge Tipton dissented in the case without opinion, probably disagreeing with the court's construction of the evidence. This dissent,
therefore, is of little significance because no disagreement in principle was
announced, and because it was probably limited to the result of application of accepted principles to the facts.
In the case of State ex rel. Banks v. Hostetter,2 a truck collided with the
rear of an automobile parked partially on the pavement and partially on the
shoulder at night. The case was submitted upon the humanitarian rule in
an instruction hypothesizing failure to swerve or failure to slacken the
speed of the truck. These grounds were submitted in the disjunctive.
The supreme court held that it was erroneous to submit slackening
because there was no evidence that slackening would have prevented the
collision. This error was held to require reversal of the judgment for the
plaintiff. This was simply an application of the doctrine earlier applied
several times in the railroad cases.
State ex rel. Banks v. Hostetter3 is a companion case involving the
identical question.
II. DIVIsIoN ONE
In Branson v. Abernathy Furniture Co.,4 two automobiles travelling
in opposite directions on the highway collided. The right front wheel of
plaintiff's car went off the right side of the concrete slab onto a muddy
shoulder. As the plaintiff pulled his car back onto the slab, it began

2. 344 Mo. 155, 125 S. W. (2d) 835 (1939).
3. 128 S. W. (2d) 1022 (Mo. 1939).
4. 344 ofMo.
1171,School
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skidding. Thereafter defendant's car, without swerving or slackening,
struck the plaintiff's skidding car which had come over onto the defendant's
right hand side of the slab.
The court held that a submissible humanitarian case was made; that
when the plaintiff's car began to skid toward the defendant's side of the
road, the plaintiff was in imminent peril and the defendant had a duty
under the humanitarian rule to act.
In passing upon the instruction, the court held that the plaintiff was
not in a position of imminent peril when his car ran off the pavement
onto the shoulder. The court held that the zone of peril is much narrower
in cars approaching each other so as to pass without interference, and cases
where the plaintiff and defendant are approaching at right angles so
that their paths will eventually cross.
In the Branson case, the court restated the rule with respect to the
requirements of a sole cause instruction. It pointed out that the requirements were different in a case submitted solely under the humanitarian
doctrine and in a case submitted under both primary negligence and the
humanitarian rule.
mdenson v. Howell5 involved an automobile collision. Plaintiff was
making a left turn to reach a filling station located on the left side of the
street on which she was travelling. She was struck by the defendant's
oncoming car.
It was held that the case was submissible under the humanitarian
rule for failure to stop and slacken. The principal instruction which imposed the duty to stop or slacken after plaintiff started turning left, was
held proper as against the contention that it unduly extended the zone of
imminent peril. The instruction required the jury to find the plaintiff
in a position of "imminent and inescapable peril."
In passing upon
the instruction, the court pointed out that "inescapable peril" defined the
situation where the plaintiff was helpless to avoid the collision by her own
efforts, while "imminent peril" may comprehend the situation where the
peril is caused by obliviousness, with ability in the plaintiff to extricate
herself.
The principal instruction contained a concluding paragraph authorizing a verdict for the plaintiff even though the jury found the plaintiff

5. 344 Mo. 1137, 130 S. W. (2d) 555 (1939).
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guilty of negligence. The concluding clause was held proper and the case
distinguished from the prior ruling in Smithers v. Barker'
In the Melenson case, the defendant submitted a sole cause instruction
and also set up a counterclaim. The plaintiff pleaded and submitted
contributory negligence as a defense to this counterclaim. The submission
of the counterclaim on primary negligence was held to be additional
justification for the concluding paragraph of the plaintiff's principal
instruction.
This case is another illustration of the complications in submitting
a humanitarian case to the jury where the defendant files and submits
a counterclaim.
In Prater v. Rausch7 defendant's car collided with the plaintiff's
car which was crossing the street on which defendant's car was travelling.
An instruction given on behalf of the defendant was held erroneous because it unduly limited the zone of imminent peril. The instruction
contained the following clause:
if you find and believe from the evidence that the
automobile in which plaintiff was riding was driven immediately
in the path of defendant's automobile, and in so close proximity
thereto as to make it impossible for the defendant to prevent his
automobile from colliding with the automobile in which plaintiff
was riding, by the exercise of the highest degree of care in the
operation thereof, then your verdict must be in favor of the defendant. "
It was held by the court that this violated the rule of the cases holding
the defendant not authorized to wait until the plaintiff's car is immed:ately
in his path before taking steps to avert the collision. The giving of this
instruction was held to be sufficient ground for the granting of a new trial
by the supreme court.
In Meese v. Thompson,8 the court again applied the rule that a humanitarian case cannot rest upon speculation and conjecture. The occurrence
out of which the suit arose was a truck-train grade crossing collision.
The e-idence failed to show that action on the part of defendant after the
plaintiff came into a position of imminent peril would have permitted the
plaintiff to escape injury. The rule seems to be well established in cases of
this kind that the evidence must positively show that slackening under
the humanitarian rule would permit the plaintiff to pass out of danger.

6.
7.

341 Mo. 1017, 11 S. W. (2d) 47 (1937).
344 Mo. 888, 129 S. W. (2d) 910, 911 (1939).
8. 344 Mo.
777, 129
S. W.
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847 (1939).
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In State ex rel. Brosnahan v. Shain,9 the court held the "discoverable
peril" feature of the humanitarian rule inapplicable where the occupier of
premises in backing her car out of her own driveway, struck a trash man
who came on the premises once a month. It was held that the practice of
the trash man coming on the premises once a month was not the sort of
user by the public which invokes the duty to keep a lookout at the point
of user. Since there was no duty to keep a lookout, there could be no
constructive notice of the plaintiff's presence such as would impose liability
under the "discoverable peril" branch of the humanitarian doctrine.
In Kick v. Franklin,0 an automobile-train grade crossing collision,
the court severly criticized the instruction of the plaintiff for violation
of the rule established in Buehler v. Festus Mercantile Co."
The instruction contained the words "immediately coming into and
were in -a position of imminent peril and danger." But the phrase was used
only in connection with the hypothesis of the actual situation and not in
connection with the hypothesis upon which a duty to warn under the
humanitarian rule was based. Under these circumstances, the Supreme
Court of Missouri held that there was error but that it was not reversible
12
error.
In Robinson v. Kansas City Public Service Co., 3 which involved the
striking of a pedestrian by the overhang of a street car, the court held that
it was not error to give an instruction concerning the right of the motorman
to assume that the plaintiff would exercise ordinary care to avoid injury
to herself. This ruling was justified on the ground that the principal
instruction undertaking to submit humanitarian negligence mentioned
some elements of primary negligence but did not submit primary negligence.
It was held that the mention of a "sharply curved switch track" and that
the rear end of the car "extended out dangerously beyond the rails"
injected primary negligence into the case, sufficiently to admit consideration
of contributory negligence.
The ruling is based upon an earlier decision and is interesting prin-

9.

472.
10.

344 Mo. 404, 126 S. W. (2d) 1193 (1939); Note (1939)

137 S. W. (2d) 512 (Mo. 1939).

4 Mo. L. REV.

11. 343 Mo. 139, 119 S. W. (2d) 961 (1938).
12. The Springfield Court of Appeals in Hank v. Anderson-Parks, 143 S.
W. (2d) 314 (Mo. App. 1940), did not follow the Kick case in a practically
identical situation.
13. 137 S. W. (2d) 548 (Mo. 1939).
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cipally as an example of the hypertechnical reasoning involved in charging
the jury under the humanitarian rule.
Reiling v. Russell"4 was the case of a pedestrian knocked down by an
automobile while crossing a street. The case was submitted solely under
the humanitarian rule and the defendant had a verdict of the jury. A
sole cause instruction failing to contain the elements prescribed in McGrath
v. Meyers,1r was disapproved.
Collins v. Leahy"8 and Conroy v. St. Joseph Ry., Light, Heat & Power
CoY. involved no notable ruling.
III. Dwsiox Two
State ex rel. Grishamv. Allen 8 was commented upon last year, 9 though
it properly belongs in the work of the court for the year 1939.
This case shows that there has not yet been expressed a clear statement
of the principle to be applied and the practice to be followed where plaintiff
and defendant simultaneously invoked the humanitarian rule each against
the other.
Clifford v. Pitcairn" involved no notable ruling.

INSURANCE
ORRIN B.

I.

EVANs*

JuRISDICTION

A. In general
Most of the insurance in force in Missouri is written by, and most of
the insurance company defendants in litigation in Missouri courts are,
foreign corporations. The Missouri statute' authorizing service upon the

14.

134 S. W. (2d) 33 (Mo. 1939).

15. 341 Mo. 412, 107 S. W. (2d) 792 (1937).
16. 344 Mo. 250, 125 S.W. (2d) 874 (1939).
17. 134 S. W. (2d) 93 (Mo. 1939).
18.

344 Mo. 66, 124 S. W. (2d) 1080 (1939).
(1939) 4 Mo. L. REv. 409.
20. 131 S. W. (2d) 508 (Mo. 1939).
*Assistant Professor of Law, University of Missouri. A.B., University
of Wisconsin, 1931, LL.B., 1935; J.S.D., Yale University, 1940.
1. Mo. REV. STAT. (1929) § 5894.

19.

Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1940

75

Missouri Law Review, Vol. 5, Iss. 4 [1940], Art. 1
MISSOURI LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 5

superintendent of insurance in certain suits against these non-resident
insurers is, therefore, of great importance, and the precise limitations of
its applicability have been much questioned. In Fogle v. Equitable Life
Assurance Soc.,2 the Springfield Court of Appeals held that such service
was proper in a suit upon a policy of insurance issued by defendant New
York corporation to a citizen of Louisiana upon the latter's own life and
payable upon his death to another Louisiana citizen, which policy, after
maturity, had been assigned to the present plaintiffs, citizens of Connecticut
and Missouri. On certiorari,this decision was found to conflict with State
4
3
ex rel. Phoenix Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Harris, and the opinion quashed.
While the appeal was pending, the statute was changed by the legislature.5
B. Of the.supreme court
Few cases are taken by the supreme court on certiorari in which lip
service is not paid to the doctrine that the court may not consider the
case on its merits but may only search for conflict with controlling prior
decisions. Twice within the past year this principle was severely strained
when the court held 6 that the courts of appeal had failed to give the
"plain words" of insurance policies their "plain meaning," thus violating
a fundamental tenet of insurance law. Of course, the particular language
had never before been passed upon by the supreme court, but the court,
in effect, so violently disagreed with the construction of the lower courts
that it felt there was no room for "construction"; that by attempting
"construction" (i. e., by reading the language as they did) the courts of
appeal flouted the supreme court rule that unambiguous language must be
given its natural meaning. To be sure, that rule is a limitation on the frequently harsh habit of construing all insurance policies against the
insurers, and in both cases the courts of appeal had found against the
insurers, but it is hard to see in the supreme court decisions anything more

2. 123 S. W. (2d) 595 (Mo. 1938).
3. 343 Mo. 252, 121 S. W. (2d) 141 (1938), discussed in Evans, The Work
of the Missouri Supreme Court for the Year 1938 (Insurance) (1939) 4 Mo. L.
Rnv. 410.

4.

State ex rel. Equitable Life Assur. Soc. v. Allen, 136 S. W. (2d) 309

(Mo. 1939).

5.

Mo. Laws 1939, p. 451.

The problems of application of the statute are

considered in detail in Note (1940) 5 Mo. L. Rnv. 336.

6. State ex rel. Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Shain, 344 Mo. 276, 126 S. W.
(2d) 181 (1939); State ex rel. Prudential Ins. Co. v. Shain, 344 Mo. 623, 127 S.

W. (2d) 675 (1939).
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than determinations on the merits of the cases, which are abstracted below
under "Construction of Policies."
II.

OFFER AND ACCEPTANCE

The most interesting case decided by the supreme court in the field of
insurance in 1939 was Yeats v. Dodson.7 In an action upon a liability
policy written through a reciprocal insurance exchange, one of the issues
was the law of which state was to be applied. The insured had named the
defendant as its attorney in fact, with power to make contracts of insurance
and indemnity with other subscribers. The power of attorney provided that
all the contracts were to be made at the defendant's office in Kansas City.
The reciprocal company operating through this attorney in fact was organized under the laws of Missouri and had an agent who traveled in Oklahoma, the residence of the insured. The agent there took the verbal order
for the liability policy covering the insured's entire fleet of cars. The
policy in question was mailed from the home office in Kansas City directly
to the insured on June 15, 1929, under a covering letter stating that it had
taken effect May 31, 1929, to replace a previous policy. The premium
was subsequently paid to the agent on one of his visits in Oklahoma.
The court held that the contract was completed in Missouri, (1) because
the last act necessary to complete the contract occurred in Missouri, (2)
the power of attorney designated the home office as the place of contract,
and (3) if delivery were necessary, delivery was completed when the
policy was placed in the mail in Kansas City. It should be noted theft the
covering letter indicated that the policy had been regarded as in force
even before any attempt was made at delivery. On rehearing, the court
disclaimed any intention to hold that a reciprocal insurance company
could never make a contract other than at its home office. It is evident, however, that from the nature of a reciprocal, in which a single attorney in fact
operates for all the parties contracting with each other, the contract will
rarely be consummated at any other place.
In Bcrnibblin v. Travelers Insitrance Co.,s the policy was delivered
to the insured with an offer of credit for the premium. On receiving the
policy the insured acknowledged in writing that the policy was taken for
inspection only and should not become binding unless the premium were

'7. 127 S. W. (2d) 652 (Mo. 1939), modified, 138 S. W. (2d) 1020 (Mo.
1939).
8. 344 ofMo.
217, 125
S. ofW.
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paid. The evidence was not considered sufficient to.establish any subsequent
agreement to pay the premium and rebut the presumption arising from the
receipt.
III.

CONSTRUCTION OF POLICY

In State ex rel. PrudentialInsurance Co. v. Shain, the policy provided
double indemnity against death resulting "directly and independently of
all other causes, of bodily injuries, effected solely through external, violent
and accidental means, of which . . . there is a visible contusion or
wound on the exterior of the body," if the death did not result ".
directly or indirectly from . . . disease in any form." The Kansas
City Court of Appeals held that death from typhoid fever was accidental
within the terms of this policy. On certiorarithe supreme court held that
there was no room for the contention that death from typhoid fever did not
result directly or indirectly from disease and that the decision of the lower
court conflicted with its own decisions that unambiguous language
must be given its plain meaning. The court declined to say that death
from typhoid fever was not "external, violent and accidental," courts of
last resort of other states having held that it might be. Does this mean
that the opinions of courts of other states are evidence that reasonable
men might differ on the meaning of language, but the opinions of our own
courts of appeal are not?
In State ex rel. Mutual Life. Insurance Co. v. Shain,0 the doubleindemnity-for-accidental-death provision of the policy excepted death resulting "directly or indirectly . . . from . . . riding in any kind
of aircraft, whether as passenger or otherwise, except as a fare-paying
passenger in a licensed passenger aircraft."
The policy also stipulated,
however, that it was "free from restrictions as to occupation except
as to military and naval service." The insured, a trained nurse, was employed as a doctor's assistant at the time the policy was issued, but was regularly employed as an airline hostess at the time of her death from the
crash of the airplane in which she was riding. The supreme court held
that this policy also was free from any ambiguity and quashed the opinion
of the lower court allowing recovery under the double indemnity clause.
In Homan v. Employers Reinsurance Corp.," the court pursued the

9. 344 Mo. 623, 127 S. W. (2d) 675 (1939).
10. 344 Mo. 276, 126 S. W. (2d) 181 (1939).
11. 136 S. W. (2d) 289 (Mo. 1939).
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tendency to construe insurance contracts as insurance against liability
rather than as contracts of indemnity. The reinsurance contract there
in question was, by its terms, "subject to" the terms of the primary insurance (which was liability insurance) and "continued concurrently with
the liability of the reinsured," applying to "the liability of the reinsured
in excess of amounts first herein stated." In one place the reinsurance
agreement defined "loss" as "those amounts actually paid to claimants,"
but the court found that in the instrument as a whole "loss" was in other
places evidently used to mean "liability."
It would appear from this case
that the only safe language to be employed by one drawing up an indemnity
contract was the familiar "no action" form.
IV.

MISREPRESENTATION

By Section 5732 of the Missouri Revised Statutes, 1929, "no misrepresentation made in obtaining or securing a policy of insurance on the life
of any person . . . shall . . . render the policy void,
unless the matter misrepresented shall have actually contributed to the
contingency . . . on which the policy is to become
.
payable,
and whether it so contributed in any case shall be a question for the jury."
Section 5729 prohibits "any discrimination in favor of individuals between
insurants
.
.
of the same class and equal expectations of life in the
amount . .
of premiums . . . charged .
.
or in the dividends or other benefits payable thereon
. ."
In Langan v. United
States Life Insurance Co., 12 the insured stated in his application that he was
fifty-three years old, although in fact he was fifty-five. Premiums were
calculated and paid as of the younger age. The policy provided for incontestability after one year, and further provided that if the age were understated the company should be liable only for the insurance which the
premium paid would have purchased calculated as of the true age. Upon
the insured's death, the company paid to the beneficiary $9,070 on the
$10,000 claim. This suit was brought for the balance. There being a conflict between the several courts of appeal, the supreme court took jurisdiction and held that the provision of the policy was valid. The result is
certainly fair, but it is at least arguable that the misrepresentation statute
covers the situation. The opinion contains some perhaps unfortunate langguage in its attempt to void that statute, suggesting that it is applicable

12.

344 Mo. 989, 130 S. W. (2d) 479 (1939).
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only where the misrepresentation was made to "induce" the issuance of the
policy, and distinguishing the instant case because the policy would have
issued as easily to the insured if the true age had been given.
V. FOREIGN LAW

No single type of contract so consistently makes contact with more
than one jurisdiction as the insurance contract. Almost every insurance
case presents a potential conflict of laws problem, although in some the
solution is sufficiently obvious to merit no discussion.
As pointed out a year ago, 13 the association of problems of conflicts of
laws and of constitutional law is very close and is significant for two purposes: if a constitutional law question, to-wit, the accordance of "full
faith and credit" to the foreign law, is involved, not only is the forum
limited in its powers, but the Supreme Court of Missouri has jurisdiction
whether or not there is conflict with other decisions. Both of these points
are illustrated by two cases presented to the supreme court in 1939.
Following the decisions in Robertson v. Security Benefit Ass'n, 4 and Clark
v. Security Benefit Ass'n,1 ' it was held in Reece v. Security Benefit Ass'n, 0
that the decision of the Supreme Court of Kansas (under the law of which
state defendant association was organized) that the endowment benefit
originally promised in the plaintiff's certificate of membership was ultra
vires and void, must be given full faith and credit, and that it was error to
refuse defendant's instruction in nature of a demurrer to the evidence. A
related problem was presented in a somewhat more complicated form in
Baker v. Sovereign Camp, W.O.W.'
Defendant company had been organized under the laws of Nebraska as a fraternal benefit association, and
had for many years done business in Missouri. In 1879 the Missouri Legislature recognized the distinctive form of organization of fraternal benefit
associations, and in 1881 exempted both domestic and foreign societies from
operation of the general insurance law. In the revision of the insurance law
of 1889, domestic beneficial societies were exempted from the general insurance law, but any reference to foreign associations was omitted. In
1897 it was provided that such foreign associations might register with

13. Evans, The Work of the Missouri Supreme Court for the Year 1938

(Insurance) (1939) 4 Mo. L. REv. 410, 416.
14. 342 Mo. 284, 114 S. W. (2d) 1009 (1938).
15. 343 Mo. 263, 121 S. W. (2d) 148 (1938).
16. 344 Mo. 29, 124 S. W. (2d) 1146 (1939).
17. 344 Mo. 230, 125 S. W. (2d) 849 (1939).
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the superintendent of insurance and upon the compliance with certain
formalities be exempted from the operation of the general insurance laws.
The certificate sued upon in the instant case was issued to the plaintiff's
husband in 1896 and provided that he should become a paid-up life member
after thirty years compliance with rules and assessments of the association.
He paid all assessments for thirty-five years, but was suspended for nonpayment before his death. The Supreme Court of Nebraska had held
the "life member after thirty years" provision to be ultra vires and void. 8
Under the authority of Sovereign" Camp, W.O.W. v. Bolin,' it was held
in the instant case that there was a fundamental difference between
old-line life insurance and fraternal benefit associations which could
not be obliterated by the simple failure of the local legislature to provide for a distinctive regulation; that because foreign beneficiary associations were treated in Missouri in 1896 as old-line companies
did not make them such organizations; that admission into a fraternal benefit association is entrance into an abiding relationship and the
assumption of a new status; that the state of the organization of such association has exclusive jurisdiction to determine the incidents of that status;
and that the decision of the Nebraska Supreme Court must be given full
faith and credit and was conclusive of the issue. The history of the Bolin
case, referred to above, illustrates the effect of the presence of a constitutional issue upon the jurisdiction of the court. The Supreme Court of Missouri
denied certiorari in that case on the theory that only a conflict of laws
question was involved. 20 The Kansas City Court of Appeals having found
for the plaintiff, the United States Supreme Court issued certiorarito that
court.
In McDonald v. Pacific States Life Insarance Co.,2 the defendant insurance company had been placed in liquidation in Colorado, the state of
its incorporation. In the present action by the Colorado liquidator to set
aside and quash execution against property of the company, it was held
that the Colorado statutory system for winding up the insurance company
was part of its charter, following it wherever it did business; that the liquidator succeeded to all the rights of the company and could assert and protect
those rights as of right and not of comity; and that his position in this regard was not to be confused with receivers appointed by courts of

18.
19.

Trapp v. Sovereign Camp, W.O.W., 102 Neb. 562, 168 N. W. 191 (1918).
305 U. S. 66 (1938).

20. 339 Mo. 618, 98 S. W. (2d) 681 (1936).
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chancery. It was further held that in liquidation of the company, it was
not Missouri policy that Missouri assets should be first applied to the
claims of Missouri creditors, but rather that the entire assets of the
insurance company should be treated as a unit and administered by the
court of its incorporation. The order of payment provided by statute for
liquidation of a Missouri insurance company was irrelevant.
In Yeats v. Dodson, as already said, the court found the contract to
have been completed in Missouri. An Oklahoma statute22 provided that
"all contracts of insurance on property of lives, or interests in this state
shall be deemed to be made therein." It was held that the state of Oklahoma had no jurisdiction to declare a contract to have been made in Oklahoma regardless of the fact, and to insist upon application of its internal
law to a Missouri contract by a Missouri court.
VI.

TRIAL PRACTICE

The insistence of the plaintiff in a personal injury action that the
jury understand that the defendant carried liability insurance brought
Schroeder v. Rawlings23 to the supreme court. Repeating the familiar
doctrine that the plaintiff might on voir dire ask prospective jurors of their
possible relationship with insurance companies, including the supposed
insurer in the actual ease, the court held that the existence of this right did
not make the carrying of insurance an issue in the case to justify the introduction of that fact in evidence. It further held that the statement by
the insured, that he had insurance, made at the time of the accident, was
merely narrative of past events and not necessary to presentation of the
picture of the accident nor admissible as incidental to an alleged admission
of liability. The case is not within the rule permitting the introduction of
evidence which is part of the res gestae of the main fact at issue, which
evidence may incidentally establish the fact of insurance coverage.
VII. REMIEDIES

Two cases24 applied the principle that Sections 5898 and 5899 of Missouri Revised Statutes, 1929, giving a direct right of action against in-

22. OKicA. STAT. (Harlow, 1931) § 10452.
23. 344 Mo. 630, 127 S. W. (2d) 6'78 (1939).
24. Yeats v. Dodson, 127 S. W. (2d) 652 (Mo. 1939), modified, 138 S. W.
(2d) 1020 (Mo. 1939); Homan v. Employers Reinsurance Corp., 136 S. W. (2d)
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol5/iss4/1
289 (Mo. 1939).
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surance carriers to judgment creditors of the insureds, invalidated the
indemnity provisions of the policies in question. No matter how strongly
the policy may be worded, as that "no action shall lie on this policy except by the named insurer to indemnify him for loss from a judgment
against him actually paid and satisfied," the judgment creditor may sue
the insurer directly. In the Homan. case, the action was against the reinsurance carrier, both the debtor and the primary insurance carrier being
insolvent. Having first held that under this rule the primary insurance
was against liability instead of indemnity against loss, the court declined
to pass upon the question of whether the statute applied to actions on reinsurance contracts, relying instead upon the wording of the particular
contract to find it a liability policy.
In Yeats v. Dodson, the plaintiff had recovered judgment in New
Jersey. The judgment debtor had subsequently been discharged in bankruptcy. The court upheld the action despite the lack of a Missouri judgment for the reason that it would not be possible to obtain further judgment against the debtor insured.

PROPERTY
WILLARD L. ECKHARDT*

The Missouri property cases bulk so large that no attempt has been
made here to brief or discuss all of them. Cases discussed have been
selected for one of three reasons: first, because they are cases of first
impression in Missouri; second, because they overrule or modify in
important respects earlier Missouri decisions; and third, because holdings
or dicta seem to be of dubious soundness.
I. POSSESSORY

AND FUTURE PROPERTY INTERESTS

A. Life estates
Sozuders v. Kitchens' is important in showing that although tenancy
by the curtesy was abolished in 1921,2 the law concerning tenancy by the

*Assistant Professor of Law, University of Missouri.
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Illinois, 1935, LL.B., 1937; Sterling Fellow, Yale University, 1937-1938.
1. 344 Mo. 18, 124 S. W. (2d) 1137 (1939).
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curtesy is by no means obsolete, or even obsolescent. Problems in tenancy
by the curtesy will continue to arise for many years.
In Masterson v. Masterson,3 testator devised and bequeathed the
residue of his estate "to my beloved wife . . . absolutely so long as
she remains my widow." The heir of the testator brought a bill to construe
this will. The widow claimed a determinable life estate 4 with a power of
appointment over the reversion, 5 by reason of the word "absolutely."
The court, after ably discussing many precedents, construed the will to
mean that the widow took an unencumbered life estate only. The court did
not consider the rule that a testator presumably intends not to die partially
intestate, which rule would tend to support the widow's construction.
Duffley v. McCaskey is a case of first impression. An intestate's
widow had a life estate in Blackacre under her dower right. The reversion7
was inherited by the intestate's sole heir, his daughter. On the failure
of the life tenant to pay taxes, the land was sold at a tax sale to the
reversioner. The question presented was whether the reversioner could
purchase free from claims of the life tenant, or whether this purchase was
merely a payment of taxes, for the benefit of both the life tenant and the
reversioner. The court held for the reversioner. "The precise question
under consideration has received but scant attention from the courts
As a matter of law, inter sese, the duty of paying ordinary annual taxes
is on the life tenant . . . There is no reciprocal duty on the part of the
remainderman to the life tenant. On the contrary, because of the life
tenant's duty, the remainderman has the right correlative to such duty
to have the property protected from tax liens." s The opinion by Douglas
is perhaps the best opinion in 1939 on property. The question presented
was important, and the issues were clear. The opinion is brief, but adequate. The court goes beyond the usual range of authorities, and cites
the American Law Institute's Restatement of Property, and Simes,
Future Interests. Missouri courts have in'the past made too little use
in property cases of these outstanding authorities.

344 Mo. 1188, 130 S. W. (2d) 629 (1939)..
4. The court describes the interest of the widow as a "base or qualified
life estate . . . subject to defeasance should defendant remarry." "Determinable life estate" more simply denominates her interest.
5. The court calls this future interest a remainder.
6. 134 S. W. (2d) 62 (Mo. 1939).
7. The court calls the future interest a remainder.
8. 134 S. W. (2d) 64- (Mo. 1939).
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol5/iss4/1
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B. Concurrent estates

"A conveyance to create an estate in entirety could only be made by the
parties."
This digest paragraph in Missouri Statutes Annotated and
the American Digest System purports to state the holdings in Smith v.
Holdoway Construction Co.' The statement is part of a sentence lifted
out of its context, and is misleading standing alone. By fraudulently
representing a quitclaim deed as a trust deed mortgage, a londowner
secured his wife's signature, the legal effect being a release of the wife's
inchoate dower. The wife asked for cancellation, and the trial court
decreed the quitclaim deed void, and "title was ordered vested in the name
of Peter F. Smith and Alice M. Smith, his wife, the plaintiff, as their
exclusive property." This had the effect of making the husband and wife
tenants by the entireties. On appeal, it was held that the cancellation
of the deed was proper. "However, the court had no authority either
under the pleadings or under general equity jurisdiction to do anything
affecting the title except to cancel the quitclaim deed. It could not create
an estate, by decree, that had never existed, and which no one had ever
intended to create. Plaintiff did not even ask for such relief, but, if she had,
a conveyance to create an estate in entirety could only be made by the
parties. This part of the decree is coram non judice and void."10 [Italics
added] In its context the statement is perfectly accurate, but the digest
paragraph out of its context would seem to say that a husband could
create a tenancy by the entireties by a direct conveyance to his wife. The
simplest proper way to create a tenancy by the entireties in this situation
is for the husband and wife to quitclaim to a bachelor over twenty-one,
and for the bachelor to quitclaim to the husband and wife as tenants by
the entireties.
In State ex rel. Ashauer v. Hostetter," the testator devised Blackacre to his daughters Adelia and Mathilda "as tenants by the entirety."
Adelia, claiming an undivided one-half in fee as a tenant in common, asked
construction of the will, and partition by sale. The trial court sustained
2
Mathilda's demurrer, but was reversed in the St. Louis Court of Appeals.'
Section 3114 of Missouri Revised Statutes 1929, provides:

".

.

.

every

9. 344 Mo. 862, 129 S. W. (2d) 894 (1939).
10. Id. at 877, 129 S. W. (2d) at 908.
11. 344 Mo. 665, 127 S. W. (2d) 697 (1939).
12. See comment on this opinion in Gill, The Work of the Missouri Supreme
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Court University
for the Year
1937School
(Property)
(1938) 3Repository,
Mo. L. Rnv.

85

Missouri Law Review, Vol. 5, Iss. 4 [1940], Art. 1
MISSOURI LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 5

interest in real estate granted or devised to two or more persons, other
than executors and trustees and husband and wife, shall be a tenancy in
common, unless expressly declared, in such grant or devise, to be in joint
tenancy." Here the gift was to Adelia and Mathilda as "tenants by the
entireties" and not as "joint tenants." If the statute is inflexibly applied,
the limitation did not create a joint tenancy. But if the court follows its
clich6, "the cardinal rule [or the polestar] in the interpretation of wills,
to which all other rules must bend, is that the intention of the testator
shall prevail," etc., the daughters will take as joint tenants, because that was
the testator's intention.1 3 The court applied Section 3114 literally. "Section 3114 makes it plain that a joint tenancy can be created in grantees
or devisees, who are not executors, trustees or husband and wife, in one way
only, and that is to expressly say so, by using the term 'joint tenancy.'
The statute says 'expressly declared.' The word expressly is the adverb;
express is the adjective, which means 'directly and distinctly stated; expressed, not merely implied or left to inference.' [Webster's New International Dictionary, Second Ed.] ",14 This case has been annotated at
length in a previous issue of the IMissouri Law Review.'5
C. Charge or condition
In Friesz v. Friesz,16 the testator devised one hundred acres to his
son William "during his lifetime and after his death to his children
The said William A. Friesz to have the above described lands upon the
express condition that he pay to my executor the sum of money herein
required of him ($800)." The life tenant paid the sum late, having acquired the $800 by conveying twenty acres by warranty deed. After the
life tenant's death, his children brought this action to recover possession of
the twenty acres. Judgment for plaintiffs was affirmed. The court held
that this "express condition" was neither condition precedent nor subsequent, but merely a charge. "In doubtful cases the tendency is to favor a
construction of provisions for the payment of legacies, or sums of money, if
possible, as charges rather than conditions because of an apparent aversion

13. Just why it makes any difference whether the sisters were joint tenants
or tenants in common is not clear. Will the court refuse partition of a joint
tenancy? If so, joint tenancy can be converted into tenancy in common by a
conveyance of one joint tenant to a dummy, with a reconveyance by the dummy
to the former joint tenant. The four unities no longer exist.
14. 344 Mo. 665, 670, 127 S. W. (2d) 697, 699 (1939).
15. (1940) 5 Mo. L. REv. 114.
16. 344 Mo. 698, 127 S. W. (2d) 714 (1939).
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol5/iss4/1
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to declare forfeitures and an inclination to favor the early vesting of
estates."' 7 The decision was reached after vigorous argument by counsel,'
and mature deliberation of the court. The decision is a wise one. Everyone interested in the land is completely protected by the charge construction.
It would needlessly penalize the life tenant to construe the words as creating
a condition. The instant case is supported by the weight of authority in
other jurisdictions. 9 This case, holding that "express condition" means
"charge," was delivered on the same day as State ex rel. Ashauer v. Hostetter, where a statutory requirement that joint tenancy be "expressly declared" was applied literally, and the word "express" was elaborately embroidered. The two cases make an interesting study.
02
D. Reversions: Doctrine of worthier title
The rule in Bingham's Case,2' often referred to as the doctrine of
worthier title, was well established at common law. It applied to limitations
of the following type: A transfers Blackaere to B for life, remainder to
the heirs of A.2 2 Under the rule, the heirs do not take a remainder by purchase, but take a reversion by descent, if they take at all. In Norman v.
Horton,' 2 3 A conveyed Blackacre to B for life, remainder to the heirs of the
body of B, but if none survive B, then to the heirs of A. Defendants contended that the future interest given to the heirs of A was a reversionary

17. Id. at 703, 127 S. W. (2d) at 717.
18. "Learned counsel (one an able lawmaker as well as an able lawyer) for
appellants have represented their clients with exceptional industry and ability
in this court and, from the record, in the trial court. From counsel's remark upon
oral argument we believe he recognized the difficulties attending his client's cause.

The most successful advocates meet occasional reverses, especially where the

facts are against the client, as here, regardless of the industry, ingenuity and
learning they may bring to the client's cause." Id. at 704, 127 S. W. (2d) at 717.
19. Cf. Post v. Weil, 115 N. Y. 361, 22 N. E. 145 (1889), where a limitation
in a conveyance included: "Upon the special condition that no part of the land

or buildings thereon should ever be used or occupied as a tavern." The problem
was whether these words gave grantor a right of entry for condition broken
(condition subsequent) or created a covenant running with the land. The court
said it was not obliged to take the words literally, and held the words created
a covenant.

The court pointed out that all interests were adequately protected

by this covenant construction.
20. See the following able and exhaustive comment by Polsky, Missouri
Law of Limitations to the Grantor's or Devisor's Heirs (1940) 5 Mo. L. REv. 232.
21. 2 Co. 91a (K. B. 1600), one of the earliest English cases applying the

doctrine. The rule later became known as the "doctrine of worthier title," a
reference to one of the rationalizations justifying the existence of the rule.
22. This type limitation must be clearly distinguished from the type limitation to which the rule in Shelley's Case is applied-A transfers Blackacre to B
for life, remainder to the heirs of B. The doctrine of worthier title and the rule
in Shelley's Case are distinct; a statute abolishing the rule in Shelley's Case does.
not necessarily destroy the rule in Bingham's case.
S. ofW.
187 (1939).
344 Mo.
290, 126
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interest, invoking the doctrine of worthier title, or that if a remainder were
created, it vested at the death of A. Either construction would have led to
the same result. The court adopted B's contention that the limitation to A's
heirs created a contingent remainder, those to take being determined as
though A died at the same moment B died. Under this construction there
was an attempt to make a gift to A's technical heirs, and therefore no occasion to apply the doctrine of worthier title. The court, through Bohling,
C., suggests, however, that the doctrine of worthier title is not a rule of
law in Missouri, the reason for the rule having vanished with feudal society,
and there being no modern reasons of policy for so defeating a testator's
intention. The court's approach to the problem deserves all commendation,
and it is to be hoped that it will be confirmed when a decision of the issue is
necessary.24
In Fullertonv. Fullerton,2' a testator bequeathed $2000 to his daughter,
Mary Jane Cain, for life, "and in case of her death then said amount to
go to her children, and in case she dies without children living, then said
sum of money is to be paid to my heirs." The funds were used to purchase
land. Mary Jane Cain, the life tenant, died without children, having previously conveyed the farm to one of her brothers who now claims to be the
owner in fee. This suit was brought by a grandchild of the testator to determine title and partition the land. The trial court gave judgment for
the defendant at the close of plaintiff's evidence. The supreme court reversed the judgment of the trial court. "The will of T. M. Fullerton, deceased, created a life estate only in Mary Jane Cain, and, since no children
survived her, the remainder would descend to the heirs of said T. M.
Fullerton. ' 26 "In either event the land would belong to the heirs of T. M.
Fullerton. ' 27 But who are these "heirs" of the testator who are to take?
No hint is given. When the testator used "heirs" did he mean heirs or
next of kin, in view of the fact that this was a bequest of personalty, and
next of kin normally would have been a more appropriate designation. The
court says Mary Jane Cain, the life tenant, takes "a life estate only." So
she is excluded from sharing in the future interest, even though she was
an heir of the testator. Does "heirs" therefore mean all of the testator's
heirs except Mary Jane Cain? Or does "heirs" mean those who would be

24.

This case is more fully discussed by Polsky in Comment (1940) 5 Mo. L.

26.

Id. at 969.

REv. 232, 237.
25. 132 S. W. (2d) 966 (Mo. 1939).
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol5/iss4/1
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heirs of the testator had he died at the same time as the life tenant, the construction in Norman v. Horton? The court does not discuss the interesting
problem whether the heirs take by descent or by purchase, i. e., whether the
doctrine of worthier title applies to personalty. The court says: "The
remainderwould descend to the heirs." Here is an inherent contradiction.
If the heirs take a remainder, they take by purchase. If they take by
descent, the interest must be a reversion and not a remainder.
E. Alienability and subjection to claims of creditors
Some statements of the court in White v. Kentling28 raise serious questions. Frank Kentling, Sr., conveyed Blackacre by warranty deed to
Bank: "In case this land is not used for the purpose of a bank and this
corporation passes out of existence said property is to revert to the grantors." In a suit to determine and quiet title, the plaintiff was a trustee liquidating the grantee bank and the defendant was Frank Kentling, Jr.,
son of the grantor. "A reversion 9 ipso facto is expressly provided for
W e, therefore, hold that the deed to the bank conveyed a base or
qualified fee determinable upon the concurrence or simultaneous existence
of the two events or circumstances referred to in the deed," 30 viz., the land
is no longer used for purposes of a bank, and the corporation passes out
of existence. The statement that is questionable follows: "The rights of
the defendant Frank Kentling, therefore, are entirely contingent
(2) upon his own survivorship of his parents, as an heir of the said grantors,
and at [sic, of] the time said base fee determines and title to said real
estate reverts." 3 Is the court suggesting that we apply in 1939 in Missonri
the common law rules as to descent of future interests? At common law
the descent of future interests is determined at the time such interests
vest in possession by tracing heirship to the person last seised, the grantor,
in the case of a reversion, possibility of reverter, or right of entry for
-ondition broken, and to the last purchaser, the grantee, in the case of a
remainder or executory interest. Some common law authorities suggested
or held that a possibility of reverter was not inheritable, but that the
person who became entitled to the possession under a possibility of reverter

23.

134 S. W. (2d) 39 (Mo. 1939).

29. It would seem that the future interest is a possibility of reverter, and
not a reversion.
30. 134 S. W. (2d) 39, at 44.
31. While the court always refers to the future interest as "contingent,"
it is a possibility of reverter and is "vested" under the rule against perpetuities.
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1940
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took by representation.2 But today future interests descend in the same
way as possessory interests,33 except in Maryland where the common law
rules are still followed.3 4 At common law a possibility of reverter was not
alienable inter vivos, but at the present time it is alienable inter vivos in
many states, and should be alienable in Missouri under Section 3014 of Missouri Revised Statutes, 1929: "Conveyances of lands, or of any estate or
interest therein, may be made by deed." When the court says that Frank
Kentling's interest is wholly contingent on surviving to the time of vesting
in possession, does it mean that his inter vivos conveyance by warranty
deed for valuable consideration would be of no effect, or that he could not
transfer the interest by will, or that his heirs will not inherit it from him if
he has not disposed of it during his lifetime ?3
Kay v. Politte" is a case of first impression in the Missouri Supreme
Court, and overrules an earlier court of appeals case. Thomas M. Politte
died in 1920, leaving a widow and children. Two years later a judgment
was had by a creditor against an adult son, Paul Politte, and his interest in
the land was sold at execution sale in 1925 to Louis Kay. Kay now brings
this action to determine title and for partition. The objection to such sale
is that the heir's interest would be sold at a sacrifice because the length of
37
dower and homestead estates is uncertain. In Armor v. Lewis, the problem was whether the fee could be sold subject to homestead, to pay a debt
of the homesteader contracted subsequent to the acquisition of the homestead, but not made a charge thereon. It was held that such a sale was not

Copenhaver v. Pendleton, 155 Va. 463, 155 S. E. 802 (1930).
The difference may be illustrated with the following hypothetical.
has a possibility of reverter. He dies
_Grantor
_ _
intestate. Son dies intestate. Grandson dies
I
Brother intestate. The possibility of reverter becomes
Grantor
possessory. At common law when the future
I M
interest vests in possession, heirship must be
Son Mother
traced to the person last seised, Grantor. MothI
er is not an heir of Grantor, and does not take.
Grandson
Brother takes as heir of Grantor. If future interests descend in the same way
as present possessory interests descend, Son inherits the interest from Grantor,
Grandson inherits from Son, and Mother inherits from Grandson.
34. Reno, Alienability and Transmissibility of Future Interests in Maryland
(1938) 2 MD. L. REv. 89.
35. That the question is not an academic one is illustrated by two Illinois
cases decided in the same year, and appearing in the same volume, Golladay v.
Knock, 235 I1. 412, 85 N. E. 649 (1908), and North v. Graham, 235 Ill. 178, 85
N. E. 267 (1908). In Golladay v. Knock, the common law rule of descent was
applied to contingent remainders. In North v. Graham, the court held that
a possibility of reverter descended in the same way possessory interests descend.
36. 344 Mo. 805, 129 S. W. (2d) 863 (1939), annotated in (1939) 122 A.
L. R. 1150.
37. 252 Mo. 568, 161 S.W. 251 (1913).
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol5/iss4/1
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467

3

authorized by statute.
Lamm, J., gave as a further reason the sacrifice
such a sale would necessarily involve. In Kelley v. Parman,39 it was held
that the fee subject to homestead could not be sold to pay the debt of an
adult son, heir of the homesteader. The sacrifice reason was used. This
seems to be the same issue as presented in the principal case. However,
in the principal case the court held that the interest of an adult son who
is heir is subject to levy of execution, even though the interest must be sold
at a sacrifice. "Reaching this conclusion we necessarily overrule the opinion in Kelley v. Parman . . . in so far as it runs counter to the ruling
here." ' 40 The decision is correct. The son's interest is a reversion. Vested
remainders and reversions are generally considered subject to the claims of
creditors, and there is no reason for exempting a reversion that follows
homestead. A much more serious objection can be raised to a forced sale
of contingent remainders or executory interests, which often are completely sacrificed. In the principal case the judgment debtor had a reversion
of one-eleventh of $10,000, and the interest sold for $477.50. This would
seem to be a fair price at no sacrifice.
F. Succession taxes
In re Bernays Estate4 ' completely changed what had generally been
considered the law in Missouri. Eric Bernays died testate, leaving personal
property to a trustee, for his widow for life, then to his daughter for life,
then over. The will provided that the provisions therein for the wife were
in lieu of "dower, homestead, allowances, rights of election and all other
rights in my estate." The widow took under the will. The widow's life
estate was valued at $83,000, from which was deducted the $20,000 exemption, leaving $63,000 on which the succession tax was assessed. The widow contended that she should have an additional exemption of the value
of her dower or child's share, year's sustenance and absolute allowances.
The court states the issue as follows: "As appellants say, the principal
issue presented is whether or not the widow's statutory interests in the
property of her husband, had he died intestate, should be deducted
in computing the taxable value of the estate, or perhaps we should say, of
the property received by her, so far as concerns the imposition of what, for

38.
39.
40.
41.

Mo. Rnv. STAT. (1929) § 612.
282 S. W. 755 (Mo. App. 1926).
344 Mo. 805, 811, 129 S. W. (2d) 863, 865 (1939).
344 Mo. 135, 126 S. W. (2d) 209 (1939).
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convenience, we may call the inheritance tax, where, as here, the husband
makes provision for her, which she accepts, in lieu of such dower and other
statutory property and rights. This precise question has not heretofore
been decided by an appellate court in this State." 42 The construction
contended for by the widow had for many years been followed in assessing taxes. The state treasurer in 1929 issued a pamphlet, generally followed
since, stating: "Exemption of widow or widower is twenty thousand dollars plus the value of a child's share in the entire net estate, whether he or
she takes by will or by the intestate laws." This opinion was based on an
interpretation of In re Rogers' Estate43 which had held that a widow who
rejects a will and takes a child's share is not subject to pay any tax. The
majority of the court does not disapprove In re Rogers' Estate, but says:
"She was not compelled to accept the provision of the will. She was at
liberty to reject it and take what the law would have given her absent a
will. If she preferred the testamentary provision, burdened with a succession tax, she had the right to accept it . . . "
The court held that
the opinion of the state treasurer was not binding, but was based on a
misinterpretation of In re Rogers' Estate. A concurring opinion by
Westhues, C., approved of the result of this case, but asserted that the rule
of In Re Rogers' Estate was wrong and that the case should be overruled,
so that a widow who elects a child's share shofild be considered to take
by intestate law and subject to the succession tax.

II. NoN-PossEssony PROPERTY INTERESTS
A. Easements
Riggs v. Springfield 5 is questionable both in its reasoning, and in its
merits. In 1893 the city of Springfield started emptying raw, untreated
sewage into Wilson Creek. This was continued intermittently, but in increasing amounts, until the time of this suit in 1934 by a riparian owner
for damages to his land. Judgment for the plaintiff was affirmed in the
Springfield Court of Appeals,4 8 which certified the case to the supreme
court because of conflicting Missouri authorities. The plaintiff's theory
was that defendant could acquire an easement to continue to pollute the

42.
43.
44.
45.
46.

Id. at 139, 126 S. W. (2d) at 212.
250 S. W. 576 (Mo. 1923).
344 Mo. 135, 146, 126 S. W. (2d) 209, 216 (1939).
344 Mo. 420, 126 S. W. (2d) 1144 (1939).
Riggs v. Springfield, 96 S. W. (2d) 392 (Mo. App. 1936).
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stream without paying compensation only by adverse user for ten years, and
that no easement had been acquired because of the interruptions in user,
and because the scope of user was not the same; because the city had not
acquired an easement by prescription, it must now acquire one by eminent
domain, with compensation. Apparently the city had not acquired an
easement by prescription. The defendant claimed that when it began permanently to pollute the creek in 1893, it had appropriated an easement by
eminent domain. This easement acquired by eminent domain is not limited
to the scope of user at the time it is taken, but is broad enough to cover
increased use. Thus the city need not rely on prescription for acquisition
of an easement. The court adopts this argument of the defendant. The
view appears to be logically sound.
It is then urged that the riparian landowner's cause of action for
compensation is barred by the five year statute of limitations. To prevent
the bar of the five year statute, plaintiff relied on Section 21, Article X,
of the Mfissouri Constitution, which provides: ".
.
private property
shall not be taken or damaged for public use without just compensation
. . .until
[such compensation] shall be paid to the owner, or into
the court for the owner, the property shall not be disturbed or the proprietary rights of the owner therein divested . . ." The court holds
this constitutional provision inapplicable where an easement is acquired by
eminent domain. "No part of plaintiffs' land was taken within the meaning of the Constitution, only an easement to use the watercourse was appropriated, so that it was not necessary first to institute condemnation proceedings." '4 7 "But the city has not disturbed the property of plaintiff,
nor divested him of any proprietary rights. It has not invaded his land
The only trouble with this argument is that the constitution uses the
word "property" and not the word "land."
Analyzed qualitatively, an
easement in land is just as much "property" as is a fee simple in land.
Professor Bigelow, among others, has discussed the problem: "It is
worth while to pause for a moment to point out that this terminology,
'corporeal' and 'incorporeal' rights, is not a scientfically sound one. The
law is never concerned with a physical object as such. The sole subjectmatter of law is rights, and rights are in all cases relations between individ-

47.
48.

344 Mo. at 430, 126 S. W. (2d) at 1148.
Id. at 434, 126 S. W. (2d) at 1151.
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uals. The relation may be purely between individuals, or it may be between
individuals with respect to physical objects, such as chattels or land. But
rights as such in every case are merely intellectual concepts.' 9 It is submitted that the court's distinction between "land" and "easements" on a
property theory is unsound.
The holding of the case is unfortunate on its merits, because it penalizes
the ordinary decent citizen. The doctrine of prescription often penalizes
the good neighbor who submits to minor invasions of his property interests
rather than sue, and who later in outraged virtue finds the invader has
acquired an easement. Prescription is too well established to be rejected
at this late day. But why should a similar result be reached where it is
not compelled by previous authority? The holding of this case compels a
landowner to sue a city within five years from the time the city starts apparently permanent actionable pollution. Perhaps the nuisance is not
great, and the landowner would rather suffer this degree of annoyance than
sue. He does not want to be cantankerous. Five years elapse, and he finds
that the city can continue and can increase the pollution without compensation. Or perhaps he decides to sue, but in a few months the city
stops pollution, and he does nothing. Ten years later the city again begins
to pollute the stream. The city has acquired a permanent easement.
III.

SECURITY INTERESTS IN LAND

50

In Murphy v. Milby, Albert B. Milby executed a trust deed mortgage
in March, 1914, to secure a note for $4500. Nannie Murphy now owns the
note. In January, 1934, Alex T. Stewart, as agent under oral authority for
Nannie Murphy, executed and filed an affidavit showing the amount due under the mortgage. This is an ejectment action by Nannie Murphy, holder
of the note, against the heirs of the mortgagor who are in possession of the
land. Judgment for the plaintiff is affirmed. Section 865, Missouri Revised Statutes, 1929, provides that a deed of trust cannot be foreclosed
after the Statute of Limitations has run on the debt secured thereby, "nor
in any event after the lapse of twenty years from the date at which the last
maturing obligation . . . unless before the lapse of said twenty years
the owner of the debt thereby secured or some person for him shall file an
affidavit duly verified, or file an instrument in writing acknowledged as

49. BIGErOW &
(2d ed. 1934) 38.

MADDEN,

INTRODUCTION TO THE LAW OF REAL PROPERTY

50. 344 Mo. 1080, 130 S. W. (2d) 518 (1939).
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deeds are required to be acknowledged in order to entitle them to record
in this state, showing the amount due and owing thereon." The affidavit
filed here was sufficient in substance. The issue is whether the agent's authority must be in writing under the Statute of Frauds because the affidavit
affected an interest in land. "It is not the purpose of an affidavit made
pursuant to Section 865, supra, to affect to real estate, and it does not do so.
Such an affidavit only serves as a notice to the public that the indebtedness
secured by a deed of trust or mortgage has not been paid. We are of the
opinion that such an affidavit may be made on behalf of the creditor by
It would seem, however, that the
an agent under oral authority. '"'
affidavit very directly affects an interest in land. The filing of the affidavit
does not affect the debt at all, nor does it toll the running of the statute
on the debt. The sole purpose of this affidavit is to toll the running of the
statute on foreclosure. Because the affidavit prevents a barring of foreclosure, it would seem to affect an interest in land. It is quite anotherquestion whether on the merits the agent should have written authority. A
much more serious problem is on what theory the holder of the note could
bring ejectment even if the mortgage were still good. The trustee under the
deed of trust could bring ejectment as an incident of his title, but the holder
of the note has no legal, and certainly no equitable, right to possession.
Bates v. Dana2 presented an interesting and a difficult problem. Anna
Sellner held a mortgage for $8,500 and Bank held a mortgage for $66,000
on certain Missouri land. There was a dispute as to priorities, and the
two mortgagees entered into an agreement reciting the Bank's mortgage
and that Mrs. Sellner held a "second mortgage," and providing further.
t .
should it become necessary to and the undersigned [Bank] begins to foreclose its said mortgage upon the real estate in Marion county,
.
take up
Missouri . . . then the said bank agrees that it will .
by 3ssignment to it the said [Sellner] note and mortgage . . . at the
amount of the unpaid balance of the principal and accrued interest thereof
and thereon." The Bank became insolvent and passed into receivership in
1932. In 1933 the Bank brought this suit in equity to foreclose its
mortgage. The trial court decreed that the Bank's mortgage be foreclosed
and that the proceeds be applied to satisfy the Bank's mortgage, then
Mrs. Sellner's mortgage. On appeal, the trial court was reversed. The
Bank contends that it had a first mortgage, and that the agreement imposed

51.
52.

Id. at 1084, 130 S. W. (2d) at 519.
133 S. W. (2d) 326 (Mo. 1939).
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on it merely a personal obligation to take up the note, that is, that Mrs.
Sellner had the "personal" obligation of the Bank, an interest in the
Bank's fund, but only a subordinate "property" interest in the mortgaged
land. If she had a mere personal interest she could share only pro ratawith
other creditors in the Bank's fund. Mrs. Sellner contends that in equity
she has prior rights against the real estate, and is entitled to priority of
payment over the Bank out of the proceeds of the foreclosure sale, that is,
that she has a prior "property" interest in the land.
The Bank invoked the aid of equity to foreclose. "He who seeks
equity must do equity." The Bank's obligation to take up the Sellner note
matured not after foreclosure was complete, but when the Bank first sought
the aid of a Court of equity to foreclose. The bank's insolvency and the
intervening receivership prevented the Bank's performance. ". . . the
Bank's obligation to 'take up' should the Bank 'begin to foreclose' carried
an implied obligation to refrain from consummating foreclosure until
after the bank purchased. . . . This construction gives business efficacy to the contract as written. It gives the contract that effect which the
parties apparently did agree upon and that effect which, as fair and reasonable men, they, in equity, presumably -would have agreed explicity upon
if, having in mind the possibility of the Bank's insolvency, they had contracted expressly in reference thereto."5 3 Mrs. Sellner therefore is given
priority in foreclosure proceeds. It would seem that the agreement gives
the Bank legal priority in the property. We have in effect the court in
equity converting a legal second mortgage into an equitable first mortgage
with priority over a legal first mortgage, on the implied agreement of the
parties. Mrs. Selner has an equitable property interest instead of a mere
legal personal right. The holding is entirely just, and the court is to be
commended on its willingness to struggle, if needs be, to arrive at that
conclusion.

53. Id. at 330.
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PUBLIC UTILITIES
FRAiNK E. ATWOODt

The volume of utility cases reaching the Supreme Court of Missouri for
review has been small since the decision in the case State ex rel. Gehrs v.
Public Service Commission.1 That decision held that Sections 5234 and
5237, Missouri Revised Statutes, 1929, authorizing an appeal to the supreme
court from a judgment of the Circuit Court of Cole County, Missouri,
reviewing an order of the Public Service Commission, was in conflict with
Section 12, Article VI of the constitution. In consequence of this decision,
a number of cases have reached our courts of appeal, involving public
utilities during the year 1939, but few cases have involved grounds of supreme court jurisdiction.
2 was a suit to restrain a
Missouri Power & Light Co. v. Pattonsburg,
municipal corporation from letting contracts for the construction of electric
light systems, the issuance of bonds, the levying of taxes for payment thereof, and the operation of the plant. From an adverse judgment below, the
plaintiff appealed.
The city had voted favorably upon the single question of the issuance
of $50,000 in bonds for the purpose of constructing an electric light plant,
whereas Section 12a, Article X of the Missouri Constitution authorizes the
city to submit to the voters the question of becoming indebted "for the
purpose of purchasing or constructing . . . electric or other lighL
plants." The contention of the plaintiff was that this constitutional provision "does not authorize the aldermen to decide in advance whether to
purchase or construct, but after the vote the city officials decide on the
method of acquisition."
It has often been held that it was competent to submit such a proposition in the alternative,3 but of the point made in the case under discussion
the court said "our state has not revealed any case where such contention
has been made." In passing, it may be said that the view of the court in
the Columbia and Canton cases represents the majority view. Drawing from

*Attorney, Jefferson City. A.B., William Jewell College, 1902, A.M.,
1912, LL.D., 1930. Former member of the Supreme Court of Missouri.
1. 338 Mo. 177, 90 S. W. (2d) 390 (1935).
2. 343 Mo. 1128, 125 S. W. (2d) 20 (1939).
3. State ex rel. Columbia v. Allen, 183 Mo. 283, 82 S. W. 103 (1904) ; State
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these cases by analogy, the court was of the opinion that the submission of
the question in the singular, as was done in the case under discussion, was
fully authorized.
The next question ruled is one which has been long established in this
state, namely, that it is not necessary for a city to obtain a certificate of
convenience and necessity from the State Public Service Commission before
a municipal light plant can legally be constructed.
A third point raised involved the authority of the city to build a smaller
plant than was in contemplation at the time the city voted on the proposition,
plans for the larger plant having been drawn and submitted with an application to the Federal Government for a grant of $17,420 and a loan of
$50,000 for its construction. The court held that while the ordinance submitted to the people stated specifically that it was for the purpose of determining whether the city should become indebted in the sum of $50,000
for the purpose of constructing an electric light and power plant, no reference was made in the ordinance voted upon to the proposals made to the
Federal Government and the acceptance or rejection of the plan by
the Federal Government would not affect the validity of the election.
State ex rel. Sikeston v. Missouri Utilities Co.,4 was a proceeding in quo
warrantoto oust the Missouri Utilities Company from the rights and privileges to use the streets and public ways of the City of Sikeston, Missouri,
and asking ouster of the utility company. This case represents the third
effort of the city in that direction. The first case, State ex rel. Sikeston v.
Missouri Utilities Co.,5 was instituted in 1931, and ouster was denied on
the ground of estoppel. The second case was State ex rel. Sikeston v. Public
Service Commission.6
In the case under discussion, the lower court sustained a general demurrer to the petition, and upon relator's refusal to plead further, the
same was dismissed. From this judgment of dismissal relator appealed.
The facts are substantially the same as were the first Sikeston case. In
1902, the predecessor of the Missouri Utilities Company obtained by ordinance a franchise running to its successors and assigns, "to use the streets,
avenues; alleys and public ways of said city for its light power distribution
system . . ." for a period of twenty years. The ordinance was approved December 16, 1902, and by its terms expired December 16, 1922.
Relator's petition refers to the first Sikeston case, and draws certain con-

4. 137 S. W. (2d) 456 (Mo. 1939).
5. 331 Mo. 337, 53 S. W. (2d) 394 (1932).
6. 336 Mo. 985, 82 S. W. (2d) 105 (1935).
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clusions in regard thereto calculated to sustain its contention that said first
case no longer applied. The petition further recites that the city failed to
prevail in the first case, on the ground that it permitted the utilities company
to operate without a franchise from December 16, 1922 to July 15, 1931,
without objection, collecting taxes of various kinds during that period;
that it appeared at a hearing before the Public Service Commission and
acquiesced in an order of that commission permitting and approving the
purchase by respondent company of the equipment and property involved
in the order, and authorizing the issuance of stocks, bonds and other forms
of indebtedness to pay for the same, and thereafter allowed the utilities
company to operate in the city without objection.
The petition denies that the city accepted the order of the Public
Service Commission referred to in the first case, and charges that the
return to the alternative writ of the respondent in that case was false in its
allegation of facts; that the Missouri Utilities Company did not rely in good
faith upon the city's acquiescence in the use of the streets, but since the
expiration of its franchise in 1922, sought and continued to seek a new
franchise from the city. These are the important allegations, among many
others, made in the petition.
Division Two of the Supreme Court held that it had no authority
to overrule a decision of the court en bane in the former Sikeston case
It also held that the city was precluded by estoppel from denying the
authority of respondent, whose franchise had expired, to engage in electrical
business.
The opinion further held that, since the records of the Public Service
Commission show that the city was represented by counsel at that hearing
and had accepted the Commission's orders, "this belated-and it seems
to us somewhat collateral-attack on the validity and binding force of the
Public.Service Commission's orders and the city's acceptance thereof, and
upon our decision in said first Sikeston case, cannot prevail."
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TORTS
GLENN A. McCLEARY*
The volume of business presented to the court from the field of Torts
continues to be as heavy as in any of the previous periods reviewed in this
annual study of the work of the court. As pointed: out in an earlier study,1
the Restatement of the Law of Torts, is having a persuasive effect in the
decisions. Outside of new life given to the attractive nuisance doctrine, or
the liability of a possessor of land to a child trespasser for harms which
the latter receives on the premises of the possessor, the court during this
period applied well settled doctrines to factual situations which varied
slightly from situations previously dealt with. Again the decisions in which
the humanitarian doctrine was presented are given special treatment so that
2
the doctrine may be examined more critically.
I.

A.

NEGLIoETCE

Duties of persons in certain relations
1. Possessors of Land

The most significant case in this field for the period under review is
Hull v. CTilioz.3 There an eight year old child sued for personal injuries
received when a heavy iron I-beam fell upon her. These beams had been
piled in two layers with heavy timbers underneath the bottom layer and
smaller timbers between the two layers of beams. Among these I-beams
were some about forty-three feet long, twenty-four inches high, with a nine
and one-fourth inch flange at the top and bottom, weighing about seventytwo and one-half pounds per lineal foot. They were kept upright on one
flange, instead of lying on the edges of both flanges, to prevent warping and
to make painting easier. The defendant was a contractor and owned the
eighty by one hundred forty foot lot, using it as a storage place for heavy
material used in construction work. The lot was located in the City of
*Professor of Law and Dean of the Law School, University of Missouri.
A.B., Ohio Wesleyan University, 1917; J.D., University of Michigan, 1924;
S.J.D., Harvard, 1936.
1. See McCleary, The Work of the Missouri Supreme Court for the Year
1937 (Torts) (1938) 3 Mo. L. Ruv. 420, 421.
2. Discussed by Mr. Becker.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol5/iss4/1
3. 344 Mo. 1227, 130 S. W. (2d) 623 (1939), noted in (1939) 4 Mo. L.
1zv. 466.
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Monett and was not fenced because a fence would have interfered with the
moving in and out of the heavy materials stored there. No watchman was
kept at the time, nor was the defendant or his employees upon the lot at
any time except when they were there to get material. There was a partially
broken "Keep Off" sign nailed on a stack of piling on the east side of the
lot. Part of the letters were gone, but the words could still be made out.
Another sign which had been near the north end of the lot was gone at the
time of the plaintiff's injury. There were houses on each side of this lot,
across the street and on streets close by. Plaintiff's family lived in the house
adjoining it on the east, having moved there with another family a week
before she was injured. There were two small children in each of these
families, the oldest of the four being ten years of age. According to the
plaintiff's evidence many children between the ages of three and sixteen
years had used this lot as a playground and had played on these I-beams
for six or seven years before the plaintiff was injured. For a year or more
prior to the plaintiff's injury one of the outside top beams could be moved
and rocked, so that a loud noise could be made in striking the beam next
to it. According to the plaintiff's evidence, there would be about twenty-five
or thirty children rocking this beam at a time. Eventually the beam worked
itself off of the timbers supporting it. There was also evidence that the
truck driver for the defendant had been notified of this dangerous condition, and that the defendant had been told about an injury which another
child had sustained on the piling stored on the lot. When this beam fell,
plaintiff and three other small children were sitting on the beam rocking it.
The beam fell on one of the plaintiff's legs crushing it so that it had to be
amputated. The plaintiff's case was based on the attractive nuisance doctrine, and the sole question on appeal was the sufficiency of the evidence to
make such a case.
The attractive nuisance doctrine up to this case had had very little
grovth in Missouri law. Outside of its application to injuries received from
turntables, usually referred to as the turntable doctrine, there had been a
steady line of decisions which had indicated that the tendency was to restrict. the doctrine. The court in the Hnll case has given new life to it and
undoubtedly the American Law Institute's Restatement of the Law of Torts
is the persuasive force in giving this new direction. Section 339 of the
Restatement is set forth in the opinion: "A possessor of land is subject to
liability for bodily harm to young children trespassing thereon caused by
a structure or other artificial condition which he maintains on the land,
if (a) the place where the condition is maintained is one upon which the
possessor
knows
or should
know
that
such children
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(b) the condition is one of which the possessor knows or should know and
which he realizes or should realize as involving an unreasonable risk of
death or serious bodily harm to such children, and (c) the children because
of their youth do not discover the condition or realize the risk involved in
intermeddling in it or in coming within the area made dangerous by it, and
(d) the utility to the possessor of maintaining the condition is slight as
compared to the risk to young children involved therein."
However, the court pointed out that it would not go the whole way
with the Restatement: First, the doctrine is to be limited to situations where
children's trespasses are due to the attractions of a dangerous instrumentality or condition, instead of applying it to conditions and instrumentalities that children could not see or know about without first becoming
trespassers; and, second, the doctrine is to be limited to instrumentalities
and conditions which are inherently dangerous, instead of applying it to
conditions in which danger has been created by mere casual negligence
under particular circumstances. The court defines "inherently dangerous"
to mean danger inhering in the instrumentality or condition itself, at all
times, so as to require special precautions to be taken with regard to it to
prevent injury; instead of danger arising from mere casual or collateral
negligence of others with respect to it under particular circumstances. It
seems questionable to the writer whether in this particular the court and
the Restatement are really very far apart. At least the court provides a
wholesome check against too free an extension of the doctrine, resulting
in placing too much responsibility on the possessor as to this class of harms.
This is made even clearer by the court pointing out specifically that the
doctrine will not be applied to wheelbarrows, lawnmowers, upturned rakes,
scythes, to other tools left where someone might step on them, to meddling
with farm implements left in a field, to climbing fruit trees or windmills, or
to sliding down hay stacks or hay chutes.
In Mann v. Pulliam,4 a social guest sued the possessor of land for injuries received as she was leaving the premises in the evening, when she was
caused to fall due to an unexpected drop in the steps of the porch. The last
step, being made of concrete and having the same color as the walk below,
reflected the light from the street and porch in such a manner as to give
the illusion that the walk had been reached. There were six steps to this
group, the top five of which were wooden steps painted gray, the lower step

4. 344 Mo. 543, 127 S. W. (2d) 426 (1939), noted in (1939) 4 Mo. L. Rev.
AM^
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and walk were of concrete material of a natural color and thus of a different
color than that of the five upper steps. The sole question in the case was
whether there was negligence in maintaining the steps and walk as described.
The court held that no reasonable person should have foreseen that someone
might sustain such an injury as the plaintiff did. The holding is not so
satisfactory since it is subject to two interpretations. The opinion may
imply that there would have been a duty to make safe or to warn had this
been a known dangerous condition, a fact which was not mentioned. However, this would be at variance with a long line of Missouri decisions, holding that a gratuitous licensee takes the premises as he finds them and no
duty is owed to warn or make safe on the part of the possessor.5 The more
plausible interpretation of this decision is that no duty is owed to such a
gratuitous licensee even if a risk of injury could have been foreseen by the
defendant.
There was the usual number of cases involving the liability of a possessor of premises to business guests (invitees) for injuries arising from
dangerous conditions existing on the premises. In Becker v. Aschen, 6 there
is the novel situation of injuries received by a motorist who slipped on an
oily grease rack step in descending from his automobile, after placing the car
on the stationary grease rack at the direction of the defendant in a filling
station owned by the Standard Oil Company, one of the defendants, and
operated by Aschen. The defendants relied on cases dealing with persons
who fell on properly oiled or waxed floors, and cases where persons were
caused to fall by reason of the condition of floors, which condition was not
shown to have been known or could have been expected by the owner or
occupant. The court held that grease and oil on steps would produce a
dangerous and unsafe condition as a matter of common knowledge, and that
the comparison the defendant was attempting to draw with properly oiled
or waxed floors or marble or stone stairs was not reasonable. The issue of
defendants' negligence under these facts was for the jury. In Stoll v. First
National Bank of Independence,7 the plaintiff's evidence showed that she
was fully cognizant of the smooth and slippery condition of the floor and
stairs of the defendant bank, where she fell sustaining injuries. The de-

5. What authority there is in the cases holds that a social guest is a gratuitous licensee since he comes on the premises for his own benefit. To be considered an invitee (business visitor), the object of the visit must be some commercial benefit to the possessor. The Restatement of the Law of Torts holds a
possessor of land liable to gratuitous licensees for known dangerous conditions
unless a warning is given.

RESTATEME.NT, TORTS (1934)

§ 342.

6. 344 Mo. 1107, 131 S. W. (2d) 533 (1939).
7. 134 S. W. (2d) 97 (Mo. 1939).
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fense was that there was no negligence on its part since the plaintiff had all
the information which she would have been entitled to from the defendant
in the performance of any duty to a customer of the bank. The theory
of the defendant was not that the plaintiff was contributorily negligent,
but that there was no breach of any duty on its part. The court held that
the trial court erred in failing to give the defendant's peremptory instruction in the nature of a demurrer to the evidence.
The status of an employee of a contractor to which the highway commission had let a contract for the construction of a railroad overpass was
held to be that of an invitee on the railroad right-of-way, in view of the
contract between the railroad company and the highway commission granting the commission or its contractor permission to enter upon the right-ofway for the purpose of constructing the overpass, in Willig v. Chicago,
Burlington & Quincy R. R.8 His presence there was undoubtedly to the
business benefit of the railroad company in having the overpass constructed,
at least he was not there solely for his own benefit or the benefit only of the
contractor or highway commission so as to be considered merely a gratuitous
licensee as to the railroad company. Therefore, in an action against the
railroad company for wrongful death, it was for the jury to determine
whether or not the defendant was negligent in operating special trains past
the construction work at a speed of from forty to fifty miles per hour.
2. Lessors
In Schneider v. Dubinsky Realty 'Co.,9 the porch immediately in the
rear of the plaintiff's second floor apartment gave way while he was on it,
causing him to be dropped to a concrete pavement on the ground about
fifteen feet below. It was urged that the defendant's demurrer to the
evidence should have been sustained because the plaintiff was injured on
that part of the premises claimed to have been set apart solely for plaintiff's
own use. It was shown that the porch was used for temporary storage of
garbage by both tenants having doors opening onto the porch; that the
garbage was removed daily and the porch swept and cared for by the
janitors furnished by the lessor; that other tenants used the porch in
stringing clotheslines from its railing to the railing across the areaway
and in hanging out laundry. The case was held to fall within the well
established rule which imposes a duty upon the landlord to use due care to

8.

137 S. W. (2d) 430 (Mo. 1939).

9. 344 Mo. 654, 127 S. W. (2d) 691 (1939).
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keep those portions of the premises in a reasonably safe condition over
which he has retained control and which are used in common by two or
more tenants.
A more troublesome problem in the case was to determine who was the
lessor. Under an agreement between the apartment house owner and the
trustee named in a deed of trust, covering the apartment house, it was
provided that the trustee appointed the owner as agent to collect the rents
and continue in the management of the mortgaged premises. It also provided that the agreement should not impair the right of the trustee or
holders of the secured notes to foreclose the trust deed. The court found
that the parties intended this agreement merely as an assignment of the
rent from the owner to the trustee, that the owner was not the agent of the
trustee, and that the trustee was not liable for the injuries sustained. The
plaintiff had sued both the owner and the trustee.
3.

Municipal Corporations

Injuries resulting from conditions in streets and sidewalks were the
basis of three cases against municipalities. In Hunt v. Kansas City,10 the
injuries resulted from falling into an open coal hole in a public sidewalk.
The instructions required the jury to find that the hole was left open, constituting a condition not reasonably safe for pedestrians, and that the hole
was negligently left open for several weeks or for such length of time so that
the city by the exercise of ordinary care could have known in sufficient
time to have remedied the condition and have prevented the injury to the
plaintiff. There was nothing new in the law involved, but the appellant,
however, contended such language told the jury, in effect, that the city
was obliged to prevent an injury at any and all hazards. The court did not
believe this misled the jury as to the measure of duty owed by the defendant.
However, in State ex rel. City of Jefferson v. Shain,1 an instruction was
erroneously given which permitted a recovery by the plaintiff if the sidewalk were found to be defective. It is not sufficient that the jury find the
sidewalk to be defective, but it must be found that the sidewalk was not in
a reasonably safe condition. The evidence relative to the depth of the stepoff, causing the plaintiff to be thrown from her balance and her foot to be
sprained as a result of the step-off or depression in the sidewalk caused by

10.

131 S. W. (2d) 514 (Mo. 1939).

11. 344 Mo. 57, 124 S. W. (2d) 1194 (1939).
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one section or block of the sidewalk being lower than the other, ranged
from one and one-half to four inches. The court held that the defect being
undisputed was an additional reason why an instruction requiring the jury
only to find the sidewalk to be defective was positive misdirection. In State
ex rel. Kansas City Gas Co. v. Shai,' 12 the plaintiff was allowed a recovery
for the negligent obstruction of the south side of a street, for the negligent
failure to warn westbound motorists of the use of the opening in the obstruction by the public to cross the street, and for the-negligent failure to warn
pedestrians crossing the street at that point of danger of approaching westbound automobiles. The excavation, two feet in width and from three to
four feet deep, was located eight feet south of the north curb. From
eight to twelve inches of concrete pavement had to be removed, and the
material taken out was laid on the south side of the trench and the dirt
was placed on the north side. The street at this point was approximately
twenty-six feet from curb to curb, but, due to these materials, the width
had been reduced to about six feet according to the apparent finding of the
jury. Owing to conditions existing, both east and west traffic on the street
was confined to that narrow portion left open for travel on the south side
of the street. The injury to the plaintiff was caused by his being struck
by an automobile traveling west, when he emerged into the street by way
of an open driveway which was left from the sidewalk to the street, running
between the mounds of earth and materials piled five or six feet high. There
were no lights and no person there to warn pedestrians and motorists, and
it was unusually difficult for either to see the other approaching.
4.

Supplier of a Chattel

In two cases an employee brought action against the employer on the
theory that the latter had supplied the plaintiff with an unsafe tool. The
duty of the employer is to furnish tools that are ordinarily and reasonably
safe for the character of the work they are intended for. It is not a duty
3
the court
to furnish the newest or best. In Fischer v. Cape Girardeau,"
held that a shovel with a worn edge was not necessarily an unsafe tool under
this rule, since a shovel with a worn edge is not inherently dangerous and,
unless subject to use not ordinarily intended, such condition would not
reasonably be anticipated to cause injury, although the worn edge might
increase the amount of labor expended in doing work. Here the employee

12.

132 S. W. (2d) 1015 (Mo. 1939).
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was shoveling frozen crushed rock with the worn shovel which slipped, resulting in the employee being thrown against the shovel handle, causing the
injuries. The evidence was held insufficient to make a submissible case. In
Choate v. Springfield,14 the negligence was alleged to consist in the furnishing by the employer of an improper and unsafe tool for breaking rocks.
The tool furnished was a flat faced hammer intended for use in striking
stakes, drills or chisels, whereas the plaintiff alleged that a round or bulging
faced hammer was the proper tool to use, due to the great reduction thereby
in the amount of flying slivers. The evidence was held sufficient to take
the question to the jury, but the case was reversed and the cause remanded
for erroneous instructions, one of which placed the burden on the defendant of proving the existence of such common usage and knowledge in the
rock-breaking trade of that kind of tool.
B.

Breach of duty established through violation of statute

The duty and breach of duty which constitute negligence may be shown
through violation of a statute which was intended to protect persons of the
class to which the plaintiff belongs against the kind of injury which he has
received. The only cases falling under this category involved the Federal
Safety Appliance Act. In Wilson v. Thompson,"5 in an action for the death
of a member of a train crew in a railroad switching movement, the plaintiff's
witnesses testified that they saw the deceased riding the leading moving car
and jerking the lever of the pin lifter, and that he fell when the moving car
struck standing cars. This was held sufficient to authorize a verdict for the
plaintiff on the theory that the coupling device failed to function, and that
the deceased fell from the car and was injured while he was attempting to
adjust the coupler.'" A recovery was based upon the same Act in Conrad
v. Baltimore & Ohio R. R.,17 where the plaintiff was injured when he was
about to examine, as an inspector, the rubber hose air coupler in the air
brakes system. As the coupler parted, the air pressure caused it to whip
around with great violence and strike him on the head. The coupling parted
before he touched it, and the evidence showed that it could not have come
apart under pressure unless it was in some way defective. The defendant
had contended that the provisions of the Act with reference to power or

14.

343 Mo. 935, 124 S. W. (2d) 1127 (1939).

15. 133 S. W. (2d) 331 (Mo. 1939).
16. The judgment for the plaintiff was reversed because the trial court did
not give instructions submitting the defendant's theory of the case.
17. 133 S. W. (2d) 350 (Mo. 1939).
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1940

107

Missouri Law Review, Vol. 5, Iss. 4 [1940], Art. 1
MISSOURI LAW REVIEW[

[Vol. 5

train brakes could not be violated with a standing train. Here the train
was made up, the engine was attached to the cars, and it was past time for
the train to have departed. Therefore, the train, and not the car, was the
unit. In Gieseking v. Litchfield & Madison Ry., 18 the injuries were caused
by failure to furnish efficient handbrakes within the Act.
C. Imputed negligence
Where the issue was whether the agent was on a mission for the insurer
at the time of the automobile accident in Snowwhite v. Metropolitan Life
Insurance Co.,19 proof that the agent made a collection in his territory two
hours after the accident would not support an inference that a purpose of
the agent's trip at the time of the accident was the collection, nor would it
authorize the submission of the case as to the insurer's liability to the jury.
In Pesot v. Yanda,'20 the agent of an insurance company caused injuries to
a pedestrian as a result of the negligent operation of his own automobile
while en route to the company's office to turn over the collection of the
preceding day. Before going to the office he had taken his wife to her place
of work which was in a direction opposite from that which he would have
taken had he been going direct to his office. He had no business to transact
on that trip for the company. However, at the time of the accident he had
started from the place where he had taken his wife toward the company's
office. But he had deviated from his regular route to such an extent that he
was not acting within the scope of his employment, and the moment he
headed back toward his employer's office he did not return to his employment, although he had money belonging to his employer in his possession to
turn in at the time. It appears that he had deviated to the extent of thirteen
or fourteen city blocks away from the place where his duty to the master
called him.
In Becker v. Aschen,21 where injuries were sustained by a motorist who
slipped on an alleged oily grease rack step in descending from his automobile which he had driven onto the grease rack, the filling station was owned
by the oil company but was leased to a lessee whose remuneration was on a
commission basis. This did not preclude a finding that the oil company
operated the filling station and that the lessee was its agent, since there was

18. 344 Mo. 672, 127 S. W. (2d) 700 (1939).
19. 344 Mo. 705, 127 S. W. (2d) 718 (1939).
20. 344 Mo. 338, 126 S. W. (2d) 240 (1939).
21. 344 Mo. 1107, 131 S. W. (2d) 533 (1939).
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substantial evidence that the oil company reserved the right to control and
did control the operation of the filling station business.
D.

Causation

Assuming negligence on the part of the defendant to have been made
out, there is still the question of causation to be determined. In Lappin v.
Prebe,22 the theory of the plaintiff's case was that the death of the deceased
was caused by the defendant in negligently operating a trailor-tractor as
to permit a part thereof to project over the shoulder along the pavement
so as to strike the deceased while he was walking on the shoulder of the
highway at night. But the nature of the deceased's injuries established that
he was not killed in this manner and the causal connection was not established. The trial court, therefore, improperly granted a new trial after
verdict for the defendants. 23 On the other hand, sufficient causal relationship was made out in Wills v. Berberich's Delivery Co., 24 where the evidence showed that septicemia, originating in a boil on the employee's chin,
was aggravated by the ten or twelve foot fall sustained by the employee
while at work, causing it to spread, so that the fall was a contributing
cause to the death. The defendant's theory was that the spread of septicemia
from the boil may have been due to low resistance or disease as shown by
the autopsy. But the respondent's experts testified that the spreading infection more probably resulted from the violent fall than from the other
possible causes shown.
E.

Defenses in negligence cases

Contributory negligence as a matter of law prevented a recovery from
the alleged owners and operators of a building for injuries sustained when
a scaffold collapsed, in Mosely v. Sum, 25 where a janitor who had been
employed at the apartment building for more than twenty-five years, in
constructing a scaffold to clean wallpaper, used as a support a stepladder
which he knew was weak and had rusty braces and had been repaired with
straps and rope. In Senseney v. Landay Real Estate Co.,26 it was held that
a tenant's use of the elevator after regular business hours, when an elevator

22. 131 S. W. (2d) 511 (Mo. 1939).
23. See Mullen v. Lowden, 344 Mo. 40, 124 S. W. (2d) 1152 (1939), where
no causal relationship was shown between the alleged acts of negligence and the
injuries sustained by a brakeman in falling off a train.
24.

134 S. W. (2d) 125 (Mo. 1939).

25. 344 Mo. 969, 130 S. W. (2d) 465 (1939).
131 S.
W. (2d)School
595 of(Mo.
1939). Repository, 1940
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operator was not provided, specifically authorized or specifically prohibited,
was contributorily negligent as a matter of law, the evidence showing that
he opened the elevator door, looked in, thought he saw the elevator, stepped
in and fell down the elevator shaft.
Under the Federal Employers' Liability Act, contributory negligence
is not a complete defense but operates only to diminish the damages. It is
an affirmative defense and must be pleaded, unless it is conclusively shown
by the plaintiff's own negligence. In Sheehan v. Terminal Railroad Ass'n
of St. Louis, 27 in an action under this Act for the death of an employee, it
was held that the issue of contributory negligence was not raised where
the case was tried by the plaintiff on the theory that the defendant's negligence was the sole cause of the injuries and by the defendant on the theory
that the employee's negligence was the sole cause of the injuries.
In Becker v. Aschen,28 a motorist had driven his automobile onto a
grease rack, and to descend from the rack used a step which was oil soaked
causing him to slip and fall. In an action for the injuries sustained, it was
held that he was not contributorily negligent, as a matter of law, because
he did not turn around and hold onto the car while descending, where the
condition of the step leading from the grease rack was not obvious to the
motorist and there was no reason to expect danger.
The rule that one in going upon railroad tracks must look and listen for
approaching trains was held, in Willig v. Chicago, Burlington & Quincy
R. R.,29 not applicable with strictness to persons who are lawfully at work
on or about tracks as invitees of the railroad. Such persons need only keep
such reasonable lookout for trains as is commensurate with the danger and
consistent with the faithful performance of their work. It was not contributory negligence as a matter of law for the plaintiff not to look or to
listen, where the railroad company's section foreman, who customarily had
notified the employees on this job regarding the time of arrival of special
trains passing on the track near the overpass, had informed the employees
that special trains would pass about noon on the day in question, and the
special train which killed the plaintiff passed about nine o'clock in the morn.
ing. Here the plaintiff had the right to rely on the information given regarding the time of the arrival of trains, if it was reasonable to do so,
whether or not the foreman was acting within the scope of his authority as
an agent of the railroad company.

27. 344 Mo. 586, 127 S. W. (2d) 657 (1939).
28. 344 Mo. 1107, 131 S. W. (2d) 533 (1939).
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol5/iss4/1
29. 137 S. W. (2d) 430 (Mo. 1939).
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The assumption of risk cases all had to do with sets of facts arising
under the Federal Employers' Liability Act where the workmen were injured by trains. In Evans v. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry., 0 the plaintiff furnished substantial evidence that the defendant had established a
custom and practice to warn trackmen and others of approaching trains,
and that no sufficient warning was given the plaintiff. On defendant's
demurrer to the evidence, where the plaintiff was struck from behind without warning in violation of this established practice and custom to warn,
it was held that the plaintiff had the right to rely upon the giving of the
customary warning signals and the court could not say as a matter of law
that he had assumed the risk of being struck without warning. But an
experienced section hand who was injured while assisting other members of
a section crew in putting a motorcar on the railroad track from a set-off
by the use of lining bars, who was familiar with the condition of the particular set-offs, and had assisted before in putting motorcars on the track
by the same method, was held in Arnold v. Scandrett,31 to have assumed the
risk of injury which he received when the motorcar suddenly upkicked and
struck him in the lower right abdomen, resulting in a direct inguinal
hernia. Likewise, a trainman is held to assume the usual and ordinary
handling of a train, especially when he rides in a more dangerous place
as a matter of his own choice when a place of safety has been provided for
him. In Mullen v. Lowden,32 the plaintiff was the head brakeman and was
thrown in some way from the tender where he was riding, and there was no
evidence of any unusual handling of the train.
F.

Humanitariandoctrine

Due to the significance of this doctrine in the Missouri decisions, this
phase of Torts is given special emphasis as a special topic which will be
found elsewhere in this issue of the Review23
G. Burden of proof
There is still some oversight on the part of lawyers and trial courts in
failing to follow the guidance which the court has attempted to provide in

30. 131 S. W. (2d) 604 (Mo. 1939).
31. 131 S. W. (2d) 542 (Mo. 1939).
32.

344 Mo. 40, 124 S. W. (2d) 1152 (1939).

33. Discussed by Mr. Becker.
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the matter of instructions as to the burden of proof in the negligence cases.3 4
The court in Flint v. Loew's St. Louis Realty & Amusement Corp.,' calls
attention to the fact that "Recently we have written much on burden of
proof instructions, indicating a preference for a short, simple instruction
."
The court therein sets forth again a considerable disthereon. .
cussion on the problem. Space is inadequate here to set forth in detail
the instructions involved in the cases during this period on the burden of
proof. In Snowwhite v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 36 an instruction informing the jury that the defendants were charged with a positive wrong,
and that a recovery could be had on a charge of negligence only where
sustained by the greater weight of the credible evidence to the reasonable
satisfaction of the jury that the charge was true, and had been explicitly
condemned by the court in earlier cases. Instructions on the burden of
proof, in Williams v. Guyot 37 and Branson v. Abernathy Furniture Co.,38
fell within the accepted scope.

II. ASSAULT AND BATTERY
In an action against a sheriff and the surety on the sheriff's bond for
damages for battery alleged to have been committed by a deputy sheriff, the
court, in State ez rel. Donelon v. Deuser,39 held not inconsistent plaintiff's
instruction, authorizing a recovery if the deputy used more force under the
circumstances than was reasonably necessary to arrest, and an instruction
given for the defendant that the deputy had the right to use such force as
appeared to him at the time to be reasonably necessary to overcome resistance by the plaintiff. The court also held that these were not unfavorable
to the defendants. The latter ground is sound enough but on the question
of inconsistency there may easily be some doubt. There would seem to
be a considerable difference between the reasonableness of the force used
-when viewed objectively (plaintiff's thory), and when viewed subjectively
(defendant's theory). The court also held that the jury may consider the
sense of shame, mental suffering, humiliation, mortification, wrong or outrage which the plaintiff suffered or would suffer as the direct result of the

34.

See this development in McCleary, The Work of the Missouri Supreme

Court for the Year 1936 (Torts) (1937) 2 Mo. L. Rsv. 467, 480; (1938) 3 id.
420, 433; (1939) 4 id. 437, 448.
35. 344 Mo. 310, 126 S. W. (2d) 193 (1939).
36. 344 Mo. 705, 127 S. W. (2d) 718 (1939).
37. 344 Mo. 372, 126 S. W. (2d) 1137 (1939).
38. 344 Mo. 1171, 130 S. W. (2d) 562 (1939).
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol5/iss4/1
39. 134 S. W. (2d) 132 (Mo. 1939).
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battery, although the plaintiff did not seek punitive damages. Due to the
severity of the damages, a verdict for $15,000 did not seem to be grossly
excessive.

III.

FALSE IMPRISONMENT

In Ussery v. Haynes, 40 the county court's determination that notice, not
legally served, of an insanity hearing was given to the alleged insane person
before rendition of final judgment committing her to the state hospital
as a county patient, was held to be error in the exercise of its judicial function for which the circuit judges cannot be held liable in damages for false
imprisonment. Neither was the county physician who took no part in the
actual commitment of the plaintiff to the hospital, though he testified as a
witness at the sanity hearing and made out a certificate, required by
statute to be transmitted to the hospital superintendent, at the court's
behest, nor the county clerk who issued through his deputy notice to the
plaintiff, which was based upon sufficient information, and who issued the
warrant of commitment as required by statute based upon the county court's
judgment which was fair and sufficient on its face.
An instruction, authorizing a verdict for punitive damages in an action
for false imprisonment only if the jury found the acts of the defendants
which caused the arrest of the plaintiff were willful and without just cause
or excuse, was held in Newport v. Montgomery Ward & Co.,4' not to be
a roving commission to assess punitive damages. This on the ground that
if the acts of the defendant caused the arrest of the plaintiff and the arrest
was made without probable cause and through malice, punitive damages
were authorized.
IV.

MALICIOUS PROSECUTION

In Bonzo v. Kroger Grocery & Baking Co.,42 the circuit court, juvenile
division, after a hearing, had entered its findings and orders, stating that
there was probable cause to believe the defendant guilty of the charge
of robbery as charged in the information and ordering that the defendant
be held to await the action of the grand jury. A subsequent judgment of
the same court finding the accused not guilty was held to be of no probative
43
effect as to the issue of probable cause for proseeution.

40. 344 Mo. 530, 127 S. W. (2d) 410 (1939).
41.

344 Mo. 646, 127 S. W. (2d) 687 (1939).

42. 344 Mo. 127, 125 S. W. (2d) 75 (1939).
43. For the troublesome experience of this question in the Missouri decisions, see (1939) 4 Mo. L. Ruv. 78.
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TRUSTS
W. L. NELSON, JR.*

Of the eight 2Missouri Supreme Court cases for the year 1939 dealing
with trust law, one is of special interest. This decision, Rossi v. Davis,1
involved the validity of a clause providing for forfeiture in the event of
contest by a beneficiary and seems to be the first case in Missouri upon
which such a provision in a trust instrument has been passed. In the other
opinions digested here, the court applied only well-established principles of
the law.
I.

EXPRESS TRUSTS

A. Appointment and removal of trustee
The appointment by a court of a successor trustee was under attack
in Riggs v. Moise.2 One Lionel Moise, named as a co-trustee by the testator,
filed an ex parte petition in Division Three of the Jackson County Circuit
Court asking that the court appoint him trustee so that he might take
charge of the property. A decree to that effect was entered. Later he resigned and his wife, Daisy C. Moise, was appointed trustee by the same
division. After his death the beneficiaries instituted this suit, alleging that
the trusteeship was vacant as a result of the death of the named trustee,
that the appointment of the successor trustee by Division Three was a
nullity, and asking that the court appoint a trustee to succeed Lionel
Moise. Division Four to which the case was assigned, did enter such a
decree, but a year later sustained a motion filed by Daisy Moise and held
that its prior orders were void, inasmuch as Division Three had exclusive
jurisdiction.
On appeal by the beneficiaries, the supreme court held that Division
Three never acquired jurisdiction over the trust estate and that its purported appointment of the trustee who had been named in the will, such
procedure for confirmation not being a condition precedent to a trustee
entering on his duties, was void.
The court also stated that the trustee's resignation was a nullity, not

*Attorney, Columbia. A.B., University of Missouri, 1933, LL.B., 1936.
1.

133 S. W. (2d) 363 (Mo. 1939).

2. 344 Mo. 177, 128 S. W. (2d) 632 (1939).
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only because of the lack of jurisdiction but also because the beneficiaries
were not notified of the trustee's application to resign, nor was their consent
obtained. The court stated that a trustee having once accepted the trust and
entered upon its management could not resign except "(a) by proceedings
before a court having jurisdiction over the trust; or (b) in accordance with
the terms of the trust; or (c) with the consent of all the beneficiaries, if
they have capacity to give such consent." 3
This question of jurisdiction was also referred to in State ex rel. Caulfield v. Sartorius,4 where the contention was made that the court did not
have jurisdiction, all the beneficiaries not appearing and no process being
issued, the only notice given being the publication in the court's official
newspaper of the docketing of the motion. That question was not passed on
but the court did say that the beneficiaries are entitled to be heard, and that
the appointment or removal of a trustee cannot be done arbitrarily.
The validity of an order of the respondent circuit judge removing
relator as a co-trustee was under attack in that case. The lower court found
that this trustee had failed to take any action to compel his co-trustee, a
bank, to account for losses due to its alleged mismanagement prior to his
appointment, a number of beneficiaries having previously filed suits charging the bank with mismanagement of the trust fund, and further found
that he had accepted $10,000 from the bank as compensation in addition
to that which the bank had been ordered to pay under the terms of the
decree providing for his appointment. The circuit court, in its hearing on
the motion, had excluded evidence that the additional payment was within
the reasonable value of the services rendered, and had then found that the
acceptance of the additional payment tended to impair the trustee's independence and to place him under obligation to the bank.
After issuing a preliminary rule prohibiting respondent from enforcing
his order, the supreme court made the rule absolute, holding that the facts
found by the lower court were not sufficient to justify the trustee's removal.
First pointing out that he had been appointed with instructions to act with
the bank, at a time when all the charges were pending against it, and -was
therefore not remiss in failing to proceed against the bank for alleged mismanagement, the court held that his failure to secure the court's approval
for the receipt of additional compensation did not justify his removal. The
court pointed out that it was neither alleged nor found that the payment

3. Id. at 184, 128 S. W. (2d) at 635.
4. 344 Mo. 919, 130 S. W. (2d) 541 (1939).
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was in excess of the reasonable value of services rendered, and quoted with
approval from two cases holding that a trustee would not be removed unless
it were clearly necessary to do so in order to save the trust property.5
B. Action against trustee
In re Howard's Estate v. Howe,6 was an appeal from a judgment dismissing a claim against the estate of a decedent. The supreme court, finding
that the claim was contingent, said that if the estate should be considered,
because of a certain agreement, to be standing in the position of a trustee,
the proceeding was analagous to an action by a beneficiary against his
trustee for money had and received, and that the general rule is that such an
action cannot be maintained until there has been a final settlement of accounts and nothing remains for the trustee to do but pay over the amount
found to be owing.
In State ex reZ. Lee v. Sartorius,7 involving the same trust arrangement
dealt with in State ex rel. Caulfield v. Sartorius, the court held that the
members of a committee formed to protect the rights of the beneficiaries who
became parties to an extension agreement were not trustees, as found by
respondent judge, but were merely agents for the beneficiaries who became
parties to the agreement, and that they could not be removed and enjoined
from acting on the committee. The court pointed out that the extension
agreement provided a method for the beneficiary's withdrawal, and that if
such method were inequitable, resort could be had to a court of equity, but
that the court would not, at the request of one person, revoke an agency for
others against their wishes.
0. Legality of no-contest clause
Rossi v. Davis involved six different appeals arising out of an action

5.

In Wiegand v. Woerner, 155 Mo. App. 227, 264, 134 S. W. 596, 608

(1911), the St. Louis Court of Appeals said: "To remove one as trustee there
must be a clear necessity for such act, a clear necessity for it, in order to save

the trust property."

The court also quoted the following from Mississippi

Valley Trust Co. v. Buder, 47 F. (2d) 507, 511 (C. C. A. 8th, 1931): "'In
no case ought the trustee to be removed where there is no danger of a breach
of trust and some of the beneficiaries are satisfied with the management.
Nor will a trustee be removed for every violation of duty, or even breach of
trust, if the fund is in no danger of being lost. The power of removal of
trustees appointed by deed or will ought to be exercised sparingly by the
courts. There umist be a clear necessity for interference to save the trust
property. Mere error, or some breach of trust, may not be sufficient; there
must be such misconduct as to show want of capacity or of fidelity, putting
the trust in jeopardy.'"
6. 344 Mo. 1245, 131 S. W. (2d) 517 (1939).
7. 344 Mo. 912, 130 S.W. (2d) 547 (1939).
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wherein trustee sought the direction of the court as to certain questions
regarding the administration of the trust. The trust instrument provided
for the payment of the income from the trust to the beneficiaries, who were
the creator's wife, children, and a grandson, and to their descendants, and
on the death of the last of the named beneficiaries, the corpus was to vest
in certain parties. The instrument contained a no-contest clause providing
that if any of the named beneficiaries instituted any action to set aside the
trust, then his interest and that of his descendants should cease and his
original share should go to the other named beneficiaries.
After the death of the settlor one of the daughters, a beneficiary, had
herself appointed administratrix of his estate and instituted a proceeding
to discover assets, the only assets being property which had been transferred
to the trustees by the instrument in question. In that proceeding the validity
of the trust instrument was attacked, and in the present action the trustees
asked the court to direct them as to whether there had been a forfeiture
under the no-contest clause. The daughter argued that the no-contest
clause should not be applied where there appeared to be probable cause for
the contest.
The court was not cited to any case construing a forfeiture provision
in a trust instrument, but it reviewed will cases in which similar provisions
were under consideration, and applying the principles which apparently
were adopted in In re Chambers' Estate,8 and which were enunciated by
the Supreme Court of the United States in Smithsonian Institution v.
Meech,9 the court stated that such a clause was valid and enforceable, and
that no exception as to probable cause should be allowed where the creator
had not so provided. The court further found that the daughter had
violated the provision by instituting the probate court proceedings, even
though she was acting as administratrix there, because as an heir and distributee she had a personal interest in having the instrument set aside.
It was not necessary in this case to decide whether a no-contest provision would be enforced where the trust instrument did not provide for a
gift over, but the court did point out that some courts made such a distinction.
The court also took up the matter of certain alleged acts of malfeasance
on the part of the trustees, but found no ground for removal.

8.
9.

322 Mo. 1086, 18 S. W. (2d) 30 (1929).
169 U. S. 398 (1898).
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IMPLIED TRUSTS

Sufficiency of proof
In holding that the defendant in Tichenor v. Bowman, 10 had failed to
establish an implied trust in certain real estate which had been conveyed to
the defendant's husband and another individual, the purchase money allegedly being the wife's separate property, the court followed the wellestablished rule that "an extraordinary degree of proof" is required to
establish an implied trust, and that the evidence must be "so clear, positive,
and convincing as to exclude every reasonable doubt from the chancellor's
mind.'"

WILLS AND ADMINISTRATION
OZBERT WATKINS, JR.*

Any selection of the decisions involving the subject of wills and administration must of necessity be somewhat arbitrary due to the broad
nature of the subject. Numerous cases digested under the general topic of
wills can just as appropriately be said to deal with other fields of law such
as Prpperty, Trusts, Taxation, etc. The fifteen cases herein discussed are
those that, in the opinion of the writer, could more appropriately be dis-

10.

133 S. W. (2d) 324 (Mo. 1939).

11. In the other two cases decided last year, the court merely touched on
the law of trusts. Fullerton v. Fullerton, 132 S. W. (2d) 966 (Mo. 1939), was
a suit by certain heirs of a testator against the other heirs to adjudge title
to real estate and partition it. The testator had directed that a sum of money
be loaned on real estate and that the interest be paid to a daughter until her
death, at which time the principal should be distributed to his heirs. The
plaintiffs alleged that one of the defendants had invested the money in the
real estate in question, contrary to the directions in the will, and had taken
title in the name of the daughter, and that she later purported to devise and
convey the land to that defendant. On appeal, the court found that such was
the fact and it held that the plaintiffs were entitled to recover, whether the money
was invested under the terms of the will, or whether it was invested without authority from the testator, for in the latter case a resulting trust would arise.
In Loehr v. Glaser, 133 S. W. (2d) 394 (Mo. 1939), the court, construing
a clause of a will under which property was devised to named trustees for
the use of certain beneficiaries with directions that the trustees should, within
two years after final settlement of the estate, sell the property and distribute
the proceeds, held that legal title vested in the trustees on the death of the
testator, as opposed to the only heir's contention that the clause provided that the
trust should not be created on the date of the death of deceased but should be
created after administration, and was therefore void.
*Attorney, St. Joseph. LL.B., University of Missouri, 1939.
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cussed under the subject of wills and administration than any other topic,
but are not the only cases involving wills that were considered by the court.
I.

CONSTRUCTION

In re Knighten's Estate' reasserts the rule that the lapse statute' does
not apply to save a gift to a spouse. In that case it was contended that
Section 306, Missouri Revised Statutes, 1929, relating to descent and distribution, included the spouse, and that this defined "kindred" or "relative" to include relatives by affinity. The court, however, overruled this
contention, and followed the rule above set out.
Gregory v. Borders, and Shields v. Borders,3 are consolidated cases.
and were suits to construe a will. The testator gave his half-brothers $1.00
each, and all of his real estate to his wife. He also left the residue of his
estate to his wife "to hold to her and her heirs forever." All of the
beneficiaries predeceased the testator. It was contended by the wife's relatives that the will showed an intent- to disinherit his half-brothers and
to leave the testator's entire estate to his wife. It was further contended
that the testator had stated after execution of the will that he had fixed it
so that his wife's relatives would get his whole estate. The court reasserted
the rule that the lapse statute did not apply to save the wife's bequest as.
she was not a "relative" of the testator within the meaning of the statute
and for the further reason that she left no lineal descendants. After stating
the usual rules concerning the testator's intention, the court went on to
hold that they could not indulge in the presumption that he intended to
exclude his relatives in the event that his wife predeceased him. It was also
contended that the words "to her and her heirs" were words of substitution,
but the court properly held that they were words of limitation and that
the estate descended to the heirs of the testator.
In Fullertonv. Fullerton,4 the will bequeathed all of the testator's cash
to his daughter, Mary Jane, to be loaned at interest, the interest to be
paid to his daughter annually for her life, "and in case of her death then
said amount to go to her children, and in case she dies without children
living then said sum of money is to be paid to my heirs." The court held
that Mary Jane took a life estate under the will and as she had no children

1.

344 Mo. 246, 125 S. W.
. REV. STAT. (1929)

2. M
3.

(2d) 863 (1939).

§ 527.

136 S. W. (2d) 306 (Mo. 1939).

4. 132 S. W. (2d) 966 (Mo. 1939). See also the discussion of this case,
in (1940) 5 Mo. L. REv. 236.
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the remainder would descend to the heirs of the testator. This was so
even though no trustee was named in the will.
The will in Loehr v. Glaserr devised all of the testator's property to
trustees and then provided: "It is my desire
. .
that my said trustees
shall, within two years after the final settlement of my said estate sell
various pieces until all of said property . . . shall have been converted
into cash." After the sale there was to be a distribution. The trust was
to terminate within two years after the final settlement of the estate. It
was contended that no trust was created for the reason that the trust was
not to commence until after administration.6 However, the court held that
immediately upon the death of the testator the clause in question vested an
estate in the trustee's named and that the trust was created at that time.
Masterson v. Masterson7 was a suit for the construction of a will. The
plaintiffs were the brothers and sisters of the testator. The will read: "All
the rest . . . of my estate
.
to my beloved wife . . . absolutely so long as she remains my widow." The will made no further provision. The court first held that the plaintiffs might invoke the jurisdiction
of a court of equity to construe a will affecting personal as well as real
property and to protect them against waste, dissipation, and conversion
of the corpus by the life tenant. The court then reviews many authorities
and construes the will as giving the widow a life estate without power
to dispose of the remainder. The reasoning in the case of Underwood v.
Cave," is expressly overruled. The court states that the word "absolutely"
indicates that the estate for widowhood exists without limitations imposed
-upon its enjoyment in other parts of the instrument.
II.

CONTEST OF WILLS

The case of Rossi v. Davis,9 involves an inter vivos trust, but many of the
principles therein set forth apply as well to wills as to trusts. The suit was
instituted by the trustees of Simon D. Rossi, now deceased. The plaintiffs,

5. 133 S. W. (2d) 394 (Mo. 1939).
6. It is rather difficult to tell from the opinion what the contention of the
parties was. See, for example (1940) 5 Mo. L. REV. 361, where it is suggested
that the heir at law was contending that the trust was not to commence until
two years after the final settlement and that, therefore, there was a violation of
the rule against perpetuities. It would seem that if the trust were not to commence until two years after final settlement that the rule against perpetuities
would have been violated, unless the fact that the distribution was to be to a
charity would prevent the operation of the rule. This matter, however, is not

discussed by the court.
7. 344 Mo. 1188, 130 S. W. (2d) 629 (1939).
8. 176 Mo. 1, 75 S. W. 451 (1903).
9. 133 S. W. (2d) 363 (Mo. 1939).
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by their petition, sought the direction of the court as to certain questions
relating to the administration of the trust. The settlor, prior to the creation
of the trust, formed a corporation to which, before he died, he transferred
all his property. The trust instrument conveyed to the trustees all of the
stock of this corporation, but reserved the right to direct the voting of
the stock during his lifetime. There is no contention that Rossi was not of
sound mind and free from undue influence when he executed the trust
instrument. The trust, generally speaking, provided for the payment of
the income to certain beneficiaries. The instrument also contained a "no
contest" or incontestibility clause to the effect that if any of the beneficiaries
instituted any proceedings of any kind, at any time, for the purpose of
setting aside this instrument, and were unsuccessful therein, then such
contesting parties should receive the sum of $1.00; that all further interest
of such contesting party should cease; that such party and his or her
children and descendants should share no further in the trust, but their
interest should'be transferred to the other beneficiaries. The settlor died
thereafter leaving no other assets and no debts or creditors. Theresa Davis,
a daughter of the settlor and one of the defendants, expressed dissatisfaction
with the trust instrument and indicated an intention to break the trust.
She procured her appointment by the probate court as administratrix of
her father's estate and purportedly in that capacity instituted a proceeding
in the probate court to discover assets of her father. In said proceeding the
only assets discovered were the shares of stock in the Rossi Corporation,
all of which the settlor had transferred to his trustees prior to his death
if the trust instrument were valid. In effect, therefore, the proceeding to
discover assets attacked the validity of the trust instrument and sought
to recover from the trustees the shares of stock which had been conveyed
thereby.
After an appeal to the supreme court the validity of the trust instrument was upheld, 10 and the present action followed. The first question
for decision was whether or not Theresa Davis had violated the "no contest"
provision of the trust instrument, and if so, whether or not she lost all of
her interest in the trust estate. The court, in its decision, reviews many
authorities and relies to a great extent on Rudd v. Searles."' The court then
reconsiders the case of In re Chambers Estate," and construes the Chambers
case as holding that probable cause for a will contest does not relieve from

10.
11.
12.

Davis v. Rossi, 326 Mo. 911, 34 S. W. (2d) 8 (1930).
262 Mass. 490, 160 N. E. 882 (1928).
322 Mo. 1086, 18 S. W. (2d) 30 (1929).
Published by University
of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1940

121

Missouri Law Review, Vol. 5, Iss. 4 [1940], Art. 1
MISSOURI LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 5

a forfeiture provided in an incontestibility clause. The court then follows
the holding of the Chambers case as it is so construed, and holds that the
incontestibility clause is valid and binding regardless of whether or not
there was probable cause for the contest. The court did not decide whether
or not there was probable cause here as they said that it made no difference.
The holding indicates that the "no contest" provision would have applied
even if there had been no gift over in case of a contest, although it is recognized that there is considerable difference in the authorities as to whether
or not a "no contest" provision does apply where there is no gift over.
This is dictum, however, as here there was in fact a gift over. The court
.then holds that the proceeding to discover assets, instituted in the probate
court, was in effect a contest of the trust as it brought into question the
validity of the trust instrument. It was contended that as Theresa Davis
had instituted the probate proceeding as administratrix she had not violated
the "no contest" clause or, in other words, that her contest as administratrix should not be considered a contest by her in her individual capacity.
The court overruled this contention, stating that she was bound by the
result and would have received benefits in her individual capacity had
the contest been successful, and further held that her husband and children
were barred from any interest in the trust estate for the reason that they
were to take upon her death only what she would have received had she
been living. In view of the fact that after the contest she had lost her entire
interest in the estate, the husband and children lost their interests also.
The court then went on to consider some important questions concerning
trusts that have no place in this discussion.
Idle v. Moody,:" was a statutory will contest case. Testatrix executed a
will, making several specific bequests and devises, and thereafter devised
all of the remainder of her property to certain named persons. Later testatrix executed a codicil, giving a certain note secured by deed of trust and
"all the rest, residue, and remainder of my estate . . . which remains
after the payment and settlement of all specific bequests and devises made
.
and to
.
in my will dated the 19th day of January, 1935, to be held
"
The
pay the income thereof to my grand-son Carroll Pettefer
ground for the contest was that the residuary clause in the codicil was made
by mistake. None of the usual grounds of a will contest were relied upon.
Testamentary capacity was admitted, and fraud and undue influence were
specifically disclaimed. A proper execution of the codicil was also admitted.

13. 344 Mo. 594, 127 S. W. (2d) 660 (1939).
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The court stated that they assumed, without deciding, that substantial evidence tending to show that the codicil was executed under the circumstances
alleged would sustain a finding against it, nevertheless the evidence was
insufficient. The contestant called as a witness the attorney who had
executed the codicil. He testified that it was the first codicil he had ever
drawn, and by a series of "yes, sir" answers, testified that he was not instructed as to the disposal of the residuary estate; that he did not know
why he wrote the residuary provision into the codicil; that he did not know
the meaning of the words "rest, residue and remainder;" and that the
first time he knew that the codicil bequeathed any more than the note and
deed of trust was when it was suggested to him, after the testatrix's death.
There was other evidence by various persons that the codicil was executed
by a mistake. The testimony of the attorney was largely relied upon. There
was a conflict in the evidence as to whether or not the testatrix knew the
contents of the codicil before she signed it, but there was substantial evidence to the effect that she read it over before signing it. The attorney also
testified that when he told testatrix to execute the codicil he also told her
that it was written in accordance with the instructions which she had given
him. The trial court found against the contestants, which judgment was
affirmed by the supreme court. The court then cites among other authorities
the case of In re Gluckman's Will, 14 for the purpose of showing that it is
against public policy to permit a pure mistake to defeat the competent
testamentary act, and further states that it is more important that the
probate of wills be shielded from the attacks of fictitious mistakes than that
it be purged of wills containing a few real ones.
The only will contest involving the mental capacity of the testator
was the case of Whitacre v. Kelly.'5 In that case there was no dispute but
that the testatrix was of sound mind up to June 25. The will was executed
on June 27. Several witnesses expressed the opinion that the testatrix was
unconscious when they saw her on the day that the will was executed and
on a day or two prior thereto and the week following the execution of the
will. Mlost of these witnesses, however, said that upon speaking to the
testatrix she responded by moving her lips or making a noise in her throat.
The evidence further disclosed that the testatrix was suffering from cancer
at the time of the execution of the will and died the following week. The
proponents introduced evidence that the testatrix was of sound mind at the

14.
15.

87 N. J. Eq. 638, 101 AtI. 295 (1917).
134 S. W. (2d) 121 (Mo. 1939).
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time of the execution of the will. Her attending physician testified that the
medicine he gave her would not affect her mental faculties; that he talked
with her several times a day from June 25 until her death and at each time
she talked rationally and was rational at the time the will was executed.
The court took judicial notice of the fact that a person could be conscious
one minute and unconscious the next and decided that the proponents had
made a prima facie case which there was no substantial evidence to rebute.
The trial court, which had set aside the will, was reversed.
III.

HOMESTEAD AND RIGHTS OF THE SURVMNG SPOUSE

The leading case dealing with the rights of a surviving spouse is Merz
v. Tower Grove Bank & Trust Co."8
The facts were that one Julius Merz conveyed over $300,000.00 to himself and defendant trust company, as trustees, with power to manage the
fund and pay the entire income to the settlor for life, and thereafter $200.00
per month to his widow for life, and $200.00 per month to Adolph Merz for
life, with other provisions for disposition of the fund on the death of either
the widow, who is the plaintiff here, or Adolph Merz. After the death of
the above beneficiaries, the corpus of the estate was to be conveyed to other
named persons. The settlor also reserved the right to revoke the trust at
any time, and to add other assets to the trust.
At the time of the creation of the trust the settlor was very ill and
knew that he did not have long to live. There was evidence that he had
voiced a desire tgifx his estate so that his wife would not have over $200.00
per month, and that he had been told that he could not so limit his wife
by will but could do it by this trust agreement. The trust instrument was
drawn up by the trust officer of the defendant trust company. On the same
day that the trust instrument in question was executed, Julius Merz also
executed a will bequeathing the residue of his estate to Adolph Merz (one
of the defendants herein) in trust, to divide the income equally between
plaintiff (the widow) and Adolph Merz, and further provided that if
plaintiff renounced the will the trust would be void. This will revoked a
prior will that Julius Merz had executed for the purpose of defeating
plaintiff's marital rights. Plaintiff filed this suit to set aside the conveyance
in trust and recover one-half of the assets on the ground that it was in
fraud of her marital rights and was testamentary in character. Adolph
Merz filed an answer in the nature of a cross-bill admitting the facts set

16. 344 Mo. 1150, 130 S. W. (2d) 611 (1939).
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forth in the petition and made several other similar charges in addition
thereto. Defendant trust company filed a general denial and set up other
additional facts. Deceased died within a few days after execution of the
trust and will, and plaintiff filed her election renouncing the will.
The court held that they would defer to the findings of the trial court
that the deceased created the trust with the intent and purpose of defeating
plaintiff's marital rights. The court also held that the public policy of the
state as evidenced by Missouri Revised Statutes, 1929, Sections 325, 327, and
333, is that when a husband dies without a child or descendant entitled to
inherit, his widow shall be entitled to half of the real and personal estate
belonging to the husband at the time of his death, absolutely, subject to
payment of the husband's debts. Further that a conveyance by the husband
with the intent to defeat his wife's marital rights was a fraud upon said
widow and she could sue and set aside such fraudulent conveyance and
recover the property so fraudulently transferred, to the extent of her interest therein. Defendant trust company argued that as the trust was made
up of personalty, the wife had no rights in and to the personal property
except that vested in the husband at the time of his death; that he could
dispose of his property by gift or otherwise free from any claims by his
wife; that to hold otherwise would paralyze commerce and trade for the
reason that a husband in poor health would be afraid to undertake to arrange his affairs or dispose of his goods for fear that the wife would follow
every transaction and void it. The court held, however, that this had been
the rule for many years and that there had been no noticeable paralysis of
commerce resulting therefrom. The contention was also made that as Adolph
Merz was executor of the estate and an heir, he had no capacity to maintain
a cross-bill as the results might be beneficial to the heirs and legal representative of a fraudulent grantor. The court reviewed the facts and stated that
the trust officer knew or should have known that the trust was certain
to fail. The court said in this regard that it would be a greater wrong
to permit the transferee to hold the property than to permit recovery by the
heirs of the deceased, and that therefore they may recover, notwithstanding
the fraudulent purpose of the deceased in executing the trust. The entire
trust was held void as being an attempt to defeat the marital rights of the
widow, and as testamentary in character.
A very interesting case is Lee's Summit Building & Loan Assn. v.
Cross.17 There the plaintiff claimed title to land through one F. C. Cross,

134 S. W.
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the widower of Anna Cross, who owned the land. Anna Cross died testate
in California leaving a will which was filed there. F. C. Cross did not
renounce this will, but filed an election in Missouri to take a child's share
of the land in question. The court held that a timely renunciation of the
will would have nullified the devises of real estate to others and endowed
the surviving spouse with common law dower, and after such renunciation
a timely election would have vested the spouse with a child's share. However, as there had been no renunciation here, the court held that there was
no right of election, and that the other devises remained. The court said
further that it seemed that the purported election was to take all that the
will gave and in addition a child's share, which could not be done under
Missouri law.
The case of Stanton v. Leonard,18 was a suit to quiet title. One Reynolds, who was the common source of title, died intestate. It was conceded
that the widow had a homestead in the real estate, and that there were three
children. The widow elected to take a child's share as provided in Missouri
Revised Statutes, 1929, Section 328. It was contended that the widow took
the property as homestead property under Missouri Revised Statutes, 1929,
Section 612, and that each of the three children took a one-third interest
in fee subject to the widow's homestead, and that the election by the widow
could not affect the interest of the children, because the widow was not
entitled to "election dower" when the only property was her homestead
property. The court held, however, that the widow could take a child's
share in this property absolutely subject to her homestead in the entire
property.
In Kay v. Politte,19 the court overrules the case of Kelley v. Parman,0
and holds that an adult son holding an interest in land subject to the homestead rights of his mother and minor brothers and sisters can convey his
interest, and his interest can be sold under execution.
The case of In re Bervay's Estate,2 is a leading case, but deals largely
with questions of taxation. The court, however, reaffirms the well-known
principles that where a will provides for a widow in lieu of dower, and she
takes under the will, she waives her statutory rights as widow. The court
also states the statutory rule that where a widow takes a child's share of

18.

344 Mo. 998, 130 S. W. (2d) 487 (1939).

20.

282 S. W. 755 (Mo. App. 1926).

19. 344 Mo. 805, 129 S. W. (2d) 863 (1939).
21. 344 Mo. 135, 126 S. W. (2d) 209 (1939).
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personalty, she takes it subject to debts, overruling language to the con22
trary in In re Rogers' Estate.
IV.

MISCELLANEOUS

Ver Standig v. St. Louis Union Trust Co.,23 was a suit for specific per-

formance of an oral contract to devise real estate. The consideration for the
contract was services rendered by the plaintiff's husband. Cora Leon, the
deceased, married one Weil, and upon her death, Weil, as surviving spouse,
elected to take one-half of the property subject to debts. The trial court
found for the defendant. The supreme court reversed the decision as
against the weight of the evidence, but held that the one-half which the
husband took subject to debts was not subject to the contract as the contract
was not a debt. The holding that this one-half taken by the husband was
not subject to the contract is weakened some by the court in stating that
there was no evidence that Weil (the husband) had knowledge of the contract, and that when Weil married Cora Leon, the plaintiff was charged
with knowledge that he would have an interest, and for the further reason
that when Weil exercised his right, the plaintiff filed a claim in quantum
meruit to recover for the services rendered. The court seems to reach its
decision by balancing the equities.
The case of In re Howard's Estate v. Howe,2 4 involves the allowance of
contingent claims against an estate. The claimant had filed a suit in the
federal court asking for an accounting against a corporation because of the
use of a patent that claimant contended was his. The claimant was successful
in that suit in the federal court, and the court had ordered an accounting
and held that the corporation was trustee of the profits for the plaintiff. The
corporation had been dissolved and the committee in charge of the assets
distributed them with the agreement that the distributees, if necessary to
pay claims, would "kick back" their pro rata share. The defendant estate
was one of these distributees, and this claim for $4,000,000.00 was presented against it. The court held that as the accounting pursuant to the
decree of the federal court was incomplete, the claim was contingent, and
an uncertain or contingent claim is not enforceable against an estate in
a probate court. The fact that an arbitrary amount based on a partial accounting is set up does not prevent the claim from being contingent. The

22. 250 S. W. 576 (Mo. 1923).
23. 344 Mo. 880, 129 S. W. (2d) 905 (1999).
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court went on to say that if this were considered a suit to trace equitable
funds into the estate, the demand was properly dismissed for the reason
that a probate court has no jurisdiction to entertain a suit lying wholly
in equity.

WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION
JAMEs

A.

POTTER*

During the year the court considered sixteen cases in which some question of interpretation of the Compensation Act was involved.' Only a portion of the cases decided deserve extended comment.
I.

WHo Is AN EMPLOYM ?

Three cases decided during the year turned on the court's view of Section 3305(a). 2 The first, Sayles v. Kansas City Structural Steel Co.,3 considered this set of facts: Widow filed claim for compensation, alleging
her deceased husband's wage was $78.00 per week. From 1922 to 1934
Sayles had worked most of the time, being paid for actual time worked.
In June, 1934, he -was put on the payroll at $78.00 per week, whether he
worked or not, and continued on this basis until his death in 1937. The
Commission denied compensation on the ground Sayles was excluded by
Section 3305. 4
In affirming the award of the Commission the court overrules Klasing

*Attorney, Jefferson City. A.B., University of Missouri, 1902, LL.B., 1905.
1.

This is a considerable increase over the number before the court in

1938 (four). During 1939 five cases came before the court for review on certiorari, ten on direct appeal where more than $7500 was involved, and one on the

constitutionality of a statute.
2. Workmen's Compensation Act, Mo. REv. STAT. (1929) c. 28. "Sec.
3305. Certain terms defined. (a) The word "employe" as used in this chapter
shall be construed to mean every person in the service of any employer, as
defined in this chapter, under any contract of hire, express or implied, oral or
written, or under any appointment or election, but shall not include persons
whose average annual earnings exceed three thousand six hundred dollars. Any
reference to any employee who has been injured, shall, when the employe is
dead, also include his dependents, and other persons to whom compensation may
be payable. The word "employe" shall also include all minors who work for
an employer, whether or not such minors are employed in violation of law, and
all such minors are hereby made of full age for all purposes under, in connection with, or arising out of this chapter."
3. 344 Mo. 756, 128 S. W. (2d) 1046 (1939).
4. One Commissioner dissented on the authority of Klasing v. Schmitt
Contracting Co., 335 Mo. 721, 73 S. W. (2d). 1011 (1934).
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol5/iss4/1

128

et al.: Work of the Missouri Supreme Court
1940]

WORK OF MISSOURI SUPREME COURT-1939

v. Schmitt ContractingCo.5 The Klasing case had declared that the exclusion
provision of Section 3305 (a) was meant to apply only to employment under
a contract for a definite term of one year or more at a salary in excess of
$3600.00.
In the Sayles case the court takes the position that such was not the
intention of the legislature. The words "under any contract of hire, express
or implied" would not have been placed in the section if the legislature
6
had intended to require a definite term of years.
State ex rel. Mills v. Allen,7 was brought before the court on certiorari
as conflicting with the Klasing case. In the Mills case, claimant was an officer of the company at a salary in excess of $3600.00 per year under written
contract. By-Laws provided officers could be removed at any time by action
of the Board of Directors. Claimant's contention was that employment was
terminable at any time; hence, not under contract for a year or more.
The court follows the Sayles case, which was handed down at the same
term, and affirms the award, holding claimant not an employee within the
Act.8
The third case involving this question is Morse v. Potosi Tie & Lumber
CoY Appellant's theory in this case was (on authority of the Klasing case)
that no one who works on a month-to-month basis is excluded from the Act,
regardless of salary.
Following the Sayles case, the court announces the rule as follows:
"All that is necessary to decide here is that, if a person has
been employed by the same company for a period of several years
5. 335 Mo. 721, 73 S. W. (2d) 1011 (1934).
6. This view seems more in line with the other provisions of the section,
for instance, the phrase "where average annual earnings." Furthermore, it is
unsound to make a distinction between two employees who earn identical salaries,
each in excess of $3600.00 per year, merely because one has a definite contract
for more than a year, while the other has not. Surely the legislature had no such
intention.

7. 344 Mo. 743, 128 S. W. (2d) 1040 (1939).
8. The opinion of the Springfield Court of Appeals (231 Mo. App. 334,
102 S. W. (2d) 769 (1937)) distinguished this case from the Klasing case on

the ground that in this case Mills was employed under a written contract

for a year or more at a fixed salary, and was continuously in the company's
employ, while in the Klasing case there was no fixed salary and no fixed earn-

ings prior to the actual doing of the work.
case.

An interesting situation with reference to the procedure arose in this
When the court of appeals handed down its opinion it was in conflict

with the Klasing case. When the supreme court decided this case on certiorari,
it pointed out that for that reason the opinion of the court of appeals should be
quashed. But it pointed out further that if the opinion were quashed the court
of appeals would have to re-write its opinion and follow the supreme court's
opinion in this case and the Sayles case, and reach the same result as it had
reached originally. Since the law does not contemplate a useless act, the court
sustained the opinion of the court of appeals.
9. 130 S.W. (2d) 477 (Mo. 1939).
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and has earned (and been paid) more than $3600 in each and every
year, he is not under the act regardless of the basis of his salary
contract (whether weekly, monthly, or annually, or subject to
termination at any time) because his 'average annual earnings exceed three thousand six hundred dollars.' ,,1o
II.

JURISDICTION

The question of the jurisdiction of the supreme court to review was
raised in Sayles v. Kansas City Structural Steel Co."' The claim for compensation was for a death benefit, and if any award had been made, it would
have exceeded $7500.00.
The court, in assuming jurisdiction, re-affirms its decision in Shroyer
v. Missouri Livestock Commission Co. 1 2 That case makes a distinction between an award of a death benefit and an award to a disabled employee.
In Morse v. Potosi Tie & Lumber Co., 3 appellant claimed an estoppel
against both employer and insurer because Morse had been classified as an
employee in employer's insurance policy. In holding claimant not an
employee, the court said that the jurisdiction of the Commission is determined from the acts of the legislature, and not by the conduct of the
parties.
An interesting situation is presented in Gieseking v. Litchfield & Madison Ry. 4 In that case employee had received an injury in Illinois while
engaged in interstate commerce. Employer reported the accident to the
Illinois Industrial Commission, made payments of compensation to employee
for temporary total disability, and took a final receipt, "in full settlement
of compensation under the provisions of the Illinois Compensation Act
Y"Employee then brought suit under the Federal Act, and the railroad set up the final receipt as an accord and satisfaction.
The Illinois Act, as the Missouri Act, excludes employees engaged in
interstate commerce. Our supreme court, following the established rule,
holds that awards of compensation commissions to employees injured while

10. Ibid. at 478. Note the language of the court so long as employee earns

$3600 or more "in each and every 1ear."

Does the language "average annual

earnings" contemplate that the employee earn $3600.00 or more each year? If
he earned $3000 one year and $4500 the next, his average earnings would be

$3600.00 or more.
11. 344 Mo. 756, 128 S. W. (2d) 1046 (1939).
12. 332 Mo. 1219, 61 S. W. (2d) 713 (1933). The Shroyer case was followed in Platies v. Theodorow Bakery Co., 334 Mo. 508, 66 S. W. (2d) 147

(1933); Edwards v. Al Fresco Adv. Co., 340 Mo. 342, 100 S. W. (2d) 513, 514
(1937).

13. 130 S. W. (2d) 477 (Mo. 1939). In this case it was held that claimant
was not an employee within the provisions of the Act.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol5/iss4/1
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engaged in interstate commerce are void, and that the final receipt does not
bar an action under the Federal Act.'5
Of course, in the Gieseking case there was no award of the Commission.
The record does not disclose that it ever passed on or approved the final
receipt. Hence there was no action of the Commission to declare void. All
that was necessary to the decision was the holding that the final receipt was
no bar to an action under the Federal Act. However, in State ex rel. Wors
v. Hostetter,"" a somewhat analogous situation was presented, and the court
went off in the other direction. In the Wors case, employee was working
for one of a number of sub-contractors on a job in St. Louis owned by
Midwest Company. He was an employee of the Illinois Terminal Railroad,
which was engaged by Midwest to load dirt excavated in St. Louis into its
cars and move the same into Illinois. While loading dirt, Wors was injured
by reason of the negligence of an employee of Tarleton, the excavating contractor on the job. Wors filed claim for compensation, and at the same time
sued Tarleton and Midwest for damages. He settled the compensation claim
under Section 3333, Missouri Revised Statutes, 1929, and the Commission
approved the settlement. Thereafter the defendants attempted to raise the
plea of res adjudicata. In reply Wors contended the Compensation Commission had no jurisdiction to make the award in view of Section 33101'
since his injuries were received while he was engaged in interstate commerce.
The court of appeals found against Wors as to Midwest Company. He
brought the case before the supreme court on certiorari,as conflicting with
its decision in Gieseking v. Litchfield & Madison Ry.'
In passing on the point, the court begins by referring to the rule,
well established as to courts of record, that a lower court will be deemed to
have decided a jurisdictional or other question consistently with the judgment rendered, even though there was no express finding thereon, if a
decision of such question was necessarily involved in arriving at the conclusion announced. It then ends by saying that inasmuch as this rule has
never been applied to the holdings of a quasi judicial administrative body,

15. The court further held that employee was not entitled to keep the
payments received by him as compensation.

16.
17.
general

343 Mo. 945, 124 S. W. (2d) 1072 (1939).
"Sec. 3310. Applicability of
Mo. REV. STAT. (1929).
unless

abrogated by federal statute--injuries received

without the state-(a).

chapterwithin

and

This chapter shall apply to all cases within its pro-

visions except those exclusively covered by any federal law."

375, Repository,
376 (1936).
18. 339ofMo.
1, 5,School
94 S.ofW.
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the opinion of the court of appeals cannot be in conflict with any of the
prior decisions of the supreme court.' 9
On rehearing, Wors contended the award of the Commission was not a
jurisdictional determination, as it was based on a compromise under Section
3333.2 0 The court answers this by saying that a settlement, when approved,
is more conclusive than an award on disputed evidence, because it is not
subject to review, while an ordinary award is subject to review on proof
of change in condition."'
III. PLEADINGS
State ex rel. St. Louis Car Co. v. Hostetter,2 was a suit at common law.
Plaintiff was an employee of Electro-Motive Co., which was operating in the
plant of the St. Louis Car Company, installing electric motors in cars
produced in the plant. He was injured by an employee of the Car Company.
Defense was a general denial. Judgment was rendered for plaintiff, and the
case came before the supreme court on certiorari. Defendant's position was
that the plaintiff's evidence showed the case came within the terms of the
Compensation Act, so that the circuit court had no jurisdiction.
The supreme court approved the opinion of the court of appeals which
held that in an action on common law negligence, the compensation law
is a matter of defense to be set up in the answer. Absent such a plea the
defendant will not be permitted to affirmatively show such exception.2 3 The

19. It might be said that the court could have held that the case of State
ex rel. Brewen-Clark Syrup Co. v. Missouri Workmen's Compensation Commission, 320 Mo. 893, 898, 900, 8 S. W. (2d) 897, 899, 900 (1928), could be

construed to impliedly, if not actually, extend the rule to awards of the Commission. For that case did hold that an award of the Commission while acting
within the scope of its authority "determines the rights of the parties as effectively as judgment secured by regular legal procedure, and is as binding as
a judgment, until it is regularly set aside or its validity questioned in a proper
manner." But even if an award is as binding as a judgment, still that would
not settle the question, as a void judgment is always open to attack.
20. Wors relied on State ex rel. Saunders v. Missouri Workmen's Compensation Commission, 333 Mo. 691, 697, 63 S.W. (2d) 67 (1933).
21. Surely these two decisions are not in harmony. If the jurisdiction
of the commission does not extend to injuries received in interstate commerce
and its acts in such situation are void, they are subject to collateral attack.
The Gieseking case so holds, although there had been no determination by the
Commission, either express or implied, that it had jurisdiction. State ex rel.
Wors v. Hostetter, 343 Mo. 945, 954, 124 S.W. (2d) 1072, 1075 (1939), distinguishes the Gieseking case oi that point.
22. 131 S.W. (2d) 558 (Mo. 1939).
23. This cites as authority for the ruling Span v. Jackson-Walker Coal &
Mining Co., 322 Mo. 158, 16 S.W. (2d) 190 (1929). How can this be reconciled
with the following ruling in Gieseking v. Litchfield & Madison Ry., 339 Mo. 1, 7,
94 S.W. (2d) 375, 377: "But where the employee is not entitled to bring a
common-law action, because such a common-law action has been superseded by
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol5/iss4/1
Workmen's Compensation Law of his state, then such employee must prove him-
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opinion of the court of appeals goes on to say that the rule is that if the facts
do not appear on the face of the petition and the defense is not set up in
the answer, still if plaintiff's own evidence shows as a matter of law that
defendant's liability is under the compensation law and the defendant's
obligations to plaintiff under the law have been discharged, then the trial
24
court should give a peremptory instruction.
IV.

MISCELLANEOus

A number of cases were decided on rules of evidence, and did not involve any new interpretation of any provision of the Compensation Act.
Wills v. Berberieh's Delivery Co.,25 had been before the court previously, and had been reversed because of the exclusion of certain evidence. The
decision in the instant case discussed the rule against piling of inference on
inference, and the rule applicable where one of two causes may have been
responsible for an injury, for one of which the employer is responsible,
but not for the other. This same rule was applied in Meintz v. Arthur

Morgan Trucking C0.26
Reiling v. Russell,27 involved a suit at common law by an employee
against a third party who was responsible for his injury. He had been paid
compensation by insurer up to January 1. In February the case at common
law was tried. The defendant took the position at the trial that although
plaintiff was contending his injuries were permanent and progressive, his
compensation payments had ceased prior to the trial, and evidence of this
fact should be admissible as an admission that his disability ceased on the
date payments were stopped. In reply to this contention the court held that
the cessation of payments was an act of the insurer and not of the plaintiff,
and hence could not be an admission of plaintiff.
It was further held in the Reiling case that the defendant in such circumstances had no right to ask that the amount of compensation paid to

self to have been injured while engaged in interstate work, in order to be within
the scope of the Federal Employers' Liability Act, or he has no right, other than
the right his State Compensation Act gives him.

.

.

."

It would be just as

easy for a defendant in an action under the Federal Employers' Liability Act
to raise the issue by answer as it is for a defendant in a common law action for
negligence.

The rule should be uniform. In all cases the plaintiff should have

fendant
25.
26.
27.

discharged his liability under the compensation law?
Mo. 856, 134 S. W. (2d) 125 (1936).
S. W. (2d) 1010 (Mo. 1939).
S. W. (2d) 33 (Mo. 1939).

the burden of taking himself outside the provisions of the compensation law,
or in all cases the burden should be on the defendant to set up the compensation law as a defense.
24. What should the court do if all of these facts appear except that dehad
339
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the plaintiff be deducted from any recovery he might have in the action at
law; that the employer and insurer have the right to be reimbursed out
28
of such judgment to the extent of the compensation paid.
Liberty Mutual Insurance Co. v. Jones,2 1 establishes the right of lay
insurance adjusters to appear before the Commission at informal conferences-but denies them the right to take part in formal proceedings.30
In McCoy v. Simpson,31 the court remanded the case to the circuit court
because that court had merely approved the award of the commission, and
had failed to render any final judgment.

28. Mo. Rnv. STAT. (1929) § 3309 does not so provide. It provides that the
employer shall be subrogated to the rights of the employee as against a third
party, and any recovery had by employer against such third party in excess
of the compensation paid shall be paid to employee. It does not so provide in
case the employee sues the third person. Undoubtedly that was the intention
of the legislature. But if practical experience is any criterion, it would not be
easy for the employer to recover compensation paid out from the employee's
recovery against a third party. The matter could be simplified by malting the
employer or insurer interested in the common law action to the extent of compensation paid.
29. 344 Mo. 932, 130 S.W. (2d) 945 (1939).
30. Mo. Rav. STAT. (1929) § 3349 provides that "All proceedings before
the commission or any commissioner shall be simple, informal and summary.

. ." The court quotes that section, but draws the line at preliminary con-

ferences when the parties are trying to adjust their differences voluntarily. If
they fail at that stage, an adversary proceeding is instituted. Although it does
not so hold, that seems to be the point at which the layman must stop. " . .
it is not an act of advocacy within the statute (11692) for appellant's lay employees to appear at informal conferences.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol5/iss4/1
31. 344 Mo. 215, 125 S.W. (2d) 833 (1939).
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